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1 
Introduction 
 
One of the most important ongoing tasks of international relations scholarship is to explore 
the manner in which hegemonic states exercise power over other nations. (Ikenberry and 
Kupchan 1990) 
 
 
A dialogue between established International Relations theory and global 
governance literature may promote a novel synthetic framework for understanding 
the „Global War on Terrorism‟ (GWOT). The author wishes to explore and develop a 
new security studies perspective which will restate and reinterpret George W. Bush‟s 
GWOT. 
 
The argument promoted here centres around the claim that in its GWOT the USA 
has engaged in the creation of an under-researched form of global governance, 
hegemonic governance, by which the hegemon persuades and coerces states across 
the globe to cooperate in the battle against sub-state terrorism. This requires a new 
understanding of global governance, as usually the main strand of global governance 
literature theorises and describes global governance as heterarchic, with equal 
partners interacting to order their common affairs (Miura 2004; McGrew 2000).
1
 The 
main purpose of this study is to challenge this particular assertion. 
 
Therefore this work is concerned with reworking notions of power in global 
governance and challenging and adding to the current use of the latter term. It argues 
that power plays a prominent role in structuring the processes of compliance and 
cooperation (hence participation) in what is here called hegemonic global 
governance.  
 
The issue of power is addressed in Power in Global Governance (Barnett and Duvall 
2005). This edited volume, however, largely neglects the factors which are going to 
be looked at here: the ordering power of the USA as a hegemon within the 
framework and as a source of global governance.
2
 Another prominent publication 
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which refers to „hegemonic governance‟ is Gilpin‟s War and Change in World 
Politics (1981). However, whereas Gilpin views hegemony from the structural realist 
perspective in thinking about systemic change (i.e. change in the distribution of 
power) in world affairs, this study wants to explain participation (hence stability) in 
them. For this purpose, critical and realist international relations (IR) theory are 
used. The need for both critical and realist perspectives on global governance, in 
order to understand the phenomenon better, is explicitly stated in Ba and Hoffmann‟s 
Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (2005). 
 
Hegemonic governance, in the case of counterterrorism, has two effects on 
international relations. Firstly, it is dangerous. The USA, in a highly unilateral 
manner (Fehl and Thimm 2008) is able to use
3
 – and has used – its position of power 
to launch a war against whatever and whomever it has determined a terrorist, a 
sponsor of terrorism or a haven for it (compare for example the justifications for the 
intervention in Iraq, McCartney 2004). This was possible as largely checks and 
balances with respect to this policy have been either absent or just ignored by the 
USA. This is to an extent different from traditional global governance and certainly 
different from normative accounts on global governance (for a critical discussion 
Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005). For example, in the United Nations and the 
world community the USA displayed a combination of dominance and neglect, to be 
interpreted as signs of exceptionalism and unilateralism (Huldt 2005). Furthermore 
and partly related to this, the process of creating hegemonic governance in the 
GWOT has had for example unfortunate implications for human rights (Ignatieff 
2002; Luban 2002; Fitzpatrick 2003; Gareau 2004; Rose 2004; Sontag 2004; Welch 
2004) and civil liberties (Dworkin 2003; Gearty 2003; Leone 2003). 
 
Secondly, this hegemonic governance has been progressive in creating a form of 
integration in the security sphere – particularly with respect to counterterrorism – 
which was absent before. Nearly all states started to collaborate in a policy field 
where formerly they had cooperated only to a very limited extent. The GWOT is 
certainly a case of global governance, and it therefore implies a remarkable 
evolutionary change. 
  
To summarise, global governance can be said to have expanded to and been 
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transformed in the sphere of counterterrorism. As „hegemonic governance‟ it is 
potentially even more marked by US dominance than global governance in the 
sphere of low politics, being based on the unipolar power – particularly in the 
military realm – of the USA. But also, counterterrorism governance leads states 
across the globe to cooperate in policy fields where integration was thought difficult 
before, such as in financial control, the control and policing of crime, and military 
intervention. There has been a quite remarkable degree of such cooperation in the 
security field since 9/11. 
 
This introduction will interrogate the literature which provides the background for 
the overall argument. Firstly, this chapter gives an overview of the traditional 
literature on global governance; it then describes hegemony and how it relates to 
critical and realist theory and to „hegemonic governance‟; thirdly, it will present the 
concept and structure of this book. 
 
Global governance and IR theory4  
 
The concept of global governance deals with considerations of how processes to 
order international relations can be established and which form these should take. 
Needless to say, different theories of international relations have different views and 
perspectives on these questions.  
 
Two very influential approaches in the study of global governance are 
institutionalism and functionalism. They view order, which provides security, as an 
outcome of institutions created to cope with interdependence, able to take over the 
role of a sanctioning and monitoring agency and of a forum for communication and 
cooperation (Rittberger and Zangl 2003). For example, they stabilise expectations, 
ensure compliance and support the formation of identities. Institutions can thereby 
enable order and regulate the cohabitation of states. In functionalism, the concept of 
„security communities‟ became prominent. The concept was developed, for example, 
by Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998).
5
 It describes how states develop 
rules by interacting with each other. During a long process of socialisation and 
mutual learning, rules become established and common identities are formed, as a 
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basis for peaceful relations among states. These rules provide for stable expectations 
and thus increase security.  
 
Constructivism argues, along similar lines, that global governance is the result of a 
self-perpetuating interactive process of norm- and identity-creation in the global 
sphere. One main protagonist of constructivism even goes a step further to argue for 
the necessity of global governance in the form of a world state (Wendt 2003). 
 
What people and groups really want is not so much security. What they really want is 
recognition, from other groups and other individuals . . . They will want that recognition 
institutionalised in law. And of course … everybody wants recognition from everybody else, 
but that does not mean that you want to give recognition to them. And so, the real challenge 
is to get all the actors to recognise, or to realise, that they have to recognise the other players, 
as such, imminently having rights, and so on. And I argue . . .  that what derives from that 
kind of realisation is that this right is something which causes conflict. . . .  if you have 
recognition struggles that produce war over time, technology makes war more costly. And in 
the end it just becomes crazy to pursue. (Wendt, interview with the author, 2007) 
 
Liberal approaches assume that conflict is not a necessary attribute of international 
relations. Particular motivating factors for peace are democracy, trade and 
interdependence. If democratic states are coupled to each other in webs of mutual 
dependence and exchange, their cost-benefit calculations would be violated by 
conflict, which is therefore not to be expected.
6
 In addition, bottom-up processes in 
democratic societies are thought to be opposed to wars and to promote peace. 
According to these assumptions, liberals argue that also global governance is a 
rational outcome of interdependence, trade and democracy. 
 
Finally, realism does not consider global governance as such since anarchy is 
thought to dominate the international system of states. States face each other in 
unregulated relations, and thus generally have to fear, and defend themselves, against 
each other. There is no superior power or authority and therefore security, necessary 
for cooperation, cannot be provided for. Anarchy is in the state of nature of the 
international system and it cannot be overcome simply by the states‟ interactions. 
There remains, however, one possibility of anarchy being transformed: when one 
state becomes powerful enough to be able to control most of the other states and to 
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visit sanctions on aberrant behavior (Jervis 1978: 167). In this case we speak of 
hegemony. Hegemonic stability is the result of there being one very powerful state in 
the system. The hegemon will provide public goods and establish norms, other states 
will follow suit and can be rewarded or sanctioned (Kindleberger 1981). Gilpin, 
discussing hegemony, explicitly uses the term „governance of the international 
system‟ (1981: 29). 
 
Concepts of global governance7 
  
All concepts of global governance rest principally on the idea of regulation beyond 
the nation state. Among them, different levels are brought into focus and different 
actors are described as regulators. In order to separate the concepts with respect to 
their systemic description, Brühl and Rittberger differentiate between three different 
versions of global governance: „authoritative coordination by a world state‟; „order 
as a result of horizontal self-coordination: governance without world government‟, 
and „hierarchical though not authoritative coordination: governance under the 
hegemonic umbrella‟ (2001: ch. 1). 
 
Authoritative coordination by a world state  
This connects the notion of global governance with that of a supranational authority. 
Its protagonists argue that coordination and cooperation cannot be expected under 
the condition of anarchy (for example Wendt 2003; Beyer 2009). As long as states 
cohabit in anarchy, they have to fear for their security. There is no mutual 
expectation of peaceful change and cooperation will only be the exception. Such 
systemic insecurity can only be ended by creating hierarchy in international relations 
which does transform the system. Hierarchy establishes the possibility of negative 
sanctions being imposed by a superior authority, a leviathan. This leviathan would 
therefore have a protective function for all states, and could control their behaviour. 
Thus, it would create stable expectations and enable (if not enforce) cooperation. The 
model has been criticised: it would be difficult for a global leviathan (assuming the 
problem of its establishment could be solved) to meet democratic standards. For one 
thing, there is as yet no global demos (i.e. a people viewed as a political unit) that 
could serve as a legitimation basis for global rule (Hirst 2000: 16). It is also thought 
that this demos could not develop even in the medium term. Secondly, there is the 
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danger of possible abuse: how could such power be held in check? Thirdly, some 
argue that in an integrated world state, there would be the risk of a general civil war 
(Shannon 2005), as conflicts would just be shifted to the „intra-state‟ dimension.  
 
A well known model of how world government can be imagined as remedying many 
of these most important concerns was provided by Höffe (1999). He conceptualises 
the world state not as a centrally organised entity, not marked by top-down 
processes, but characterised by regional formation and subsidiarity. Other authors 
openly decry the possibility of world government created by analogy with national 
governments: „World government during our lifetimes seems highly unlikely, at least 
in the absence of an overwhelming global threat that could only be dealt with in a 
unified way‟ (Nye and Donahue 2000a: 13). Such views seek justification in the lack 
of support among populations for such an idea. Global governance was much more 
to be understood as a „networked minimalism‟ (Nye and Donahue 2000a: 13), not as 
a set of hierarchies. „Minimalism‟ here also refers to the fact that global governance 
could never proceed beyond what is nationally accepted.  
 
Order as a result of horizontal self-coordination: governance without government  
„Order as a result of horizontal self-coordination‟ refers to the possibility of 
coordination out of the „logic of appropriateness‟ alone. There is no need for control 
exercised by or sanctioning mechanisms used by a superior power. States will be 
rational enough to adopt cooperation:  
 
In this model, the coordination of international activities is affected by states agreeing, for 
their mutual benefit, upon norms and rules to guide their future behaviour and to create 
mechanisms which make compliance with these rules and norms possible (i.e. in each actor‟s 
self-interest). (Brühl and Rittberger 2001: 27)  
 
As this is the most common model in the literature on global governance, it will be 
dealt with here at some length before turning to the hierarchical coordination model, 
which best explains current global governance in the sphere of counterterrorism. 
  
The term „(global) governance without government‟ has many protagonists, e.g. 
Rosenau and Czempiel, who published an edited volume in 1992, Governance 
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without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. With this, Rosenau and 
Czempiel became to many the most popular authors on a „diagnostic concept of 
global governance‟. Overall, their concept remains empirical, is not normative or 
prescriptive, and provides a description of real processes of change in the 
international system (Brand et al. 2000: 29). In their analysis, Rosenau and Czempiel 
differentiate between government and governance. The former is based on formal 
power, legally defined and having the monopoly of force. The latter describes a 
system of rules that, given the absence of a central power, is carried out by a 
diversity of actors at different levels. The concept of global governance then refers to 
more than the formal institutions and organisations that have been established to 
regulate international relations. It encompasses informal and formal structures and 
systems of order at all levels of human action. A criterion for subsuming these 
structures and systems of order under global governance is that they exert control, 
and that this has a transnational effect (Brand et al. 2000: 30). Actors can be states, 
regimes, international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
transnational enterprises, social movements, cities, micro-regions or transnational 
criminal organisations. Governance structures emerge in an evolutionary process of 
self-organisation, not politically controlled, from the bottom up (Brand et al. 2000: 
30).  
 
Another important point of reference when discussing governance without 
government is the Commission on Global Governance (CGG), which was founded at 
Willy Brandt‟s initiative in 1990 and worked under the umbrella of the United 
Nations (UN). It produced the report Our Global Neighbourhood, first published in 
1995, in which it described the processes of transformation in global politics over the 
preceding decades. It identifies the end of Cold War, and of bipolar confrontation, as 
one of the major changes, along with decolonialisation, the revolution in the 
communication sector, immense growth in worldwide productivity, and tendencies 
towards integration into a common world market. The report considers existing 
institutions as inadequate for the effective solution of problems such as poverty, 
instability, environmental degradation and violence. Global governance is 
understood as the solution to these problems. It is the sum of the regulatory 
processes pursued by public and private institutions and by individuals with respect 
to their common problems. It encompasses formal institutions as well as systems of 
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rule-like informal regulations. Global governance, furthermore, can be described as a 
continuous process marked by a balance of interests and by cooperation. The CGG 
maintains that no state can progress without recognising insecurity and poverty in 
other states. It therefore argues normatively, and demands a cognitive change 
towards a „global neighbourhood‟. This means, each state should regard itself as 
close to others‟ concerns, treating them as its own. 
  
Also, the overall aim of the CGG is not world government or a world federation, 
since there would be the mentioned danger of democratic deficits in such a 
constellation. Its aim is much more to achieve the broadest possible cooperation in 
order to solve global problems, cooperation which should involve sub- and supra-
state actors and states. Civil society should be strengthened, more possibilities for 
participation are called for, and a culture where human rights are placed before the 
states‟ rights is envisioned. The role of civil society should be that of a watchdog 
between market and state, it would be integrated into the UN system by a „forum of 
civil societies‟ (Messner and Nuscheler 2003: 12ff). Even given these revolutionary 
ideas, states would remain the principal actors in the CGG‟s concept. Messner and 
Nuscheler therefore describe it as a form of institutionalised multilateralism 
(Messner and Nuscheler 2003: 13). Evidence for this is the following: in order to 
secure cooperation, the CGG points to the paramount necessity of leadership, the 
quality of which ultimately depends on political state leaders (Commission on 
Global Governance 1999: ch. 7). Some concrete measures are proposed regarding 
the reform of the UN system. The Security Council should be reorganised, the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should be replaced by an Economic 
Security Council, and the General Assembly (GA) should be revived, accompanied 
by the named forum of civil societies. Finally, though the CGG‟s main focus is on 
the global level, regions are understood to be elements of global governance, and are 
even thought to be more appropriate levels for dealing with certain problems than the 
global level (Mürle 1998: 10). 
  
In Germany, the research institutes Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF) and 
Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF) have pondered the question of global 
governance. The INEF adopted the report of the CGG and developed a number of 
more concrete proposals for political action; this was the basis for the global 
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governance concept of Messner and Nuscheler, which recognisably builds on the 
work of the CGG. They use the term Weltordnungspolitik (world order politics) to 
distinguish it from world government and world public policy, as they do not 
understand global governance to be a precursor of a world state. Weltordnungspolitik 
is also not to be conflated with US President George W. Bush‟s concept of a new 
world order, as the aim is not the assimilation of economic and political systems. A 
hierarchical order in global society is opposed (and here we find the normative 
aspect). But still, global governance is more than the simple sum of nation states‟ 
activities. It is beyond these two poles, being the common effect of actors and their 
activities from the local to the global level (Brand et al. 2000: 34ff). Hierarchies do 
continue in global governance, since nation states remain the strongest and most 
powerful actors in this scheme. However, they are under pressure. Sovereignty has to 
be redefined as no longer indivisible. It has now to be shared with regional, local and 
global organisations. Furthermore, global governance aims at the establishment of 
„regimes‟ in order to legalise the international relations of cooperation. Finally, 
global governance implies the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation and of a 
foreign policy oriented towards the common good. The architecture of global 
governance, therefore, is comprised of nation states, international regimes, regional 
integration projects, UN organisations, civil society and local politics. The nation 
state remains the most important entity, but under different preconditions. It is now 
its duty to manage interdependence and to coordinate policies. It has to cede its 
traditional tasks in order to gain control over globalisation. It loses autonomy in 
many policy areas due to its involvement in interdependence structures (Messner and 
Nuscheler 2003: 15ff). In this architecture of global governance regions are gaining 
some importance: „The redistribution of global economic and political power, 
described as „multipolarisation“, is accompanied by a process of regionalisation‟ 
(2003: 15ff, translation by the author).  
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Table 1. Selected concepts of global governance 
 
 Rosenau and Czempiel CGG Messner and Nuscheler 
Actors Pluralistic, from the 
family, to NGOs, to 
 states and IOs 
Mainly states with a 
special role for leading 
actors, but non-state actors 
also involved  
States as the main actors, 
IOs, regions and NGOs 
Governance „System of rule‟ or „order 
plus intentionality‟, with 
no central power  
Cooperation in 
institutionalised 
multilateralism 
Global neo-corporatist 
policy networks in a 
multi-level polity 
Ideal form of 
governance 
Not government, but 
governance, not 
normative 
Governance with a 
tendency to multilateral 
government in reformed 
institutions 
Global governance as 
the transformation of 
sovereignty 
Role of regions Regions as one level of 
action among many  
Regions as one 
subordinate level, but 
according to the principle 
of subsidiarity also an 
important element 
Regions as an element in 
the multi-level 
architecture of global 
governance, the EU 
serving as a model  
 
 
Table 1 summarises the various aspects of global governance in the concepts 
presented, and shows that even within the traditional notions of global governance 
there is a strong element of diversity. The actors which figure in the literature of 
traditional global governance are generally states, but can also encompass IOs and 
non-state actors. Apart from that, the term „governance‟ itself bears different 
meanings with different authors, and in a continuum between „order by cooperation‟ 
and the more differentiated forms of Messner and Nuscheler. The „ideal form of 
governance‟ describes the normative implications of the concepts and is important 
for an understanding of the authors‟ arguments. Regions (the units chosen for the 
case studies) are referred to in all concepts, but the importance attached to them 
varies; going furthest in this regard are Messner and Nuscheler. One important 
observation is that most of such concepts (and all of those presented) centre around 
the notion of ordering processes between various members, with states being the 
most important and acting on an equal level. It is important to remember here that 
this study challenges this implicit notion of factual equality.  
 
Many other prominent authors describe forms of global governance. Held and 
Jackson, for example, provide a model for a world covenant (Jackson 2003; Held 
2006). However, given limitations of space, they will not be dealt with here further. 
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Hierarchical but non-authoritative coordination 
„Hierarchical but non-authoritative coordination‟ describes the case of one superior 
power taking over leadership and providing security in order to facilitate 
cooperation. The difference between this and the former model of a world state is 
that the superior power is a hegemon already in existence, rather than a leviathan to 
be created. Such a hegemon has the power of negative sanction, and can thus 
establish stable expectations; it is an equivalent to a supranational authority. Due to 
the superior power resources which the hegemon has at its disposal, it presides over 
the means of ensuring compliance with international norms and rules (Brühl and 
Rittberger 2001: 26).  
 
In order to understand the concepts behind hegemonic governance, a neo-Gramscian 
perspective has to be combined with a realist one. Hegemony was introduced from 
the Gramscian use of the term (ch. 7) into IR proper by Robert Cox. He stresses the 
presence of consensus and coercion, with the latter always the exception in 
hegemony (Cox 1996). Furthermore, he writes about the USA as a hegemon: 
 
In the third period, following World War II (1945-65), the United States founded a new 
hegemonic world order similar in basic structure to that dominated by Britain in the middle 
of the nineteenth century but with institutions and doctrines adjusted to a more complex 
world economy and to national societies more sensitive to political repercussions of 
economic crises. (1996: 136) 
 
The US hegemony was (and is) based on international institutions:  
 
One mechanism through which the universal norms of a world hegemony are expressed is 
the international organization. Indeed, international organization functions as the process 
through which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. Among the 
features of international organization which express its hegemonic role are the following: (1) 
the institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; 
(2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically 
legitimate the norms of the new world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral 
countries; and (5) they absorb counterhegemonic ideas. (1996: 137ff) 
 
Also according to realism, cooperation is only possible when there is a hegemon in 
the international system. A hegemon, according to Hobson,
8
 meets five defining 
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criteria:  
 
 It must have a preponderance of economic and military power. This is clearly 
the case of the USA in the current international system.  
 A hegemon must be a liberal state, „because only liberal states have the will to 
pursue hegemony: authoritarian states prefer imperialism, moreover, only liberal 
states are concerned to create an open and liberal world order‟ (2000: 39). The 
USA is regarded as a liberal state par excellence,
9
 and it attempts to create a 
liberal world order by spreading the values of free trade, capitalism and 
democracy.  
 A „rudimentary consensus‟ for hegemony among the major states is necessary. 
Such a consensus is more or less present in the current world order, at least 
where the major states are concerned
10
. The US hegemony is, however, criticised 
by a number of smaller states (particularly Iran and others) as well as in the 
public sphere.  
 A hegemon must have a long-term perspective on the setting-up of international 
regimes.
11
  
 „A hegemon must be willing to make short-term sacrifices in order to achieve 
benefit in the long term‟ (2000: 40). 
 
Hobson also concludes that in the current world system the USA is a hegemon. It has 
made sacrifices in the sense of performing the role of a world policeman and 
provided a military shield for the Western alliance; it secured asymmetrical gains 
from trade with its major trading partners until the 1950s, but thereafter promoted 
free trade; the dollar functioned as the global currency, and the USA made sacrifices 
in investment and aid (Hobson 2000: 40). Hobson further argues that there are two 
phases of hegemony: benign and predatory. The first phase (benign) describes the 
USA from 1945–1973. „This is followed by the predatory phase in which the 
declining hegemon (the United States from 1973 to the present [2000]) eschews its 
policy of self-sacrifice and pursues its own selfish national interest‟ (2000: 40). This 
predatory behaviour is detectable now in unilateral policies that even tend to hamper 
global governance. 
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Therefore, in conclusion, hegemony is based on dominant power which is exerted 
via (at times) coercion and always via influence within and outside of international 
institutions and organisations; hence hegemonic governance. Whereas coercion leads 
to compliance and cooperation, influence is additionally necessary to achieve the 
consensus without which hegemony would deteriorate into imperialism. 
 
The term „hegemonic governance‟ thus serves to introduce the factor of power into 
the discussion of global governance. This implies that we are not dealing with – as is 
implicitly often assumed, especially in the normative concepts – an egalitarian 
(„heterarchic‟) form of global governance in the case of counterterrorism. States 
which are the main actors in global governance preside over different power 
potentials. This aspect will be covered by the new term „hegemonic governance‟. 
Hegemonic governance assumes that in the international system we observe a 
unipolar constellation. In the current world order, the USA, at least as far as hard 
power is regarded, has superior capabilities at its disposal (Brooks and Wohlforth 
2002: 21; Bacevich and Myers 2005). Also, in the sphere of soft power, the USA is a 
strong actor (disregarding the aberration of the Iraq war, which led to a significant 
but temporary decline in soft power due to the unilateral application of force). 
Finally, it establishes norms of behavior, its ideology inspires international politics, 
and it has a dominant voice in most international institutions.  
 
Hegemonic governance thus describes the fact that we cannot negate the 
predominant position of one actor in global governance, in this case the USA. The 
USA can and does apply coercion and influence (arguably comparable to hard and 
soft power) to cause others to behave in its own interest. The decision to use 
coercion or influence most often depends on relations with the other states 
concerned, their compliance, and any possible threat they pose, as well as on the 
strength of traditional relations (alliances, for example). Generally, coercion is 
thought to be only used in exceptional cases; influence is the rule. This means that 
the USA can rely on the cooperation (hence participation) of states simply because 
they share interdependence with the USA, are under its influence, are willing to 
accept its authority, or at times because they are coerced to comply.  
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A word on method  
 
The author therefore makes the argument that in the sphere of counterterrorism we 
have to deal with hegemonic governance. In pursuing this argument, two case studies 
are conducted, focusing on the European Union (EU) and on the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as actors presumably under US hegemony. The 
question is posed as to the reasons they participate in the GWOT. If reasons are 
found which relate to dominance, coercion and influence on the part of the USA, 
then hegemonic governance is assumed to be present.  
 
For establishing the factors presumably causal for participation in global 
counterterrorism under hegemony, neo-Gramscian as well as realist theory are 
looked at. From this, factors such as the following are established as reasons for 
participation under hegemony: 
 
 the absolute power (dominance) of the USA, and the relative power of the other 
actors; 
 active coercion, US pressure on the target states and entities; 
 passive coercion via asymmetrical interdependence;  
 rhetorical influence, creating an enhanced perception of a terrorist threat, as a 
precursor of issue-specific consensus; and 
 the legitimacy and authority of the USA among elites, as a sign of general 
influence and a precursor of general consensus.  
 
The strategy is furthermore to integrate several literatures on critical theory, realism 
and global governance, and additionally to introduce a security-studies perspective. 
This will not only broaden the empirical and theoretical scope of thinking on global 
governance, but will also give a more accurate description of the GWOT. 
  
Furthermore, it is argued here that participation in global governance is particularly 
dependent on the very structure of global governance, as well as the enactment of 
power within it. That is to say, in hegemonic governance the mere hegemony of the 
undertaking is one cause of participation in it.  
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Methodologically, this study is based on Bhaskar‟s assumptions and principles of 
critical realism: ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgemental 
rationality (Bhaskar 1998, 1986). A „critical realist‟ approach (in a slightly different, 
but logically consistent, meaning from above; Patomäki 2002) can tell us the story of 
participation, as it is capable of explaining issues of military (hard), economic 
(„sticky‟) and ideological (soft) power as possible reasons for cooperation, 
compliance and therefore participation. He highlights the interconnected and 
interdependent role of explaining and understanding, the need to broaden our 
perceptions of „levels of analysis‟ in current international affairs (hence the focus on 
regional actors) and the need to address „causal complexes‟ rather than to search for 
single causes. Also, Patomäki (2002: 120) encourages further theoretical adaptation 
and specification of his critical realism, which focuses ontologically on action, 
structure, power, and the system. For this reason, this study combines Patomäki‟s 
hermeneutical propositions with Gramscian and structural realist ontology, which 
then could be termed „neo-critical realism‟. This study started under the assumption 
that participation in global governance generally, and the GWOT in particular, could 
be explained with liberal theory, such as neofunctionalism, or other integration-
oriented theories. The results from the empirical analysis, however, indicated the 
need to focus on hegemony and power in diverse forms (material, immaterial, active 
and „passive‟), which resulted in the choice for this kind of theory-synthesis.   
 
The method used in this study is „grounded theory‟ (Glaser 1992). Grounded theory 
is a dialectical approach which uses data to reformulate theory and theory to 
reinterpret data. It is also an open approach which does not imply any specific 
research method to establish the data, though it generally uses interviews or text 
analysis. In grounded theory, the researcher moves back and forth between data and 
theory. Data are coded via a number of keywords. From these keywords a „story‟ is 
creatively established, and the story is checked against the theory. If they match, 
more specific keywords are established and the data are checked once again against 
these keywords. The dialectical movement between theory and data serves to 
integrate both elements better and to enhance theory building. Grounded theory was 
combined in this study with focused interviews conducted in ASEAN and the EU. In 
both areas, interviews were conducted with scholars as well as members of the 
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organisations themselves. Though the number of interviews was limited by the 
availability of experts on the questions at issue, in all cases interviews were 
conducted in-depth with highly knowledgeable individuals on (their specific) 
regional security politics and on counterterrorism policy in particular. The limitation 
on interview numbers is therefore not thought to present a major impediment to 
reaching conclusions. Expert interviews were mainly conducted with scholars rather 
than public officials. Firstly, the former were more readily available for interview; 
secondly, they were assumed to be freer from political constraints and thus able to 
answer questions more objectively. The study‟s time frame are the years 2001–8, i.e. 
the years of George W. Bush‟s GWOT. It is still uncertain how the GWOT and 
global counterterrorism will develop under the new US administration, and the 
current situation is therefore not considered here.  
 
Structure of the book  
 
Chapter 2 presents the research design, referred to above. Firstly, participation as a 
new issue in global governance is elaborated upon and defined. Secondly, the causes 
of participation in the GWOT are established, as a measurement of hegemonic 
governance. If hegemony in the global governance of counterterrorism is present, 
and exercised, it is then argued that this exercise of power should influence (hence in 
part cause) participation in global counterterrorism. Signs of hegemony could 
therefore be regarded as causes of participation in hegemonic governance. Following 
critical-realist theory on hegemony and international governance, possible 
measurements of hegemony are established, which will inform the latter analysis as 
hard test-variables. The variables (the dominance, coercion and influence of the 
USA, for example) are mentioned above. 
 
Furthermore, this study looks at the two most similar cases (EU and ASEAN) with 
regard to their supranational set-up. Internationally, there are no regions more similar 
than these two (Gramegna and Beng 1997). However, they differ strongly in the 
extent of their political integration and in their relative power compared to that of the 
USA, as well as certainly in their economic and ideological relations with the USA. 
Chapter 3, therefore, elaborates on these „units‟ chosen for the case studies and 
establishes them as actors. Even though classical IR theories do not regard regions as 
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actors in their own right, it is argued here that it makes sense to speak of the EU (as 
well as ASEAN) as „collective actors‟. Several criteria are developed, using the 
research of Bretherthon and Vogler (1999; 2005) to measure the „actorness‟ of the 
EU as an example for both regions. The EU is then tested to see whether it meets the 
criteria of actorness in the field of counterterrorism. The conclusion is that the EU 
can be regarded an actor in its own right in this policy field, even if it often lacks a 
common voice. It is a „collective actor‟, which describes the fact that the EU member 
states act together or at least with reference to each other, though not necessarily 
always in consensus. In the case of ASEAN it is more difficult to speak of actorness. 
The main ASEAN actors are still the member states, and are careful to retain their 
sovereign powers. Yet at the intergovernmental level ASEAN does play an important 
role, and here it is understood as an „emerging collective actor‟, a term implying that 
the member states increasingly use ASEAN to come to some form of collective 
action, even if they do not always cooperate or agree on common strategies and 
policies.  
 
Chapter 4 starts with the first case study, elaborating on the EU participating in 
global governance of counterterrorism, and the reasons for it doing so. It can be 
clearly discerned that the EU does indeed participate in the GWOT, even if only 
partially through military undertakings. It also takes over the role of a strong 
promoter and manager of counterterrorism, enabling the states to cooperate among 
themselves and coordinate their policies. As for the causes of participation, the main 
factors were found to be the dominance of the USA and the perception of terrorist 
threat, the latter of which in the EU is presumably the effect of US influence. Also, 
authority and legitimacy as causes of participation are clearly discernable. Active 
coercion was confirmed as being present by half of the interviewees. It can overall 
be concluded that hegemonic governance is a strong causal factor in the EU‟s 
participation in counterterrorism. 
  
Chapter 5 comprises the second case study, looking at ASEAN‟s participation in 
counterterrorism and its causes, in the context of global governance. Such 
participation by ASEAN is clearly to be found, even if as an organisation it seems 
too weak to make much impact on the nations comprising it. ASEAN rather takes 
over the role of a coordinator and manager, supporting the notion of „collective 
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actorness‟. Causes for participation are found to be again the dominance of the USA, 
passive coercion, and the US authority and legitimacy. It can therefore be concluded 
that hegemonic governance does indeed play a dominant role also in ASEAN‟s 
participation in the GWOT. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 go on to describe the structure and processes of global governance, 
both specifically in respect to counterterrorism and more generally. Chapter 6 
focuses on the global governance of counterterrorism and the ways in which 
hegemony is present and exercised in global governance in this field. The main 
actors in the GWOT comprise the USA, the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the Group of Eight (G8), with Russia, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the EU also playing major roles. Still, rather than being a 
heterarchic undertaking, global counterterrorism is described as being hegemonic in 
nature, with the main driving force behind the efforts being the USA. Furthermore, 
the USA uses its dominant power position in many international organisations as 
well as vis-à-vis other actors in order to exercise control over global counterterrorism 
efforts.  
 
Chapter 7 additionally theorises about hegemonic governance more generally. 
Firstly, it deals with power and hierarchy in global governance applying an empirical 
and theoretical focus. In the empirical part, it looks at the question of US unipolarity, 
dominance and domination (power exertion via force, coercion and influence). The 
theoretical part analyses the conditions for hegemonic governance (particularly 
coercion and consensus), its effects, scope and stability.  
 
Finally, this study makes the argument that power counts, and that we should not 
forget what is established in realist and critical theory when speaking about the 
emergent reality of global governance. Global governance bears the hopes of 
mankind for the future, but neglecting its inherent hierarchy and exercise of power 
would be a dangerous mistake. To prevent this mistake is one of the goals of this 
book. 
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2 
Participation in Global Governance and its Causes12 
 
Critical- and realist-inspired IR theory (C&RIR) and global governance theory have 
so far existed and developed in parallel, but there has been little communication 
between these two strands of research. This is unfortunate, as global governance 
theory has a lot to benefit by listening to critical and realist IR theory, as well as vice 
versa. This study attempts to combine C&RIR and global governance theory with the 
prospect of achieving a new theoretical as well as empirical description of global 
governance, respectively „hegemonic governance‟, which was created, for example, 
in the GWOT under the last US administration. This perspective is novel since, as 
already mentioned, hegemony and power in global governance are blatantly 
undertheorised, or even openly negated in the literature (Robert Cox 1992). Without 
taking a normative turn, the author argues that hegemony is a reality of global 
governance. Furthermore, this study is also taking a security studies perspective on 
global governance (Krahmann 2003 for an approach to conceptualise security 
governance). There are studies on governance in the security sphere (Martin 2008), 
but mostly these remain single-issue-specific. This study, even though it centres on 
counterterrorism, attempts to construct a broader argument about security 
governance. 
 
This research sets out to look particularly at participation in the global governance of 
counterterrorism, or to frame it differently: Why do actors participate in the GWOT? 
This specific policy field was chosen due to the author‟s familiarity with it, 
stemming from previous publications (e.g. Beyer 2006; 2008
13
). It is clearly a case of 
global governance, described as 
 
purposive systems of rules or normative orders apart from the regularities (natural orders) 
emerging from unrestricted interactions of self-interested actors in a state of anarchy. This 
implies that the actors recognize the existence of certain obligations and feel compelled, for 
whatever reason, to fulfil them. (Brühl and Rittberger 2001: 5). 
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Global counterterrorism is more than a „regime‟, given the complexity of the issue, 
fields and policies involved (more on this in Chapter 6). It is also a case for 
hegemonic governance, as the Global War on Terrorism (a term which can be used 
to describe the global efforts to counter terrorism under the auspices of the USA) is 
marked by strong US dominance. The USA is the clear leader in the global efforts to 
counter terrorism, and, therefore, its GWOT is more or less equated with global 
counterterrorism. Other actors that participate in global counterterrorism remain, 
therefore, under the strong leadership and influence of the USA.  
 
This research thus focuses on the following questions:  
 
 How do actors participate in hegemonic governance? 
 Which structural factors are causal for participation?  
 What does this tell us about hegemonic governance? 
 
It is assumed that participation is caused by the structure underlying global 
governance, hence hegemony. If hegemony is present, certain features of it should 
cause participation in the GWOT. This follows from critical and realist theory, soon 
to be discussed. Forms of participation (a dependent variable) include compliance 
with US inspired regulations, active participation in multilateral programmes, 
promotion of counterterrorism, and congruent rhetoric. The test variables 
(independent variables) established were dominance of the USA, active and passive 
coercion, authority and influence. These variables, if shown as causal for 
counterterrorism participation, would indicate hegemonic governance.  
 
Participation in IR 
 
There is little about participation in global governance to be found in the literature. 
However, the main results of what existing research there is will be presented here. 
Auer writes about „Who participates in global environmental governance‟, 
contending that it is not only states and international organisations, but also NGOs 
which do so. However, it is states and state-derived institutions that make the rules: 
„The supremacy of state and state-derived institutions in international environmental 
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rule-making is amply illustrated by research on international environmental regimes‟ 
(2000: 159f). Still, non-state actors play a role, even if a possibly minor one: „Non-
state actors are major players, too – creating, assembling and disseminating 
knowledge, and lobbying for regional and global environmental protection‟ (2000: 
160):  
 
Other students of global civil society contend that while NGOs and other non-state actors are 
increasingly politically savvy and are insinuating themselves in global environmental 
problem-solving institutions, these entities are less successful than states in reaching into and 
influencing the lives of ordinary citizens, and that global civil society is unlikely to replace 
the state system as the main source of global environmental governance. (2000: 164)  
 
He comes to the conclusion that global environmental governance is a multi-level, 
multi-actor process, and „one that bridges local, national, and supranational 
environmental and policy contexts‟ (2000: 163). 
  
Fisher and Green also write about participation in global governance in the case of 
civil society and in that of developing countries. They come to the conclusion that 
„though both groups are widely perceived as critical for the creation and 
implementation of effective international policy for sustainable development, 
developing countries and representatives of civil society still face obstacles that 
impede their participation in the multilateral arena‟ (2004: 66). They start to develop 
a model for understanding the extent of these two actors‟ political engagement in 
global governance. One factor is disenfranchisement: the fact that, „despite their 
legal standing, developing countries are still frequently unable to exercise the level 
of influence they wish and to achieve their desired outcomes‟ (2004: 69). The 
realities of multilateral processes create barriers to their participation: limited 
resources and personnel, lack of training, and so forth. In the case of civil society, 
disenfranchisement refers to its perceived legitimacy and the organisational forms it 
takes. As factors contributing to disenfranchisement, Fisher and Green single out 
endogenous resources, transnational connectivity and geopolitical status. This model 
is then used to study the extent of disenfranchisement in the participation of 
developing countries and of civil society representatives.  
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The only other article to be found that addresses the question of state participation in 
global governance is Sassen‟s „The participation of states and citizens in global 
governance‟ (2003). However, even here the focus is on citizenship and the 
participatory opportunities afforded for citizens by the denationalisation of the state, 
rather than about the causes of participation by state actors themselves.  
 
Thirdly, Nanz and Steffek write about „Global governance, participation and the 
public sphere‟. They argue that the participation of NGOs in the case of the WTO 
would enhance its legitimacy and accountability:  
 
[W]e explore the possibility of democratic and legitimate decision-making at the global level 
– in both its normative and its analytical dimensions – from the perspective of a deliberative 
theory of politics. This theory claims that democratic legitimation can be generated by means 
of deliberation between a variety of social actors (e.g. government officials from different 
national communities, scientific experts, NGOs, etc.). Political decisions are reached through 
a deliberative process where participants scrutinize heterogeneous interests and justify their 
positions in view of the common good of a given constituency. In our view, any bestowal of 
democratic legitimacy on Global Governance must ultimately depend on the creation of an 
appropriate public sphere, i.e. an institutionalized arena for (deliberative) political 
participation beyond the limits of national boundaries. Moreover, we argue that actors from 
organized civil society play an important role in the creation of a public sphere (2004: 315).  
 
The argument is thus made, using the WTO as an example, that the participation of 
civil society in international organisations enhances the legitimacy of global 
governance. 
 
Clark and others have researched NGO participation in UN world conferences, and 
Weiss and Gordenker (1996) „NGO participation in the international policy process‟. 
However, this research has never addressed the causes of participation in the terms 
used here, being limited to civil society actors alone, as is Loy‟s (2000) article on 
„Public participation in the World Trade Organization‟. These works are linked to a 
debate about stakeholdership in global governance, which addresses the need for 
participation of sub-state actors (NGOs) in global governance for reasons of 
democracy and efficiency (Hemmati 2002; Pigman 2007; Vachani 2006).  
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There is thus a need for further research on participation (particularly on the part 
state and supra-state actors) and the causes of such participation in global 
governance. Results on these issues appear to be lacking in the current literature. We 
need this research in order to understand the mechanisms and processes that lead to 
states pursuing the common goal of global governance. If global governance is 
indeed to be the model for world politics in future (Rajaee 2000: ch. 4; McIntosh 
2007; Wendt 2003), we need a better understanding of how it can be achieved, 
constructed and spread. The different actors in the world will in any event need to 
cooperate in solving such diverse global problems as climate change, health 
challenges, migration and global violence (terrorism being one part of the latter, 
Väyrynen 1999). It will therefore be useful to know how this cooperation can be 
brought about, and which causal mechanisms it depends upon.  
 
Participation as cooperation and compliance in global governance  
 
Weiss and Gordenker define global governance as the attempt to find orderly and 
accountable responses to social and political problems that surpass the capacities of 
individual states. It is based on the absence of a supranational authority, and also on 
the assumption that cooperation of governments and other actors is necessary (1996: 
17). 
  
Participation in hegemonic governance is here understood as a more complex form 
of cooperation, the latter being a central feature of any form of global governance. 
Such governance is in principle based on the idea of cooperation, which in 
international relations is not a given but more a theoretical and practical problem. 
For this reason, this chapter will first tackle the question of cooperation (and 
compliance) in order to derive a definition of participation.  
 
Cooperation 
In realism as well as neo-realism cooperation is possible but is not the primary 
choice of action:
14
 „For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and 
conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they 
share common interests‟; realist theory also argues that international institutions are 
unable to mitigate anarchy‟s constraining effects on interstate cooperation‟ (Grieco 
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1993: 116). The reasons for (particularly) neo-realists‟ pessimism about the 
possibility of cooperation are as follows:  
 
 states are seen as rational egoists: the maximisation of their own gains – and thus 
power and security – is in their interest;  
 as states are positioned within the international system, relative distribution of 
power also counts, and it is thus against their interest to have another state also 
gaining (Grieco 1993: 127; Carr 1964: 111).  
 
How cooperation is possible under these conditions is described by the theory of 
hegemonic stability (Kindleberger 1973; 1981; 1986). In the case that there is one 
strong actor in international relations that presides over enough resources of power to 
command the behaviour of other actors (by providing benefits or by coercion), 
cooperation is possible (Snidal 1985; McKeown 1983).  
 
Among the liberal approaches there are a number of theoretical assumptions 
regarding cooperation that can only be dealt with here in part. Generally, it can be 
argued, as Schieder does, that republican liberalism (inspired by the works of 
Immanuel Kant) does explain cooperation by looking at the democratic constitution 
of states. Pluralist liberalism highlights a balanced distribution of power as beneficial 
for cooperation, which results in fewer struggles over this distribution; sociological 
liberalism sees the cause of cooperative behaviour in transnational relations; and 
trade liberalism sees it in open trade-relations and interdependence (Schieder and 
Spindler 2003: 172). Liberals generally have a different understanding of actors than 
do realists. Actors here are also understood as gain maximisers, but absolute gains 
are in their interests, whereas realists focus on relative gains. The causes of this 
difference are to be found in the liberal respect for domestic politics and in a strong 
focus on that level, and thus on the regarding national societies (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1993: 101). Yet the logic of anarchy is not denied: liberalism also assumes 
that insecurity stemming from anarchy can lead to a breakdown of cooperation 
(Jervis 1999).  
 
Liberals as well as realists refer in their arguments to rational choice theories in 
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order to explain cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1993). In rational choice, one 
way of describing the problem of cooperation is the „prisoner‟s dilemma‟.15 
Participating actors cannot be certain about the intentions of the other actors and 
have to fear that their own willingness to cooperate is not returned in kind. Even 
when mutual cooperation here does lead to the optimal results, such an outcome is 
not generally to be assumed. For the single actor, the best result of any interaction is 
the constellation: „I defect, and you cooperate‟. Secondly, mutual cooperation 
follows, then mutual defection. The worst outcome of any interaction is the 
constellation: „I cooperate, and you defect‟. As in realism, the rational actor here is 
not interested in cooperation: if there is no security as to the behaviour of the other 
actors (this is the case in realist approaches), even the altruistic actor will decide 
against cooperation (Wagner 1983). 
  
Figure 1. Prisoner‟s dilemma.  
Source: Wagner 1983: 332. 
 
The situation changes slightly if the interaction is repeated a number of times. Even 
here, the principle of non-cooperation can become dominant with increasing 
repetition if the length of the game and the number of repetitions are not known 
(Wagner 1983). This even holds true if absolute information is possible. Only under 
the condition that the game is repeated endlessly and the participants are aware of 
this fact does cooperation become rational
16
 (Wagner 1983: 344; Taylor 1976).  
 
The conditions minimally necessary for [cooperation] include transparency of action, 
capacity to monitor any noncooperative behavior and punish the same in a predictable 
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fashion, a sufficiently low discount (high appreciation) rate for future gains from the 
relationship, and an expectation that the relationship will not end in the foreseeable future. 
(Hopf 1998: 188)  
 
Thus, an existing hegemony or institutions as regimes or international organisations 
are positive factors for cooperation, as they increase transparency, monitor 
behaviour, and possibly can sanction it and reduce uncertainty. These would be the 
realist and institutionalist (Oye 1986; Axelrod and Keohane 1993) answers to the 
question of cooperation under the security dilemma. 
 
Constructivism, as the youngest of the approaches presented here, is in concordance 
with liberalism insofar as it assumes that cooperation is possible under the condition 
of anarchy (Wendt 1999). Yet, it explains cooperation differently. In so-called 
„communities of identity‟ the presented games of cooperation no longer take place in 
this form. Communities with a common identity are marked by the characteristic that 
the actors understand it to be in their interest to cooperate (Hopf 1998: 189). They 
become altruistic, and see themselves more as „partners in some common enterprise‟ 
(Hopf 1998: 191). Insecurity, which is also assumed in liberalism, is decreased due 
to norms, practice and identity.  
 
Compliance is a form of cooperation under the condition of inequality. Compliance 
is looked at in what follows, in order thereafter to help define participation.  
 
Compliance 
„Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given subject 
conforms to prescribed behaviour‟ (Young 1979: 104). 
 
Compliance and realism/ neo-realism 
Classical realists argue that the primary concern of states is their territorial integrity; 
and it follows that all other aims are subordinated to this. With respect to 
compliance, this means that everything is judged by its effect on integrity. In the case 
that non-compliance leads to a threat to integrity, compliance is to be expected. It 
follows that compliance mainly depends on the fact that there is a state that possesses 
superior power potentials (firstly), and that this state threatens with sanctions in the 
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case of non-compliance (secondly; Haas 2000: 51. Haas does not discuss the 
possibility that compliance could threaten integrity). Thus, compliance is determined 
by cost-benefit calculations about national interests.  
 
Compliance and neo-liberal institutionalism 
International institutions can also influence states‟ aims and preferences. Institutions 
can be defined as „persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations‟ (Keohane 
1989: 3). Neo-liberal institutionalists claim that institutions fulfil functions that lead 
states to compliance, basing their argument on the will to comply: „Institutions serve 
a therapeutic role in encouraging compliance and deterring non-compliance by 
eliminating barriers to self-interested compliance. However, they may not exercise a 
direct influence on state preferences that were formed previously‟ (Haas 2000: 53). 
International organisations, for example, exercise three different functions with 
which to propagate compliance: they improve the conditions that are laid down in 
treaties and that influence the decisions of states (for example by the establishment 
of special decision-making procedures and regular meetings); they allow for changes 
in states‟ preferences (for example, monitoring and increased transparency leads to 
pressure from other states or civil society); and they improve national capacities 
(Haas et al. 1993). These institutional factors do not influence all states to the same 
extent, however. Particularly influential in the effective creation of compliance are 
the role, preferences and power of national interest groups. Secondly, the degree of 
vulnerability is decisive (Haas et al. 1993). Vulnerability can be measured in the 
extent of foreign trade, foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign debt, and leads 
to diminished possibilities of evading the negative effects of external shocks. During 
the course of globalisation, the vulnerability of all states has been increased, so it can 
be deduced that the will to comply will increase accordingly.  
 
Compliance and constructivism 
Constructivism highlights the role of ideas and norms. In constructivism, these count 
as independent variables for explaining states‟ behaviour. Constructivists assume 
that rational decisions are made on the basis of norms rather than information, given 
that correct information in a more and more complex world is increasingly hard to 
come by. States thus behave according to a „bounded rationality‟, a rationality 
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formed by cognitive frames. The latter can be socially-generated convictions 
regarding ethical and moral behaviour (norms), or convictions regarding causal 
relations and the effects of compliance on the state: „From a constructivist‟s 
perspective compliance is more likely if there exist relevant widely shared causal 
beliefs about the operation of the issue to be controlled, and the degree to which the 
actual rules promote valued ends‟ (Haas 2000: 62).  
 
Definition of participation  
Compliance as a term, therefore, is also well-established in IR theories (Börzel 2007; 
Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 539f). The term describes the fact that actors conform 
to existing norms and rules in the international community. Thus compliance is only 
part of cooperation; cooperation also entails those actions which are pursued 
disregarding existing rules and norms but which are in the interest of the actor in 
question. Compliance, as well as cooperation, mean that the actor behaves not solely 
self-interestedly. In the case of compliance, it also acts in the interest of the 
international community, or of the entity that has established the norms or rules. In 
the case of cooperation, its actions are in the interests of the addressed actors. Both 
categories of actions are positive in respect of the mode of interaction: the interests 
of others are taken into account. In both cases, of course, there can also be negative 
implications: the interests of a third actor or the acting actor itself might be violated. 
In the present study, these aspects will be dealt with only marginally.  
 
Compliance here is further understood as taking place in a structure of factual and 
possibly formal inequality.
17
 Potentially, it can be enforced by the producers of the 
norms. The compliant actor is therefore usually subordinate to the enforcer. 
Cooperation, however, is taking place in a structure of at least formal equality. Thus, 
to reflect the hegemonic structure of global governance marked by formal equality 
but factual inequality (Cosnard 2003), participation here encompasses both 
compliance and cooperation.   
 
Participation in global governance is defined, therefore, as compliance and 
cooperation with the central actor (the USA) and with its policies in global 
governance in the field of counterterrorism.  
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Possible forms of participation 
In this study, active and passive participation are distinguished. The former might 
involve a contribution to military programmes, or the implementation of common 
policies and programmes, but also the promotion of standards, policies and norms. 
Passive participation is no more than the adoption of the dominant rhetoric.  
 
Active participation: 
Participation in multilateral actions means to play an active role in them, for example 
by the commitment of military personnel and materiel to common undertakings, or 
by financial support for these undertakings. The implementation of common policies 
also counts as active participation.  
 
Furthermore, an actor can become a promoter by supporting common policies vis-à-
vis third parties, and in trying to convince them to also participate. Such promotion 
can be seen in cases where one state actively encourages other states to change their 
behaviour, or lobbies for common norms and standards. 
  
Passive participation  
The adoption of common terms and rhetoric is a form of passive participation. Such 
discursive changes are understood here as participation since they can be the first 
step towards the adoption of norms. They can be interpreted further as acceptance of 
certain patterns of behaviour on which concrete policies can then be based. This 
acceptance is thought to precede concrete and active participation.  
 
The importance of external factors 
 
According to Börzel, political power plays an essential part in determining 
compliance with European law, its presence results in less compliance from the 
powerful. Economic power, on the other hand, does not have an effect on 
compliance.  
 
The political weight in the Council of Ministers (“SSI”) has a significant effect on infringements 
per legal act. Member states like France, Italy or Germany have more Council votes and violate 
European law more frequently than member states with low voting power, such as Denmark, 
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Finland, Sweden, or the Netherlands … Greater economic power, by contrast, does not 
substantially affect a countries compliance record. (Börzel 2007: 24f) 
 
Checkel (2001) also researched the causal conditions for compliance. In the case of 
human rights policies in Germany and the Ukraine he found that domestic 
institutions played an important role in compliance and non-compliance, and that 
national institutions can hinder compliance as well as further it. For the Ukraine, the 
isolated position of the institutions led to a situation where convictions and learning 
became more important factors for compliance. In the case of Germany‟s pluralist 
institutions, social sanctions played an important role. Norms already in existence 
were decisive in influencing actors with respect to their compliance with new norms. 
Counter-intuitively, norms already in existence in Germany posed a barrier to 
compliance, whereas their absence in Ukraine led to a faster adoption of the new 
norms.  
 
The importance of external factors for states‟ participation in regional integration 
had been a secondary question until the 1990s (Roloff 1999: 75). The first systematic 
work on the importance of external factors stems from Zimmerling. She refers in her 
work to Nye, who in the 1960s had already mentioned the importance of such 
factors. Zimmerling distinguishes between negative and positive external factors as 
imperative causes and as influencing decisions on integration. As negative external 
factors, she cites common threats and challenges: nation states, according to this 
view, become interested in the formation of a collective as soon as they face external 
costs that they are unable to meet on their own (Zimmerling 1991: 145). So, for 
example, international terrorism as a common threat could have an influence on 
community building and integration. Positive external causes are, for example, 
benefits and advantages that result from cooperation or integration. Even with a lack 
of common threats, the formation of a collective can bring advantages. It is possible 
that cooperation takes place in order to realise benefits that could not be realised by 
the single states on their own (Zimmerling 1991: 150). Examples of these advantages 
can be the improvement of the relative positions of the states vis-à-vis a third party, a 
larger sphere of action, competitive advantages, or a heightened bargaining power. 
Zimmerling herself states that the demarcation line between positive and negative 
causes is always a relative one, as every positive can also be interpreted as a negative 
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cause, and every negative cause can lead to positive effects. 
  
Haas (2000) deals with the causes of compliance, particularly in integration projects. 
He distinguishes between endogenous (or domestic) and exogenous (or systemic) 
causes. Technological and political factors count as endogenous causes. States, for 
example, might lack the technological capability to implement treaties and the 
policies specifically required; this refers particularly to developing and 
underdeveloped states, and less to highly-developed Western states. The 
population‟s acceptance of policies is a relevant, political factor. If there is serious 
opposition to the policies to be implemented, the state is less likely to comply (Haas 
2000: 46). Haas refers to IR theories for the description of exogenous causes of 
compliance: in the world view of realism and neo-realism, the causes of compliance 
are to be found in material resources; neoliberal institutionalists, meanwhile, focus 
on rules framed by formal institutions; constructivism, finally, highlights the role of 
shared assumptions and values. All these three factors count as causes of states‟ 
behaviour, and thus of compliance.  
 
Roloff, finally, presents Hurrell in order to point out the importance of external 
factors:  
 
In the modern world there can be no wholly self-contained regions, immune from outside 
pressures. Systemic theories underline the importance of the broader political and economic 
structures within which regionalist schemes are embedded and the impact of outside 
pressures working on the region. (Hurrell 1995: 339)  
 
Neo-critical realism and causes for participation: force, coercion, and influence 
in hegemony  
 
This study argues that the hegemony to be found in the global governance of 
counterterrorism is one cause for participation in the GWOT (the type of 
„counterterrorism governance‟ that the USA developed). Hegemonic governance will 
be further elaborated upon in the following chapters. Here, this chapter will finish 
with the factors, particularly external ones, causal for participation in it. External 
factors are of importance; realist theory looks at the structure – hence at international 
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rather than intranational factors – for explanations. Describing the distribution of 
power as a cause of participation is taking a structural realist approach. However, 
this realism is combined with the ideas of Gramsci and others; this approach can be 
termed „neo-critical realism‟ (ch. 1). 
 
„[R]ealist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the 
causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for 
cooperation and peace among them?‟ (Grieco 1997: 163). In neo-realism, states are 
unitary actors, meaning that they are essentially alike (neo-realism does not open the 
so-called „black box‟) and fulfil the same functions, because there is no division of 
labour between them.  
 
States vary widely in size, wealth, power and form. And yet variations in these and in other 
respects are variations among like units . . . States are alike in the tasks that they face, not in 
their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function. (Waltz 
1979: 96ff)  
 
This fact derives from anarchy: „From one country to another, one can identify the 
effects of structure by noticing similarities of behaviour in polities of similar 
structure‟ (Waltz 1979: 88). Anarchy is thus the structural condition, the ordering 
principle between the units. It refers to the absence of an international government 
(Waltz 1979: 89). Structure and anarchy – terms normally having opposing meanings 
– are used here synonymously. However, anarchy is only one possible expression of 
structure, hierarchy being at the other end of the continuum. Yet this possibility is 
not realised: global governance does not qualify as the realisation of the opposite of 
anarchy, hierarchy being „the presence of a legitimate and competent government‟ 
(Waltz 1979: 114). Yet international political systems are thought of as being more 
or less anarchic (Waltz 1979: 114). Thus global governance is referred to by Waltz 
in terms of a state of structure between these two extremes, it is: „International 
politics … [is] flecked with particles of government and alloyed with elements of 
community – supranational organizations whether universal or regional, alliances, 
multinational corporations, networks of trade, and what not‟ (Waltz 1979: 114).  
 
Waltz, in his theory, refers to anarchy for reasons of simplicity, not reality: „That 
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would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less 
theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy‟ (Waltz 1979: 115). In 
anarchy, states are absolutely responsible for their own survival: „Whether those 
units live, prosper, or die depends on their own efforts . . . states seek to ensure their 
survival‟ (Waltz 1979: 91). As there is no superior power in an anarchical structure, 
states have to take care of their survival by gaining the most power possible, or at 
least more power than that of competing states. 
  
Even if states are functionally alike, they can be differentiated according to their 
capabilities: „Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their 
capabilities‟ (Waltz 1979: 105). These capabilities are the basis of power. If power is 
distributed in the system very monopolistically, we can speak of a hegemon which 
might take over the task of ordering international affairs:  
 
Hegemonic stability theory . . . argues that . . . stability is most likely when there is a single 
dominant state . . . The basic contention of the hegemonic stability thesis is that the 
distribution of power among states is the primary determinant of the character of the 
international . . . system. A hegemonic distribution of power, defined as one in which a 
single state has a predominance of power, is most conducive to the establishment of a stable . 
. . system, [and the hegemonic state has] symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that 
can be used to entice or compel others . . . (Webb and Krasner 1989: 183f) 
 
Webb and Krasner use hegemonic stability theory particularly for explaining the 
economic effects of this configuration on the system. 
  
Cooperation, power and hegemony 
The causes of cooperation under the condition of hegemony are described by Gilpin 
(1981). He singles out dominant power and authority as the main factors that 
determine cooperation by less powerful states with the hegemon; cooperation under 
hegemony is first and foremost an effect and result of power:  
 
The distribution of power among states constitutes the principal form of control in every 
international system. The dominant states and empires in every international system organize 
and maintain the network of political, economic, and other relationships within the system 
and especially in their respective spheres of influence. Both individually and in interaction 
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with one another, those states that historically have been called the great powers and are 
known today as the superpowers establish and enforce the basic rules and rights that 
influence their own behaviour and that of the lesser states in the system. (Gilpin 1981: 30)  
 
Power here refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of a state and 
ensures that „one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability 
rests‟ (Gilpin 1981: 30). Yet it is not only the power of mere force that leads to 
cooperation, but also the perception of power – authority and „prestige‟:  
 
The second component in the governance of an international system is the hierarchy of 
prestige among states. In international relations, prestige is the function[al] equivalent of the 
role of authority in domestic politics. Like the concept of authority, prestige is closely linked 
to but is distinct from the concept of power . . . Authority (or prestige) is the „probability that 
a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons‟. 
(Gilpin 1981: 30) 
 
According to Gilpin, prestige and authority have a moral and a functional basis. 
Cooperation on the part of the less powerful states (or other actors) develops because 
„they accept the legitimacy and utility of the existing order‟ (Gilpin 1981: 30). Thus, 
it is implied that the system, whether hegemonic, bipolar or multi-polar, has to serve 
at least some of the interests of the less powerful states. In a hegemonic system, the 
hegemon thus has to provide some basic public goods in order to appease the less 
powerful actors and to gain legitimacy: „Empires and dominant states supply public 
goods (security, economic order, etc.)‟ (Gilpin 1981: 30). Authority18 is thus 
centrally based on legitimacy, in the absence of which there would only be power by 
force. Force and authority, coercion and consensus, are, therefore, complementary.  
 
Ultimately, however, the hierarchy of prestige [i.e. authority] in an international system rests 
on economic and military power. Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in 
particular . . . prestige refers . . . to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state‟s 
capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power. (Gilpin 1981: 30ff)  
 
Gilpin implies that not only is respect an indication of authority („numerous factors, 
including respect and common interest, underlie the prestige of a state‟, Gilpin 1981: 
30) but also fear. Yet authority implies that force does not necessarily have to be 
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applied. Cooperation is not a result of the use of strength, but of the „implicit mutual 
recognition that deadlock at the bargaining table could lead to decision on the 
battlefield‟ (Gilpin 1981: 31). 
  
Both factors, material power and authority, lead to cooperation, particularly under 
the condition of hegemony: „Thus, both power and prestige [i.e. authority] function 
to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the dominant 
state or states‟ (Gilpin 1981: 30). Further, possible factors contributing to 
cooperation are „rules‟ and „cost-benefit calculations‟. Cost-benefit calculations 
determine whether a state or other actor decides to cooperate or not: „States make 
cost/benefit calculations in the determination of their foreign policy and . . . a goal of 
a state‟s foreign policy is to . . . enhance the state‟s own interests‟ (Gilpin 1981: 50). 
In political realism, these interests are power and security: „Every state desires to 
increase its control over those aspects of the international system that make its basic 
values and interests more secure‟ (Gilpin 1981: 50). If a state pursues the goal of 
securitisation, for example, it is dependent on its calculation regarding the costs and 
the benefits of such a policy. If the costs for measures undertaken to enhance 
security would exceed the benefits implied, it will abstain. If the benefits weigh more 
or have a higher priority (Gilpin 1981: 51), it will pursue the policy. Further, the 
decision to cooperate depends on the „historical experience‟ of a society. Here, the 
factor of socialisation enters the equation: „What, in particular, have been the 
consequences for the country from past attempts [to cooperate], and what lessons has 
a nation learned about war, aggression, appeasement etc.‟ (Gilpin 1981: 51).  
 
Finally, we must take one step back. The idea of hegemony (as it is in use today) 
originated with Gramsci. Gramsci describes hegemony as „a relation, not of 
domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological 
leadership. It is the organisation of consent‟ (Simon 1991: 22). In this later 
description of hegemony, he introduced the idea of oppression or coercion, 
hegemony being based on „a combination of force and consent‟ (Gilpin 1981: 51).  
 
The starting-point for Gramsci‟s concept of hegemony is that a class and its representatives 
exercise power over subordinate classes by means of combination of coercion and 
persuasion. In his notes on Machiavelli‟s Prince, Gramsci evokes the mystical Greek centaur, 
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half animal and half human, as a symbol of the „dual perspective‟ in political action – the 
levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization. Hegemony is 
a relation, not of domination by means of force, but consent by means of political and 
ideological leadership. It is the organization of consent. In some passages in the Prison 
Notebooks, Gramsci uses the word direzione (leadership, direction), interchangeably with 
egemonia (hegemony) and in contrast to dominazione (domination). (The use of the term 
hegemony in the Gramscian sense must be distinguished from the original Greek meaning, 
the predominance of one nation over another. There are, however, a few passages in the 
Prison Notebooks where Gramsci uses hegemony in its ordinary sense of predominance to 
refer to relations between nations . . .). (Simon 1991: 21) 
  
Also, Gramsci concurs that „at the centre of hegemony is power operating with 
legitimacy‟ (Howson and Smith 2008a: 6). 
  
In conclusion, this study construes hegemony as the exercise of dominant power by a 
superior actor, accompanied by a degree of consensus. What exactly is hegemony 
based on? It can be understood as a combination of a set of structural features as well 
as of an actor‟s characteristics and behavioural features. The structural features refer 
to the position in the world system, and in the normal use of the term „hegemony‟ it 
is clearly based on unipolarity. Unipolarity implies domination, i.e. the command of 
great power, but not necessarily outright control. Further, unipolarity is enacted in 
certain ways. Power is exerted by means of soft power (such as ideology) or the 
application of „sticky‟ power (Russell Mead 2004, referring to economic power due 
to asymmetric interdependence) and hard power (force). Whereas the use of soft 
power results in influence, meaning the capacity to „affect policies and behaviours of 
other states‟, sticky and hard power result in control, meaning force and coercion or 
the „ability to achieve goals even in the face of opposition‟. Here it must be referred 
to Wartenberg (1990) in order to explain the use of the term „power‟; for other 
conceptualisations of power in hegemony see Lentner (2006). Wartenberg 
distinguishes between force, coercion, and influence to describe forms of power, and 
understands domination as the continuous exertion of power over another actor.  
 
Force or ‘control’19 
 
An exercise of power by an agent A over an agent B is an exercise of force if and only if A 
physically keeps B from pursuing the action-alternative that B wishes to pursue or causes a 
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certain behaviour to apply to B that B would avoid if possible. Force achieves its ends by 
keeping an agent from doing what she wishes. An exercise of force relies on the physical 
ability of an agent to keep another agent from doing what she would prefer to do or to get 
something to happen to the agent that she would prefer did not. (Wartenberg 1990: 93)  
 
Force equals the application of hard (military) power. It can be found in international 
relations in the form of interstate war. Intrastate wars, according to the classic 
definition, are not a form of international force even if international involvement is 
possible and international effects are frequent, which has resulted in the increasing 
acceptance of intrastate wars as a topic of concern in IR. Other forms of force are 
intervention (one state wages war against another without the other state responding 
in kind) or international terrorism. Force, as we have learnt from Gramsci, is not the 
only feature of hegemony, as otherwise it would be termed imperialism or 
dictatorship. 
 
Coercion 
 
Coercive power . . . targets the set of action-alternatives that constitutes one aspect of an 
agent‟s action environment. When an agent is in a position to threaten to use a resource or 
ability [and by these means affects] the action-alternatives of another agent, then the agent 
can exercise coercive power. (Wartenberg 1990: 96, emphasis added)  
 
Coercive power is exercised if inequality in power resources can be used to threaten 
another actor and if this threat results in adaptation or behavioural change in the 
threatened actor. Keohane and Nye describe coercion (interestingly, they do not 
speak of force in their discussion of power) as a form of behavioural power, which is 
understood as the „ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do 
through threat of punishment or promise of reward‟ (Keohane and Nye 2001: 220). 
Byman and Waxman (2002) argue that: „Coercion is not destruction. Coercive 
strategies are most successful when threats need not even be carried out.‟ 
Furthermore, coercion „boil[s] down to inducing the adversary to choose a different 
policy than he otherwise would‟. Also, „The flipside of threatening an adversary with 
economic or political sanctions is the offering of inducements for compliance‟ 
(Byman and Waxman 2002: ch. 1). 
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Influence 
 
In general, the distinctive feature of influence is that it occurs through the acceptance by the 
subordinate agent of something that the dominant agent tells her. In moving from force 
through coercive power to influence, one moves from a non-discursive form to a purely 
discursive one. Influence is a pure form of communicative interaction, one in which no non-
discursive action is involved. (Wartenberg 1990: 104ff)  
 
Influence results in compliance when it leads to acceptance or consent on the part of 
the affected actor. Power here is used in a „legitimate‟ way: it has the approval of the 
affected actor. Whether this approval is based on misperception or is well-informed 
does not affect the concept of influence (even if it seems clear which form of power 
is ethically superior). Influence in terms of IR theory can be described as „soft 
power‟. The term was coined by Nye to describe power resting on „attraction rather 
than coercion . . . because the others want what you want‟ (Keohane and Nye 2001: 
220). Rhetorical or discursive influence as a sign of hegemony is extensively 
discussed in Laclau and Mouffe (1985).  
 
All these three forms of power are exerted by the USA to varying extents: force is 
mainly exercised outside or alongside global governance and will not be relevant for 
the case studies, while coercion and influence are to be found within global 
governance by the hegemon (ch. 7). Coercion and influence are typical features of 
hegemony, they lead to participation. They will be used here as causal factors. How 
can coercion and influence be conceptualised and operationalised for this purpose? 
        
Coercion is based on sanctions: the threat or the mere possibility of sanctions 
(Wartenberg, in opposition to Nye) that induce a shift in the cost-benefit calculations 
(Byman and Waxman 2002: ch. 1) of the exposed actors. Coercion can be active and 
then is understood as pressure, which is the threat of negative sanctions or the grant 
of positive rewards to other actors (Byman and Waxman 2002: ch. 1). Coercion can 
also be passive, and understood as making use of asymmetric interdependence. 
Asymmetric interdependence entails sensitivity and vulnerability and the possibility 
of a superior and less dependent actor to induce costs for the more dependent actor. 
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This mere possibility can be understood as passive coercion. If an actor calculates 
that it is better for it to follow the way of the stronger actor because it depends on it, 
and a deterioration of the relationship might entail unbearable costs for it, it is 
coerced to adapt its behaviour even if the more powerful actor does not threaten the 
use of this possibility. Therefore, the threat of sanctions as well as the possibility of 
inducing costs are taken as examples of coercion.  
 
Influence is based on the discursive power that can be employed to change the 
rationale and actions of the actors in question. Influence is power applied directly to 
the thinking, the values and beliefs of another actor. Influence, furthermore, 
contributes to the consensus on which hegemony is based. 
 
We should also discuss authority and legitimacy. As we learn from Gilpin, authority 
and legitimacy in global governance rest on others‟ perception of material 
dominance, on the assumption of beneficiality, and on the production of a general 
good or goods. Authority and legitimacy are not only conducive to participation, 
they are also further producers of consensus in global governance, both by the 
induction of fear (induced by material dominance) and fearlessness (induced by the 
idea of beneficiality and the production of a general good or goods).  
 
Material dominance, finally, is measured as the relative power on the world stage, 
comparing the regions to the USA. It is the basis for coercion and authority. 
Socialisation and cost-benefit calculations, as they are not central to Gilpin, are not 
regarded in the following analysis.  
 
Research design 
 
Following Patomäki‟s „critical realism‟ (2002), the analysis to be conducted here 
will be a multi-causal one. From the above-mentioned works in this chapter, the 
following factors contributing to participation can be deduced for the analysis.  
 
Dependent variable: participation in global governance  
As one form of participation we may include active participation (of the majority of 
the member states or the organisation itself), for example in political programmes 
43 
 
and military sorties, and the promotion of the policies and compliance with the 
norms established by the USA. Passive participation entails rhetorical assimilation. 
Participation overall will be measured by analysing the counterterrorism policies, 
strategies and accompanying rhetoric of the regions. It is researched by analysing 
official documents and the available literature.  
 
The test variables (causes of participation, see below) are researched by analysing 
interviews with security-policy experts in the respective regions.  
 
Independent variable 1: relative power 
Relative power describes the relative positioning in the international system. It can 
be based on resources (such as military and economic capabilities) as well as on 
control over outcomes. Hegemony (dominance of one actor, the USA) is thought to 
lead to participation in the GWOT. This is in concert with Börzel‟s findings that 
higher relative political power in the states expected to comply (hence less power or 
hegemony in the inducer) is leading to a decline in participation.  
 
Independent variable 2: active coercion or pressure  
Pressure can be exerted by diplomatic, economic and/or even military means. But 
pressure, as opposed to force, means only the threat of the application of power on 
the part of the major actors in order to create participation in the regional actors. It is 
assumed that pressure leads to participation.  
 
Independent variable 3: interdependence and passive coercion  
Interdependence is a situation in which two or more actors are mutually dependent, 
which means each is sensitive – perhaps even vulnerable – to the others‟ actions. 
Change in the actions of one actor leads to effects on the others. Interdependence is 
mostly based on economic transactions, but can also be found in the security sphere. 
Asymmetric interdependence leads to increased vulnerability for the weaker side (for 
a discussion of this assumption Mansfield and Pollins n.d.), and therefore to a 
willingness to compromise in order to avoid costs. This is congruent with the 
assumption that the mere possibility of inducing costs in any interdependent 
relationship can be interpreted as „passive coercion‟. 
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Independent variable 4: perceived threat of terrorism as influence  
A higher perception of threat should lead to more willingness to participate in the 
global governance of counterterrorism, to reduce the threat and protect the 
population concerned. A higher threat perception does not, of course, necessarily 
have to correlate with a higher threat; still, it is assumed as causal for participation. 
Threat is regarded here as an indicator of hegemonic governance as, arguably, the 
perception of threat as such might be a sign of the „influence‟ (the discursive or 
agenda-setting power) of the USA (Steger 2005: 32ff). Jackson argues that „language 
has been used to deliberately manipulate public anxiety about terrorist threats to gain 
support . . . to normalize a global campaign of counterterrorism‟ (Jackson 2004: 173) 
and describes this as a process of the formation of consent (2004: ch.1). His fourth 
chapter, „Writing Threat and Danger‟, examines how such a „minor form of criminal 
activity which poses a miniscule risk to personal safety – statistically, there is a 
greater chance of choking to death on one‟s lunch than of dying in a terrorist attack – 
has come to be accepted as the single greatest threat‟ by the use of the rhetorical 
influence of the USA (Jackson 2004: 6). Threat perception, therefore, counts here as 
influence of the USA. To check against misinterpretation, this factor is compared to 
statistics on factual terrorist attacks. 
  
Independent variable 5: authority and legitimacy  
Authority and legitimacy of the major actors describe their acceptance within the 
regions. If their authority and legitimacy are high they should lead to more 
participation.  
 
Hypotheses  
From the considerations presented, the following hypotheses can be deduced.  
 
 all or most of the factors (variables 1–5) seem causal, which implies that 
hegemonic governance is causal for participation in the GWOT; and  
 
 none or few of the factors seem causal, which implies that hegemonic 
governance is not causal for participation.  
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3 
Regional Actorness in Counterterrorism:  
The EU as an Example20 
 
The main actors looked at in this study are regions, understood here as macro-
regions, meaning entities comprising a number of states in a common organisation. 
These are generally not established as actors in global governance, at least in the 
academic literature on the phenomenon. In the majority of theories of global 
governance, regions are only marginally seen as actors. Yet there has recently been 
an increased attempt to conceptualise regions, in particular the EU, as actors (Telo 
2007; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009). This study argues that they are seen to 
participate, and thus are actors and worth studying as such. Participation in itself 
might be seen as one feature among others (like external effect, common strategies, 
etc.) for defining an entity as an actor (ch. 3). As the selected regions do indeed 
participate, it is possible to establish them as relevant actors in respect of research on 
causes of participation in the GWOT.  
 
Regions were chosen as case study-units for two reasons: regions are gaining in 
importance as actors in global governance, and the focus on regions allows for the 
study of causes of participation in global governance without having to take into 
account additional supranational influences, which might have distorted the results 
for states. If European states were studied, for example, the analysis would have to 
take into account possible effects being caused by both the European Union level, as 
an intermediary at least, and other external causes. Choosing the regional 
organization as the unit, therefore, seemed to remove this problem. The EU and 
ASEAN furthermore are most similar in terms of integration, but differ in terms of 
level of participation. Variance in the dependent variable is therefore present, as far 
as possible. There are internationally no cases of absolute non-participation, apart 
from states that are declared „terrorist‟ states or „states supporting terrorism‟ 
(currently the only apparent case would be North Korea, even Cuba and Iran engage 
in counterterrorism of sorts). Similarity in characteristic of the units again simplifies 
the analysis by reducing the number of potential additional internal causal factors.  
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This chapter will be concerned with the question of regional actorness in 
counterterrorism, using the EU as its example. It will develop a scheme for 
measuring actorness and then test the counterterrorism cooperation of the EU in 
respect of these criteria. The European Commission, in its „Agenda 2000‟, has 
developed a blueprint for the European Union as an actor:  
  
The Union must increase its influence in world affairs, promote values such as peace and 
security, democracy and human rights, provide aid for the least developed countries, defend 
its social model and establish its presence on the world markets . . . prevent major damage to 
the environment and ensure sustainable growth with an optimum use of world resources. 
Collective action by the European Union is an ever increasing necessity if these interests are 
to be defended, if full advantage is to be taken of the benefits of globalization and if the 
constraints it imposes are to be faced successfully. Europe‟s partners . . . expect it to carry 
out fully its responsibilities. (cited in Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 15)  
 
In this document the assumption is expressed that in a number of policy fields the 
EU is an actor in its own right. To the question of whether the EU is indeed an actor, 
especially in the field of security, one has to look first at the concept of actorness in 
IR. What constitutes an actor? Are only states actors – as in the realist understanding 
– or can regions also fall into this category? How is actorness defined? In addition, 
one has to examine the relative effectiveness of an entity, and thus its capabilities 
and capacities as criteria for actorness.  
 
Actorness in IR 
 
The discipline of IR provides an answer to the question of actorness. The classic 
actors, of course, are states. The EU is a special case. Its globally and politically 
unique character differentiates it from other actors, which are much easier to classify. 
It is more than an international organisation, yet less than a federal state, and for this 
very reason the question of the EU‟s actorness has been given considerable attention. 
In practice, however, attempts to classify the European Community and later the EU 
as an actor have been only moderately successful; existing categories of 
classification were simply inadequate. 
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Realist approaches – here referring to the neo-realist version of the theory – take 
states as their main actors: „For realists, the fundamental unit of political 
organization for the past several centuries has been, and present[ly] is, the nation-
state‟ (Grieco 1997: 164), and:  
 
States set the scene in which they, along with nonstate actors, stage their dramas and carry 
out their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of 
nonstate actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse . . 
. When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate. (Waltz 
1979: 94)  
 
Gilpin observes that „the state is the principal actor in that the nature of the state and 
the pattern of relations among states are the most important determinants of the 
character of international relations at any given moment‟ (1981: 18), and Krasner 
justifies states as the basic actors in the international system by arguing that: „The 
behaviour of other actors, including multinational corporations and international 
organizations, is conditioned and delimited by state decisions and state power‟ 
(1985: 28). Yet, other actors also, such as international institutions, multinational 
enterprises and transnational bodies, are recognised by realists (Grieco 1997: 164). 
Even the European Community (now the EU) is understood as a potential actor, even 
a potential superpower in Waltz‟s seminal work, Theory of International Politics, 
which is the most fundamental account of neo-realism: 
 
The United States is the leading country . . . the question to ask is . . . whether a third or 
fourth country will enter the circle of great powers in the foreseeable future . . . Western 
Europe is the only candidate in the short run – say, by the end of the millennium. Its 
prospects may not be bright, but at least the potential is present and needs only to be 
politically unfolded. Summed, the nine states of Western Europe have a population slightly 
larger than the Soviet Union‟s and a GNP that exceeds hers by 25 percent. Unity will not 
come tomorrow, and if it did, Europe would not instantly achieve stardom. A united Europe 
that developed political competence and military power over the years would one day 
emerge as a third superpower, ranking probably between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. (1979: 180)  
 
In another passage he refers to Europe as a potential „third great power‟ and a 
potential „unit‟ (1979: 201f).  
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A broader approach to IR is that of the world society, developed by Burton (1972), 
Bull (1977) and their followers, wherein entities like IOs are regarded as actors equal 
to states. For example, Rosenau (1990) developed such an approach, giving entities 
from individuals up to social movements a place as actors in IR. Rosenau 
differentiates between micro- and macro-actors in international politics: micro-actors 
can be citizens, officials, leaders and private actors, while macro-actors encompass 
states, IOs and social movements. The EU is considered a macro-actor. Even given 
the relative crudeness of the scheme, this seems to be the most applicable 
classification for thinking about the EU‟s actorness due to its high degree of 
openness. 
 
Since the 1970s, theoretical attempts have been made to integrate new actors into IR. 
The need to do so is caused by what Keohane and Nye (2001) term „complex 
interdependence‟, given the increase in relations and actors at the international level. 
Keohane and Nye (1973: 380) differentiate „governmental, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental‟ actors, which in turn are distinguished by the extent of their 
centralised control to arrive at a six-part classification scheme. The EU (then the EC) 
was not explicitly discussed in this scheme, but would theoretically fall into the 
intergovernmental category. This accords with international law, but cannot 
adequately cover the multidimensional nature of the actor (Bretherton and Vogler 
1999: 20).  
 
The most comprehensive account of the concept of actorness with regard to the EU 
has been developed by Bretherton and Vogler; they establish internal and external 
factors for measuring actorness. 
 
The attribution of actorness does more than simply designate units of a system. It implies an 
entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external environment, and indeed from its 
internal constituents, and which is capable of volition or purpose. Hence a minimal 
behavioural definition of an actor would be an entity that is capable of formulating purposes 
and making decisions, and thus engaging in some form of purposive action. (1999: 20) 
 
Furthermore: 
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Presence conceptualizes the relationship between internal developments and external 
expectations. Opportunity encapsulates factors in the external environment that enable or 
constrain actorness. Capability refers to the capacity to respond effectively to external 
expectations and opportunities. (Treacher 2004: 50) 
 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999) further distinguish between region-ness as well as 
actorness in order to describe the concept of actor. The capacity to act is of relevance 
internally as well as externally, yet the actor can be known by his external actions. 
Whereas region-ness refers mainly to the internal dimension, actorness describes the 
external dimension of common action. Actorness is a result and function of region-
ness, as common action in the external sphere can only manifest itself due to 
cohesion within and due to common action in the internal sphere. An actor, thus, is 
the result of internal as well as external factors.  
 
Following this, Bretherton and Vogler establish five criteria for measuring actorness: 
 
(1) Shared commitment to a set of overarching shared values and principles; 
(2) The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; 
(3) The ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system; 
(4) The availability of, and capacity to, utilize policy instruments; and 
(5) Domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy. 
(cited in Hettne and Soederbaum 2005: 537) 
 
Overall, Bretherton and Vogler use the concept described here to characterise the EU 
as an actor in environmental politics (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Vogler 2005). 
The concept was simplified slightly with the following edition of The European 
Union as a Global Actor (the five criteria above were summarised under „presence‟, 
„the ability to formulate policies‟ and the „availability of policy instruments‟) and it 
was now used to describe the EU as an actor in more than one policy dimension 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2005). In the following, a scheme is presented which builds 
on that of Bretherton and Vogler but distinguishes in addition three dimensions of 
measuring actorness, in all of which the actor has to realise itself. The concept will 
be used to test for actorness of the EU in the sphere of counterterrorism.  
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Figure 2. A concept for measuring actorness 
(Developed in cooperation with Siegmar Schmidt.) 
 
The schema differentiates between internal (structural) and external (effectual) 
criteria, as well as measuring actorness as such (actor-specific criteria). Coherence 
refers to region-ness in Bretherton and Vogler‟s sense, as a measure of regional 
integration. „One voice‟ and „addressability‟ refer to the capability of communicating 
actively and passively with the external world. With regard to the external effects, 
the existence of common strategies seems important, and they are considered more 
thoroughly in the following. Also, the capacity to take external and internal action is 
looked at. Finally, intended effects are regarded as a measure of actorness. With 
regard to the actor-specific criterion, participation in global governance seems 
important and is also a factor to be considered here and in the following chapter, 
along with recognition under international law. 
  
Measuring actorness 
Coherence 
Bretherton and Vogler‟s understanding of coherence (shared values, principles and 
common policies, issues which are discussed in their monograph) being somewhat 
different to the use here, coherence will be discussed more generally. 
 
A region can be defined as a geographical sphere that under certain conditions, for 
example political or economic, forms an entity and is distinguishable from other 
neighbouring regions (Der Große Brockhaus 1980: 399). One can distinguish 
between national, sub-national and international regions. Here it is international 
regions that are mainly of interest, regions that encompass a number of states. Roloff 
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defines the region along these lines as „a geographic area comprised of a number of 
independent states sharing common economic, social and political values and goals‟ 
(cited in Yalem 1965: 15). Thus, the term „region‟, beyond its geographical and 
territorial reference, can encompass further economic, political and even military 
aspects. Regionalism, according to Nye, can be defined as the formation of interstate 
associations or groups on the basis of regions, and even the propagation of these 
formations (Nye 1968: vii). 
 
The region according to the definition given above is a space where we find a certain 
degree of homogeneity, as well as a core centre and external borders. Geographical 
closeness serves as a condition for political and ideological integration (Frey-
Wouters 1969: 466). The academic literature further distinguishes between political 
and economic regions, which describe the underlying motive for cohesion or 
integration. The term „political region‟ describes a geographical entity in which 
individual states form a group; it can also be employed over far distances. The 
political region presides over coincidence or complementarity of interests, and a 
certain degree of solidarity as an ideological and cultural entity. Within the political 
region, institutional structures emerge due to common interests and due to the 
necessity for coordination in order to deal with interdependence. Political regions 
can also be divided into five types: regions of conflict, of confrontation, of 
coexistence, of cooperation and region of consensus. Such political regions can be in 
the process of formation (left to right), or in the process of dissolution (right to left). 
In this schema, certainly, the EU is a political region in the process of formation.  
 
The economic region is in general subordinated to the political region; it is a part of 
and precondition for it. It develops from the interdependence between single 
economic entities and from the complementarity of their national economies and 
their elites. Cooperation between states is the aim of economic union, which is 
realised as economic integration, in the finality of the formation of a political region. 
An economic region can exist other than in a political region, but the lesson of 
historical experience is that an effective political region presupposes – at least in the 
long term – a functioning economic region.  
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The region is not only a geographical, economic and political entity; it can also be 
understood as showing the quality of actorness. This is caused by the fact that, where 
we are dealing with many other economic and political regions, these entities form 
common organisations (Hettne 2005: 11). These can be conceptualised as „a system 
of intentional acts, which would include numerous actors operating in some way in 
concert‟ (Hettne 2005: 11). The differences between this and a state here are gradual: 
whether one can speak of a region as state-like depends on the closeness of its 
supranational community. In the available examples worldwide, the EU is of course 
the most state-like region.  
 
The capacity of a region to take collective action changes with time, which also 
depends on the integrating power of the organisation. The more intensive the 
integration, the more the region can act as a single entity and thus become an actor. 
„When different processes of regionalisation in various fields and at various levels of 
society intensify and converge within the same geographical area, the distinctiveness 
of the emerging region increases‟ (Hettne 2005: 11). The term region-ness then 
means that the region develops from a geographically defined space into an actor, 
and also is increasingly able to articulate interests.  
 
To strengthen the argument by applying Bretherton and Vogler‟s criteria for 
coherence, common values are regarded as a fundamental basis for current European 
integration and enlargement (Emerson 2005; Rehn 2005). Comparing the member 
states‟ policies on counterterrorism allows us to measure coherence: 
 
The initial post 9/11 reactions of the selected countries show no significant differences 
among the countries analysed. Top ministerial steering committees and task forces were 
quickly put together in all countries to provide leadership and a focal point in the confusion 
that followed the attacks. In particular the security and surveillance of commercial aviation, 
designated objects and components of critical infrastructures, dignitaries and, to a lesser 
extent, country borders were immediately strengthened. Intelligence gathering and 
intelligence sharing were increased, both domestically and internationally. All countries 
engaged in and adhered to international negotiations, most notably within the EU, but also 
with the UN, the USA and NATO, except Finland, which is not a NATO member. [And] in 
line with international resolutions, all countries have particularly stepped up their investment 
in the prevention of terrorism by increasing the capacity of intelligence, increasing the 
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capacity to prevent money laundering, and strengthening the legal and law enforcement 
structure to deter terrorism and to bring terrorists to justice quickly, with increasing 
European harmonisation regarding the penal code. (van de Linde et al. 2002: 4) 
 
One voice/addressability  
The criteria of one voice and addressability are only partially fulfilled in the EU. 
Addressability of the EU is provided by the so-called „Troika‟ and by the Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator, now Gilles de Kerchove. This long-standing problem for the 
EU (Kissinger: „Who can I call when I want to speak to Europe?‟) has been solved.  
 
Yet in the case of Iraq, for example, we have seen the EU facing serious difficulties 
in speaking with one voice (Reckman 2004). Interests and policies have differed 
starkly. The EU generally does participate in the GWOT, but in the case of Iraq it 
was divided: 15 of 25 member states were in opposition to participation in the war, 
or undecided. A number of states, for example France and Germany, openly opposed 
participation in „Operation Iraqi Freedom‟. These differences over the Iraq war have 
been debated in public; of special interest have been the related questions of whether 
there were indeed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and of whether an 
intervention was necessary. The differences over such questions made it impossible 
for the Europeans to establish a common standpoint. 
  
The EU failed to think early on about proceeding in common. The two regular 
Council meetings in the first half of 2002 did not deal at all with the question of Iraq 
(Reckmann 2004: 125). The two permanent members of the UN Security Council – 
the UK and France – evinced strong interest in avoiding the issue outside the UN, 
and especially within the EU. Under the Spanish Council presidency there were 
single declarations in support of Resolutions 1284 and 1409. Beyond this, a common 
Council standpoint was issued (in July 2002) only in reference to the embargo 
against Iraq. Europe overall, in 2002, kept a low profile on this question (Reckmann 
2004: 125). As the conflict proceeded, rhetorical and political differences emerged 
between the European states. So, for example, the UK offered its support to the 
USA, if necessary without a UN mandate, a move which arose from the tradition of a 
„special relationship‟. France, in turn, criticised the unilateral policies of Washington 
but on the other hand stressed that further disregard of UN resolutions by Iraq would 
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not be tolerated. Under a new resolution of the Security Council, France would have 
participated in a military intervention; it was France‟s primary aim not to allow the 
Security Council to be further weakened. Germany, meanwhile, completely opposed 
a military solution in Iraq. Any such solution, or any German participation in it, was 
categorically rejected. Instead, the necessity of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
was pointed out (Reckmann 2004: 128).  
 
Due to these very different approaches taken by just three of the most important EU 
member states, a common policy (and voice) was rendered impossible. Still, at an 
informal meeting in Helsingör in 2002 the states came to a compromise that brought 
the USA once again to the Security Council and led to a resolution which introduced 
new weapons inspections in Iraq, but with no automatic mechanism for military 
intervention (Reckmann 2004: 129; the resulting report delivered by Iraq, however, 
was not accepted by the USA). 
  
Further differences within Europe in the following period developed into a serious 
foreign-policy crisis. France threatened a veto in the Security Council, and, together 
with Germany, asked for the support of Russia. The consequence was a dispute that 
came into the open in the Security Council as well as in NATO about proceeding 
against Iraq. The EU member states, as well as the candidates for membership, found 
themselves on opposing sides (Reckmann 2004: 131). Whereas Poland and other 
states supported the USA, France used the EU to „soft-balance‟ the USA. Internal 
tension thus was reflected at the supranational level. Commission President Prodi 
referred to an intervention against Iraq as unnecessary. On the other hand, the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, finally 
accepted a war against Iraq, as a last resort. Yet in June 2003 he delivered a strategy 
paper supporting a strong and assertive role for the EU in international relations, 
criticising the unilateralism of the USA, and describing a multilateral world order as 
the overall aim of the EU. Therefore, even at the European level, internal differences 
were obvious and it was hard to find a common voice. It was clear that this was due 
not only to the integration of new member states, as might have been assumed, but 
reflected the situation in the core of Europe.  
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Later, in the framework of the conflicts with Iran and North Korea, the EU showed 
less opposition to the US position, but also did not focus predominantly on the 
military option the USA proposed (European Commission 2009). 
 
Common strategies  
The EU has (even if comparatively late) formulated a common strategy against 
terrorism. In the counterterrorism strategy adopted after 2005, terrorism is referred to 
as a crime, „criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances‟ (Council of the 
European Union 2005: 6). Terrorism is thus not taken to be an act of war. It is made 
clear that due to its internal freedom the EU is a target for terrorism and thus 
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special protection is needed. This protection – „to reduce the threat‟ (Council of the 
European Union 2005: 6) – was proclaimed as the aim rather than the extinction of 
terrorism. The necessity of cooperating with IOs (especially the UN) and other 
nations was highlighted, though the USA is not specifically mentioned in this 
context. The strategy further builds on four pillars: prevention of terrorism; 
protection of citizens; interdiction of terrorism; and reaction to terrorist attacks. The 
root causes of terrorism are mentioned at the outset, as well as the necessity of 
addressing them: „To prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or 
root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and 
internationally‟ (Council of the European Union 2005: 3). The security of citizens is 
to be improved by enhanced border and transport security, and by the protection of 
critical infrastructure. Terrorists are to be interdicted in Europe and at the 
international level and their criminal activities prevented. Captured terrorists are to 
be brought to justice. Finally, and in a spirit of solidarity, capacities for responding 
to a possible attack are to be improved.  
 
Toye is very critical of the EU strategies: 
  
At the hands-on level, the EU has so far come up with a number of „common strategies‟; it 
has formulated targeted policies against terrorist financing, and launched three military 
operations . . . [However] the common strategies are unfocused and the military operations 
were so small that they would barely have been noticed had they not been the first military 
missions for the EU. (Toye 2005: 118)  
 
Writing four years later, the author does not agree with the above interpretation: 
particularly in distancing itself clearly from the predominantly military approach to 
countering terrorism and by focusing on preventive measures instead, the EU with 
these very strategies has shown a decisive actorness. More on the common strategies 
of the EU is to be found in Chapter 4. 
  
Capability of action within and without  
The capability of a common foreign policy (even if not laid down in the initial 
treaties), as a sign of capability of action „outside‟, is described by Treacher as 
follows:  
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trade with third countries, development policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the 
Single Market, humanitarian relief and the single currency, not to mention enlargement. 
Moreover, the Union‟s economic weight has enabled it, to a greater or lesser extent, to 
impose economic and political conditionality on the third countries it deals with. Irrespective 
of any military dimension, it became, and remains, a significantly influential international 
actor, whether this be in the forum of the World Trade Organization, in the reconstruction of 
former Yugoslavia, in the promotion of liberal market reform and democratic practice in 
central and eastern Europe, or in tackling global underdevelopment. (2004: 51) 
 
In the field of counterterrorism, however, the picture is somewhat unclear. The 
genesis of European cooperation in that area was in the 1970s, when cooperation was 
still problematic due to the nation states‟ fear of loss of competencies. This situation 
has generally improved, but as a problem has up to now not been totally solved 
(Keohane 2005). The EU member states started their cooperation in counterterrorism 
in 1979, when a common police task-force against terrorism was established (Lugna 
2006: 116). The group assembled representatives of national police forces in order to 
harmonise the methods to be used in the fight against the IRA, the Red Brigade and 
the Baader-Meinhof group. The increase in transnational criminality and in violent 
excesses at football games in the 1980s hastened European cooperation in this 
regard. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 made police cooperation a common policy. 
  
After 9/11, the EU governments directed more resources to the fight against 
terrorism (Lugna 2006; and European Commission n.d.). A European Arrest Warrant 
was established that rests on a common definition of terrorism and that allows the 
member states to cooperate in the prosecution of terrorists and criminals; a common 
list of terrorist groups was also established. There have been common exercises for 
police forces in the EU, and governments have given additional resources to Europol 
and created a special force for counterterrorism operations. „The governments also 
created Eurojust, the EU‟s nascent law enforcement agency, to help national 
magistrates work together on cross-border investigations‟ (Keohane 2005: 17). In 
November 2004, the ministries for justice and the interior agreed on a five-year plan 
known as the Hague Programme (European Commission n.d.). The plan covers all 
aspects of their security policy and legal cooperation and will operate until 2010. It 
further encompasses a number of measures that will be used in the fight against 
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terrorism; an example is the right of police officers to demand information from 
police agencies in other countries. Cooperation with regard to information-sharing 
on aviation passenger-lists has been debated.  
  
In March 2004, three days before the attacks in Madrid, Javier Solana presented a 
report on the status of EU efforts on counterterrorism (Keohane 2005: 18). The 
report hinted at three serious shortcomings: some member states had not 
implemented the common agreements (for example, the EU arrest warrant). The EU 
lacked sufficient resources to play an important role in counterterrorism, and 
coordination between the representatives in the differt policy fields remained weak. 
After the attacks in Madrid, Gijs de Vries was named the EU‟s Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator; yet he did not have the resources to implement his ideas, apart from the 
power to compel. He did not have a budget and could not propose legislation. De 
Vries was supposed to influence cooperation between the Commission and the 
Council (Keohane 2005: 19). The Commission develops legal texts for a number of 
measures against terrorism (as, for example, in the fight against criminal funding) 
and proposes them. In the Council, the interior and foreign ministries meet in order 
to decide on common EU policies.  
 
Furthermore, even given certain common approaches against terrorism, EU 
governments differ in their legal procedures. For example, Germany, Belgium and 
the Netherlands have only weak laws for the fight against terrorism, and often fail to 
arrest suspects. In Germany, those suspected of belonging to terrorist groups 
(according to Keohane) are allowed to go free, whereas in other states they would be 
arrested. For example, in the UK counterterrorism laws are stricter, and the 
intelligence services dominate internal counterterrorism, while France and Spain 
provide special courts to deal with terrorists. States also differ in the organisation of 
their police forces. France and Italy, for instance, have two different kinds of police. 
The carabinieri in Italy and the gendarmes in France are the responsibility of the 
defence ministry, whereas the rest of the police forces work under the ministry of the 
interior. Denmark, Finland and Ireland have national police forces that are centrally 
managed. The UK and Spain have decentralised police forces. In Britain there are 
more than 50 different police entities. It should be clear from this that there are large 
differences in the structures employed in counterterrorism, which makes it difficult 
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for the EU to act internally. However, there are common structures in development, 
such as Europol, whose powers have been enhanced after a Council decision:  
 
Europol is now also competent to investigate, for instance, murder, kidnapping, hostage-
taking, racism, corruption, unlawful drug trafficking, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in 
human beings, motor vehicle crime etc. Moreover, the Council has adopted a Framework 
Decision which enables Member States to set up joint investigation teams. (Lavranos 2003: 
262)  
 
A problem for counterterrorism „within‟ the EU is that it is not a well-defined policy 
field. Broadly understood, it can encompass a large number of such fields and of 
accountabilities, like border control and foreign and defence policy, as well as legal 
issues, intelligence, financial policies, information policies, and so forth. Therefore 
national governance faces problems in coordinating its own ministries and agencies, 
which are all in some way accountable for countering terrorism. It is even more 
problematic to coordinate the efforts of the (now) 27 member states. However, the 
EU is currently unified in the conviction that cooperation with regard to 
counterterrorism is necessary as it deals with a transnational problem that cannot 
possibly be solved or even addressed by single states alone. On the other hand, a 
high level of willingness to allocate to the EU competencies and resources needed 
for it to be truly effective is still not present; and the EU is therefore limited mainly 
to the difficult task of coordinating the counterterrorism policies of the member 
states.  
 
Externally, the EU is collectively active, for example in Afghanistan, where the 
member states participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The 
EU as an organisation provides aid to the country, it has sent a police training 
mission, and in Iraq it has been participating since 2006 with the EURJUST mission 
(Council of the European Union 2006a, ch. 4). Its military capabilities for possible 
involvement in military operations in the GWOT are estimated as follows:  
 
The combined armed forces of the EU-25 total over 1.8 million. From these, the Headline 
Goal (HG) agreed at the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) aims to make 
available to the EU the necessary capabilities, including the necessary command and control, 
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intelligence, logistics and air and naval assets, to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops 
within 60 days and sustainable for a year, (Biscop 2004: 512)  
 
The EU is very much in favour of and engages in international cooperation in the 
sphere of counterterrorism. For example, it works together with the USA in the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF); Europol and the USA have signed two 
strategic cooperation-agreements, and consultations regarding further cooperation 
are taking place (Kerber 2007). The EU is also in contact with Russia over 
counterterrorism questions as well as other states with which it has cooperation 
mechanisms (European Commission 2006). Counterterrorism legislation is 
integrated into treaties with other states, and with many states there have been 
common declarations (and also with other regions, such as ASEAN). In some cases, 
the EU supplies other states with technical aid in order to facilitate the 
implementation of Resolution 1373.  
 
Further, the EU is active in preventing the recruitment of terrorists in third countries:  
 
Through its military and civilian crisis management operations under ESDP the EU 
contributes to improving the security environment which influences the conditions for 
violent radicalisation in third countries. Examples include the Aceh operation (2006), the 
Rafah border monitoring mission (Gaza), and the planned police support mission in 
Afghanistan (2007). Additional civilian capabilities to prevent and counter terrorism under 
ESDP are being identified within the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 . . . EU aid projects to 
third countries in the field of good governance and the rule of law are addressing factors 
which can contribute to radicalisation and recruitment (Euromed, Western Balkans, ASEM, 
cooperation with Algeria and Morocco) . . . With the Euromed countries the EU has 
organised expert meetings to analyse and compare processes of radicalisation in the 
Mediterranean area. The Commission will organise a Euromed conference on the role of the 
media in preventing incitement in 2007. (EU Council Secretariat 2007: 2) 
 
Counterterrorism is a cross-pillar policy field (Stetter 2004; Monar 2007). It is 
addressed at the first, second and third pillars, or European Community (EC), 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), and Police and Judicial co-operation 
in Criminal Matters (PJCC). Whereas in the first pillar the EU has traditionally the 
capability to act outside its own borders, this situation is less clear in the second and 
third pillars. In the second pillar, it is still mainly the member states that decide on 
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foreign policy. Regarding the third pillar, Monar (2004) writes that the „Council can 
make use of the CFSP provision enabling it to negotiate and conclude agreements 
with third countries or international organizations‟. However, „not the Union as such 
can conclude such agreements but only the Council in the name of the Member 
States‟ (Monar 2004: 400).  
 
We could argue here rather for collective action, and therefore collective actorness, 
than unity. Musu confirms this interpretation with his observation on „the 
development of a stronger convergence of Member State policies as a result of the 
influence exercised by a number of exogenous and endogenous variables‟ (2003: 
48). Monar also provides us with arguments for this interpretation: firstly, the 
legitimacy of common action if it stems from the EU‟s treaty-defined objectives and 
tasks for the safety of citizens; secondly, the involvement of the Council as an organ 
of the EU, as well as the fact that EU institutions are bound by collective action; and 
thirdly, the widespread use of majority voting, which all seem to speak for the 
actorness of the EU in this field. 
  
External effect  
It is difficult to estimate developments in international terrorism, as the numbers 
published differ to such a large extent. Firstly, the data from the RAND Corporation 
must be cited: there were 104 international terrorist attacks in 2000, 298 in 2002 and 
302 in 2005. These data show a decrease in the late 1990s and a strong increase after 
2001 (RAND MIPT database). The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), set 
up by President Bush, counted 3,192 attacks with 28,433 victims in 2006, and 
11,770 attacks with 50,000 victims in 2008 (National Counterterrorism Center 
2008). The Human Security Report (2005) has also found an increase in terrorism 
since 2001. Officials of the State Department and the NCTC have referred to these 
new numbers as „dramatic uptick‟. Experts like Bruce Hoffman have spoken of an 
increase in the personal basis of international terrorism and predicted a further 
increase for the coming years (World Economic Forum 2005). Given these numbers, 
it seems clear that terrorism is increasing rather than on the decline. However, there 
is no obvious way of measuring the external effect of the EU on terrorism, and in 
any event other factors (such as the intervention policies of the USA and others) 
clearly influence that effect. Furthermore, the overall increase in terrorism is 
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reflected in some regions, but not in all. For example, the data do not support the 
assumption of an increase of terrorism within the EU itself, which in turn could be a 
sign of effectiveness of EU counterterrorism policies internally. 
 
Where the EU does have a clear impact is in promoting counterterrorism 
cooperation. As the counterterrorism expert Michael Bauer has stated (interview 
with the author, 2007), the EU is constantly trying to convince other states to 
improve their counterterrorism measures and is backing these demands with 
technical help, for example to ASEAN (ch. 5). Common declarations have been 
signed by which ASEAN‟s compliance with international norms and over 
cooperation with the EU is being improved.  
 
Participation in global governance  
The classic concepts of global governance (e.g. by Rosenau and Czempiel or the 
Commission on Global Governance) contain little elaboration on the role of regions 
as actors in global governance. The first explicit reference to regions was made by 
Messner and Nuscheler (2003). In their concept, regions are regarded as one level in 
global governance, and one type of actor in it. The EU in particular is explicitly 
termed a „laboratory for Global Governance‟ (Messner and Nuscheler 1997: 351). In 
the final report of the Enquete Commission of the German Parliament, 
Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft – Herausforderungen und Antworten (Enquete-
Kommission 2002) regions are also seen as actors in global governance. The report 
states that global governance has to be based and built on regional cores of 
cooperation. Whether the EU can be termed an actor in global governance, therefore, 
might depend on the level of participation therein. 
  
To give some examples of its participation, the EU has developed a number of 
regulations in order to implement the resolutions (particularly 1373) of the UN 
Security Council. For example on 26 January 2002 the EU signed the UN protocol 
on the illegal production and trade in small weapons, their parts or ammunition. The 
EU is currently working on implementing the protocol in its repertoire of legislation, 
the acquis communautaire (Brasack 2007). The signing and ratification of the 12 
counterterrorism conventions is the responsibility of the single member states, but all 
of them are called upon to do so within the common position adopted by the 
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Council‟s note 2001/930/CFSP (Eur-Lex 2001) of 27 December 2001. The process 
of ratification is monitored at the EU level. In addition, the member states are 
cooperating in the Financial Action Task Force, which is an element of global 
governance. At the EU level, lists have been drawn up that name individuals, groups 
and other entities that are to be made subject to financial control measures; al Qaeda 
is one of them. The EU cooperates with the USA on extradition, mutual legal 
assistance and the exchange of police data (Mitsilegas 2003), as does Europol 
(Lavranos 2003). The issue of participation in global governance will also be a 
central feature of Chapter 4.  
 
Recognition in international law 
International law, by recognising the EU, identifies it as a „legal personality‟ and 
thus provides a formal answer to the question of the EU‟s actorness. Since the peace 
of Westphalia, the state has normally been the main actor in international law, and is 
thus a legal personality in IR. States can enter into treaties, for example, and be held 
accountable for their policies by the UN Security Council: „Legal actorness confers a 
right to participate, but also to be held responsible by other actors, and to incur 
obligations‟ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 16). Since the middle of the twentieth 
century, with increasing globalisation and a decrease in individual states‟ 
sovereignty, the assumption that the state is the only actor has been challenged. The 
first formal recognition of this change was made by the establishment of the UN as a 
legal personality by the International Court of Justice. „On this basis the European 
Community achieved legal personality, although its formal status has been that of an 
intergovernmental organization and it is entitled to act only in areas of legally 
established competence‟ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 14). Lavranos concurs with 
this interpretation:  
 
In my view, the EU has an implicit international legal personality, which it has indeed 
exercised already by concluding so far at least three international agreements with a third 
state. In fact, the „Working Group III on Legal Personality‟ which advised the European 
Convention unanimously proposed to include in the new European Convention a provision 
granting one legal personality for the whole EU. (Lavranos 2003: 263)  
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Conclusion  
 
The EU can indeed be termed an actor in the security field of counterterrorism. It is 
still a weak actor, as is shown in certain critical fields, and there are for example 
limitations regarding a common voice for the EU. Yet overall it does show 
characteristics of an actor: it can be addressed, it has an effect on other countries and 
regions, and it is termed an actor in international law. However, due to the problems 
mentioned above over a common voice and the internal capability to take action, it 
might be sensible to speak of a „collective actor‟ here. „Collective actorness‟ would 
describe the fact that the member states always act within the common frame of 
reference and with regard to each other, though not necessarily in consensus. Others 
have also argued for the actorness of the EU: Monar (2004), for example, described 
the EU as an international actor in the domain of Justice and Home Affairs (now 
called Police & Judicial co-operation in Criminal Matters). 
 
In the case of ASEAN, it is more difficult to speak of actorness (Rüland 2002: 6). 
Eaton and Stubbs (2006) argue that it is particularly from the constructivist 
perspective that ASEAN can be regarded as an actor (and as a powerful one) in 
international affairs. Realist scholars more often tend to dispute this interpretation. It 
is usually agreed that the main actors in ASEAN are still the member states. 
However, ASEAN does play an important role at the intergovernmental level. These 
features will be better described in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, ASEAN can be 
understood as an „evolving‟ or „emerging‟ collective actor, a term that describes the 
fact that the member states use ASEAN to come to some form of collective action, 
even if they do not always cooperate or agree on common policies. This concurs 
with the interpretations of others (Soesastro 2003; Philippine Information Agency 
2008, Rüland 2001; Nischalke 2000): 
 
Notwithstanding a high degree of external cohesion, decision-makers in the ASEAN 
countries have shown reluctance to abide by the norms of consultation and consensus. The 
need to harness support and external pressure explains best the only modestly high degree of 
norm compliance. Put starkly, the „ASEAN way‟ has proven to be a myth. As an 
international actor, ASEAN has constituted a community of convenience based on functional 
considerations rather than a community of shared visions. These findings cast doubt on 
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optimistic accounts of ASEAN as an emerging security community. On the other hand, 
optimism can be derived from the fact that ASEAN has been able to arrive at common 
positions and present a cohesive front towards outside powers even when beset by internal 
disagreements. ASEAN‟s behaviour bespeaks a latent reservoir of „we-feeling‟ that could 
provide the seed for a community in the future. (Nischalke 2000: 113) 
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4 
EU Counterterrorism Participation and Causes  
 
The threat scenario 
 
A Europol report describes the threat situation thus: 
 
Eleven member states were targeted by 498 terrorist attacks in 2006. During October–
December 2005, 51 terrorist attacks were carried out in the EU. Despite the high number of 
terrorist attacks, the vast majority of them resulted only in material damage and [were] not 
intended to kill. There were no successful Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006. 
However, a coordinated but ultimately failed attack aimed at mass casualties took place in 
Germany. The vast majority of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by separatist terrorist 
groups targeting France and Spain. (Europol 2007: 13) 
 
 
Table 2. Terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006 by types of terrorism 
 
Member 
state 
Islamist Separatist Left-wing Right-wing Other/not 
specified 
Total 
Austria  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Belgium  0  0  0  0  1  1 
France  0  283  0  0  11  294 
Germany  1  0  10  0  2  13 
Greece  0  0  25  0  0  25 
Ireland  0  1  0  0  0  1 
Italy  0  0  11  0  0  11 
Poland  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Portugal  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Spain  0  136  8  0  1  145 
UK  0  4  0  0  1  5 
Total  1  424  55  1  17  498 
 
Source: Europol 2007: 13. 
 
The RAND MIPT database counts only 152 cases of terrorist attacks in 2006. It is 
interesting to note (according to this database) that since the time of the 9/11 attacks, 
the general occurrence of terrorism in Western Europe has not increased. Whereas 
the database (now merged with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
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and Responses to Terrorism, START) counts 205 attacks or threats of attacks per 
year for the period 1970–97 (5,540 overall in Europe21), it counts 207 attacks or 
threats of attacks pear year for the period 1998–2004 (1,246 overall, according to 
START).  
 
Counterterrorism in the EU 
 
The beginning of European cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism dates back 
to the 1970s. Cooperation was at that time hampered by fears of losing national 
prerogatives. However, in 1976 the so-called Trevi (Terrorism, Radicalism, 
Extremism and Violence International) Group of interior and justice ministers was 
established:  
 
This was largely an intergovernmental forum for collaboration outside of the formal treaty 
structure and it lacked a permanent secretariat, but provided the law enforcement authorities 
in the European Union with a limited, yet useful way to communicate and exchange 
information on various transnational crimes, as well as to share best practices to combat 
them. (Lugna 2006: 105)  
 
The group brought together representatives of national police forces to coordinate 
methods in the fight against the IRA, the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof 
Group. With increasing transnational crime and violence in sports events in the 
1980s, cooperation in this field also increased. With the Maastricht Treaty, police 
cooperation was introduced into the common policies of the EU (Lugna 2006: 116).  
 
After September 2001 governments provided more resources for the fight against 
terrorism. A common arrest warrant was introduced in the EU as well as a common 
definition of terrorism. A European list of terrorist groups was established, as were 
joint exercises by the police forces of the member states. The governments provided 
Europol with additional resources and established a joint task-force for 
counterterrorism. Furthermore, „the governments also created Eurojust, the EU‟s 
nascent law enforcement agency, to help national magistrates work together on 
cross-border investigations‟ (Keohane 2005: 17). In November 2004, the member 
states‟ ministers of justice and the interior agreed on the so-called Hague 
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Programme. This five-year plan addresses cooperation in security policy and judicial 
matters, and is to continue until 2010. It comprises a number of measures to be 
pursued in the fight against terrorism, for example, the possibility of police forces 
calling for information from bureaux of other member states. It has also considered 
the handling of flight-data lists. With the Hague Programme, the ministers of the 
interior took up a leading role in the fight against terrorism (Keohane 2005: 17).  
 
In March 2004, three days before the attack in Madrid, Javier Solana issued a report 
on the status of the EU‟s efforts in counterterrorism (Keohane 2005: 18). He pointed 
out a number of shortcomings: a number of member states would not implement 
common agreements, e.g. the European Arrest Warrant; the EU lacked sufficient 
resources to be an important player in counterterrorism; and cooperation between 
responsible figures in individual institutions was weak. Against this background, and 
following the attack in Madrid, Gijs de Vries was installed as the Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator (ch. 3).  
 
Up to now, the EU‟s member states have been the main actors in European 
counterterrorism. The EU itself, according to Keohane, only has the role of a 
coordinator. Among the member states, individual states such as France, Spain, the 
UK and Ireland are leading in cooperation. If the EU had more competencies in 
counterterrorism related policy fields, it could facilitate cooperation and broaden it to 
the whole community, as happened with the European Arrest Warrant. Many fora 
exist for the member states to cooperate outside the formal EU framework: for 
example, the so-called G5 Group of the biggest five member states (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) meet to coordinate their political 
counterterrorism measures.  
 
Institutional setting of counterterrorism 
 
Counterterrorism in the EU can be described as cross-pillar politics (Stetter 2004; 
Monar 2007), as more than one pillar is involved. However, counterterrorism is 
officially located in the so-called „third pillar‟. The third pillar formerly concerned 
Justice and Home Affairs, but has now been renamed to address Police and Judicial 
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Co-operation in Criminal Matters; it is one of the two intergovernmental pillars (the 
second and third).  
 
Table 3. The three pillars of the EU 
 
First pillar (European 
Communities, EC) 
Second pillar (Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, CSFP) 
Third pillar (Police and 
Judicial Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters, PJCC) 
Common policies:  
 Agriculture, fisheries 
 Trade 
 Transport 
 Customs union and internal 
market 
 Economic and monetary 
policy 
 Industrial policy 
 Regional policy 
 Policy to strengthen 
economic and social 
cohesion 
 Employment and social 
policy 
 Energy 
 Research and development 
 Environment 
 Consumer protection 
 Culture 
 Audiovisual policy 
 Public health 
 Education, training and 
youth 
 Trans-European networks 
 Development aid 
 Competition 
 Taxation and approximation 
of laws 
 Judicial cooperation in civil 
matters 
 Citizenship of the Union 
 Asylum and immigration 
 External borders 
 
EURATOM 
Foreign policy: 
 Cooperation, common 
positions and joint action 
 Peacekeeping 
 Human rights 
 Democracy 
 Aid to non-member 
countries 
 
Security policy: 
 With the support of the 
WEU: questions concerning 
the security of the EU 
 Disarmament 
 Economic aspects of 
armament 
 In the long term: European 
security framework 
 
 
 
 Judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters 
 Police cooperation 
 Combating racism and 
xenophobia 
 Fighting drugs and the 
arms trade 
 Fighting organised crime 
 Fighting terrorism 
 Combating criminal 
acts against children 
and trafficking in 
human beings 
 
 
Source: Eur-Lex 2009 
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The European Council discusses proposals by the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
and the General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council at least once a year. In June 
2005, it adopted the Plan of Action (containing some 100 initiatives on combating 
terrorism). It also identified a number of priority areas, including information-
sharing, combating the financing of terrorism, mainstreaming counterterrorism 
action in the external affairs of Europe, and improving civil protection and the 
protection of critical infrastructures (Lugna 2006: 108). However, the European 
Council‟s resolutions often remain mere declarations. 
  
The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) prepares the decisions of 
the Council. It has established a contact group of persons from the member states‟ 
permanent representations in Brussels which deals with all aspects of terrorism, and 
whose task is also to act as a central contact-point to gather all the information 
related to counterterrorism (Lugna 2006: 108). 
 
In the Justice and Home Affairs Council, justice and interior ministers meet on 
average once a month to discuss the development of cooperation in the sector. The 
Council has adopted „important legislative measures to facilitate cross-border 
cooperation‟, particularly „by national law enforcement authorities and intelligence 
agencies‟ (Lugna 2006: 109). It is supported by the Article 36 Committee, which 
brings its views to the attention of the Council and coordinates the work of several 
third pillar working groups (dealing with police cooperation, judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, the Schengen information system, etc.). It is also supported by its 
Terrorism Working Group, which was established specifically to address terrorism 
and counterterrorism issues. The group consists of representatives from the member 
states‟ ministries of the interior and law-enforcement agencies, and addresses 
internal threat assessment, and practical cooperation and coordination among EU 
bodies (Lugna 2006: 109). It covers only aspects of cooperation in law-enforcement, 
as opposed to the third pillar (PJCC) elements in the fight against terrorism (such as 
visa policy, document security, etc.). The Working Group on Civil Protection is 
concerned with early-warning mechanisms and consequence management. The 
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum coordinates the work of 
the various working groups in the field of migration, visas, borders and asylum. 
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The General Affairs and External Relations Council mainly updates the EU list of 
terrorist groups and individuals. It is supported by the Political and Security 
Committee, which coordinates the second pillar working groups, and by the Working 
Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors which deals with the freezing of assets of 
terrorist organisations. The Working Party on Terrorism also deals with issues 
related to external matters, threat assessments and policy recommendations as 
regards third countries, as well as implementation of UN conventions (Lugna 2006: 
111).  
 
The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is affiliated with the Council Secretariat, 
coordinates the work of the Council in combating terrorism and maintains an 
overview of all the EU instruments and mechanisms at its disposal for fighting 
terrorism. However:  
 
[He] has virtually no powers, apart from persuasion as he cannot force governments to act, in 
addition he has no budget and cannot propose legislation nor can he chair meetings of 
national justice or foreign ministers to set the anti-terrorism agenda. (Lugna 2006: 111)  
 
The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is thought to influence the cooperation between 
the Commission and the Council in counterterrorism matters. The Commission 
proposes legislation for measures in the fight against terrorism and in the Council; 
interior and foreign ministers meet to plan the EU‟s strategic policies. Within the 
Commission, better coordination of the directorates is necessary. However, the 
Commission is sceptical of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator – it was feared he 
could hamper the competencies of the Commission. In addition, a number of other 
institutions and agencies (such as Europol and Eurojust) have a role in countering 
terrorism, all tackling different aspects of the task. It is also the responsibility of the 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to coordinate those. The EU‟s counterterrorism 
structures are very complex, and it was the task of the Coordinator to rationalise 
them. One proposal was the installation of a „European security committee‟ 
(Keohane 2005: 20).  
 
 
The EU Commission makes proposals, together with the member states, for EU 
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legislation in the fields of Justice, Freedom and Security. It also monitors its 
implementation.  
 
Generally, the Commission, which until 1997 had virtually no role in the area of law 
enforcement and security, is now fully associated with the work and indeed has generated, in 
response to the requests from the Council and the European Council, most of the proposals in 
the field of counterterrorism. (Lugna 2006: 112)  
 
There is an internal working group of the Commission on counterterrorism dealing 
with external and internal aspects. Below that level there are groups focusing on one 
or the other of those aspects. The Monitoring and Information Centre is the central 
instrument of cooperation between the national emergency systems, able to provide 
assessment and coordination teams. In addition, there is a Situation Centre staffed 
with national experts to analyse intelligence reports from the member. 
 
There are also a number of independent agencies dealing with counterterrorism at the 
EU level. They are under the intergovernmental control of the member states. The 
first is Europol, which is the „European Union law enforcement organization that 
handles criminal intelligence‟ (Lugna 2006: 113). It maintains a European database 
used to analyse and investigate crimes, and assists national police forces by sharing 
this information. Whereas Europol has established a Counter-Terrorism Task Force, 
Eurojust serves to improve cooperation between investigators and prosecutors of 
crimes, including terrorism. The European Border Agency, meanwhile, coordinates 
operational cooperation between the member states with regard to the management 
of their external borders.  
 
Also, member states cooperate outside the Council in the Counter-Terrorism Group 
(CTG). It brings together the security services of the member states and is a follow-
up to the so-called „Group of Bern‟ (Lugna 2006: 115). In the G5 Group, the biggest 
five member states meet to coordinate their political measures. Beyond this, there are 
other multinational groups in existence, such the Salzburg Group and the Baltic Sea 
Task Force.  
 
European strategies against terrorism 
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The European Security Strategy 
In December 2003, the EU member states issued a common European Security 
Strategy which inter alia addresses the problem of terrorism: „Europe is both a target 
and a base for such terrorism . . . Concerted European action is indispensable‟ (cited 
in Keohane 2005: 6). The document calls for a broad-based strategy against 
terrorism: „none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by 
purely military means . . . Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of 
intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means‟ (Keohane 2005: 6). 
 
Though there are similarities with the US strategy, the two differ fundamentally. The 
Europeans in general do not believe in the possibility of success in a war on 
terrorism, as the Americans do. The regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq are only 
partially supported and are not regarded as primary in the fight against terrorism. The 
US approach to terrorism, furthermore, is understood to be too short-term oriented 
and ignores the long-term aspects of dealing with the problem: „Many think that the 
US approach concentrates too much on averting terrorist attacks in the short-term 
and not enough on the long-term political challenge of militant Islamist terrorism‟ 
(Keohane 2005: 7). Gilles Andreani, a former director in the French foreign ministry, 
described the American strategy as „a good cause‟ but „the wrong concept‟ (cited in 
Keohane 2005: 7). Europe understands terrorism to be more a means than an end in 
itself, and that the focus has to be on the root causes of the phenomenon. The EU is 
therefore more interested in long-term strategies against terrorism.  
 
Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (Hague Programme) 
The Madrid attacks prompted the Council of the EU to create the EU Action Plan 
against terrorism. The Council of the European Union Declaration of 25 March 2004 
set out the following seven objectives for the EU‟s Action Plan against terrorism:  
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 To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to  
 combat terrorism; 
 To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources; 
 To maximize the capacity within EU bodies and Member States to detect,  
 investigate and prosecute and to prevent terrorist attacks;  
 To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border 
control; 
 To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to  
 deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; 
 To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into,  
 terrorism;  
 To target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third  
 Countries where counterterrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be 
enhanced. (Council of the European Union 2004) 
 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
In the 2005 strategy of the EU on terrorism, the latter is described as a criminal act: 
„criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances‟ (Council of the European 
Union 2005: 6); it is not, therefore, an act of war. It is stated that the EU, due to its 
internal freedoms, is a target for terrorism and that there is a need for special 
protection. This protection – „to reduce the threat‟ (Council of the European Union 
2005: 6) – is declared the goal, rather than the wholesale elimination of terrorists. 
The strategy further states that cooperation with international organisations (IOs) – 
especially the UN – and with other nations is necessary.  
 
The strategy is based on four pillars: prevention of attacks, protection of citizens, 
pursuit of terrorists and reaction to terrorist attacks. The strategy states at the outset 
that the root causes of terrorism must be tackled: „To prevent people turning to 
terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and 
recruitment, in Europe and internationally‟ (Council of the European Union 2005: 3). 
For the protection of citizens, border security was to be enhanced as were the safety 
of transport and the protection of critical infrastructure. Terrorists were to be pursued 
in Europe as well as at the international level, and hindered from carrying out their 
activities. Here, the EU explicitly mentions the network character of new terrorist 
organisations and the necessity of controlling financial transactions and interdicting 
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terrorist access to weapons. Finally, terrorists must be brought to justice, and in 
addition, in a spirit of solidarity, the capacities to deal with a possible attack must be 
enhanced (Council of the European Union 2005: 3).  
 
„Prevent‟ 
Importantly for the prevention of terrorism, the causes of radicalisation of parts of 
societies are often similar (Council of the European Union 2005: 7), so it is possible 
to speak of root causes that must be addressed. Here, the focus is primarily on 
terrorist recruitment, for countering which the responsibility rests with the EU 
member states. It remains the task of the EU to facilitate the exchange of 
information, to pass on information on best practice, and to coordinate national 
policies. It is further stated that national governments alone will not be able to solve 
the task of preventing terrorism: „This challenge . . . will require the full engagement 
of all populations in Europe and beyond‟ (Council of the European Union 2005: 8). 
The factors which facilitate radicalisation are: autocratic governments and bad 
governance; rapid modernisation without adaptation; lack of political and economic 
options; and lack of education. Such factors are not generally to be found in the EU, 
or only in some segments of the population. As an external counter-strategy, the 
promotion of good governance, human rights and democracy are proposed (the 
strategy being in such respects similar to that of the USA). Also, education and 
economic progress would have to be promoted, as would the resolution of conflicts 
(Council of the European Union 2005: 9). Inequalities and discrimination must be 
addressed, and intercultural dialogue and integration facilitated.  
 
The strategy further refers to the recruitment of terrorists. Facilitators for recruitment 
are identified as: the spread of globalisation (with regard to travel and 
communication); the activities of radicalisers; training for future terrorists; and the 
internet (Council of the European Union 2005: 8). Terrorism is explained as the 
result of an extremist world-view spread by means of propaganda, which has to be 
met by counter-propaganda and publicity.  
 
Finally, a list of priorities regarding prevention is presented, which addresses firstly 
the prevention of Internet misuse, followed by prevention of terrorist recruitment in 
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zones of particular danger. The promotion of democracy and foreign aid are 
mentioned in third and fourth places.  
 
„Protect‟ 
The protection of citizens is the responsibility of the member states. Transnational 
traffic and border control, however, demand collective action by the EU. 
  
Explicitly mentioned is the protection of external borders to prevent the immigration 
of terrorists. Here, the European Borders Agency (Frontex) is to be used for a risk 
analysis. A visa information-system is to be established as well as a second-
generation Schengen information system. In addition, the security of transport is to 
be enhanced, particularly at ports and airports. 
  
The vulnerability of critical infrastructures is to be reduced. For this, a programme 
was already in operation (Council of the European Union 2005: 11). There is 
elaboration on further measures in this area: „We must . . . ensure that our collective 
work . . . contributes to developing methodologies for protecting crowded places and 
other soft targets from attacks‟ (Council of the European Union 2005: 11). 
 
Priorities in the protection of citizens are:  
 
 the enhancement of passport security by introduction of biometric data; 
 establishment of a visa-information system and a second-generation Schengen 
information system (SSIS); 
 risk analysis of external borders by Frontex; 
 common standards in transport security; and 
 finalisation of a European programme for the protection of critical 
infrastructures. (Council of the European Union 2005: 11). 
  
„Pursue‟ 
The EU is to enhance its efforts to pursue terrorists and to hinder them in carrying 
out their plans (Council of the European Union 2005: 12). While the pursuit of 
terrorists is highlighted, human rights and international law are also mentioned: „. . . 
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while continuing to respect human rights and international law‟ (Council of the 
European Union 2005: 12). The member states are to be supported by the Union in 
exchanging information and cooperating in matters of justice and intelligence. At the 
national level, the authorities must provide the necessary means for gathering and 
analysing information. A peer-evaluation process of practices is to be installed. 
Decision-makers will be kept informed of the threat status by the Joint Situation 
Centre. 
  
There is a particular focus on juridical cooperation (e.g. on the European Arrest 
Warrant), as well as on cooperation between police forces. In addition, the Internet 
will be kept under surveillance and communication data from it will be gathered 
(Council of the European Union 2005: 23). Finally, action on the prevention of 
criminal financial transactions is described, including the necessity of cooperating 
with the UN. An additional aim is mentioned here: to prevent terrorists from 
acquiring WMD, and as well as from aquiring support from third states.  
 
„Respond‟ 
In response to attacks, all available measures are to be implemented, including the 
Civil Protection Mechanism. This involves the participation of 30 European states, 
pooling their civil-protection resources and making them available to disaster-struck 
countries. In the case of transnational damage, the necessity of rapid and all-
encompassing cooperation is highlighted. Here again, the main responsibility rests 
with the member states, which should consider establishing a common data-bank for 
capability assessment.  
 
Overall, the strategy highlights the responsibility of the member states. The role of 
the Union lies in four fields:  
 
• strengthening of the capacities by enhanced information exchange; 
• facilitation of European cooperation by legislative measures; 
• development of collective capabilities: here, the existing institutions on EU level 
shall be used (Europol, Eurojust and others); and 
• promotion of international cooperation, particularly with the UN and central third 
countries, including the search for consensus on measures in counterterrorism. 
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(Council of the European Union 2005: 4).  
 
International cooperation in counterterrorism: participation in global 
governance 
 
Participation in global counterterrorism efforts will be measured below. It can be 
concluded that the EU is active in all formerly designated spheres of participation. 
However, it must be reiterated that – just as in ASEAN – the main responsibility for 
implementation and activity rests with the member states themselves, with the EU 
acting as a facilitator or manager of counterterrorism participation.  
 
Active participation 
The military participation of EU member states in the Afghanistan war was 
significant. Special forces operations against the Taleban were accompanied with 
participation in the US led Operation Enduring Freedom. Member states sent more 
than ten Provincial Reconstruction Teams to the country. In 2006, the Council 
approved a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to Afghanistan.  
 
23 EU member states are deploying troops to ISAF [International Security Assistance 
Force].
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 Following stage 4 of the geographic expansion phase to the South (October 2006), 
their combined contribution to ISAF is approx. 15,800 troops. EU member-state 
deployments to ISAF started in December 2001 and have increased steadily over time, from 
about 3,000 in 2002 to about 5,000 in 2003, 6,000 in 2004 and 10,000 in the second half of 
2005 (including additional temporary deployments in conjunction with the elections). 
Several Member States have been expanding personnel and assets in 2006 and/or are 
planning to do so in 2007. (Council of the European Union 2006a) 
 
Also, since the International Security Assistance Force‟s (ISAF) intervention, the EU 
has been participating with the „EUPOL Afghanistan‟ mission to train police 
officers. Finally, the financial contributions to Afghanistan made by the EU (and its 
member states) are substantial: of all reconstruction aid allocated, a third is 
stemming from the EU and its member states combined, making it the second largest 
donor to Afghanistan. Only in political assistance the EU does not score high (Krow 
2009: 5). 
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In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, on the other hand, a number of states (for 
example France and Germany) refused their cooperation in the intervention. 
 
 INSERT NEW FIGURE HERE 
 
Figure 3. „Coalition of the willing‟ to support the armed intervention in Iraq 
 
Differences over the Iraq war have been made public in Europe. There was 
particularly a dispute about the question of whether there were indeed weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) to be found in Iraq, and whether a military intervention 
was necessary. These differences made a common approach impossible. 
Furthermore, there was a lack of coordination of positions early on; the two Council 
meetings at the beginning of 2002 did not address the issue of Iraq (Reckmann 2004: 
125). The two permanent members of the Security Council – France and the UK – in 
particular were not interested in addressing the issue outside the framework of the 
UN, and especially not in the framework of the EU. Under the Spanish presidency, 
single declarations were issued supporting Resolutions 1284 and 1409. Apart from 
this, the Council has only taken a common position over the embargo against Iraq. 
Europe overall retained a low profile on the Iraq question for a long time (Reckmann 
2004: 126). 
  
After the intervention, the EU has sent the „EUJUST‟ mission to Iraq in order to help 
strengthen the rule of law and promote respect for human rights. Since 2003, the EU 
provided more than €900 million on humanitarian aid and reconstruction. Also, the 
EU supports the political process in Iraq (with €84 million since 2004), the 
establishment of „rule of law‟ (€14 million), the elections (€20 million) and provides 
aid for the refugee crisis (€140 million, European Comission 2009). 
 
General cooperation 
The EU has adopted a number of regulations in order to implement Security Council 
Resolution 1373. The signature and ratification of the 12 anti-terrorism conventions 
is the responsibility of each member state. All of them are called upon to do so by a 
Common Position of the Council (2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001). The 
ratification process is monitored at EU level. 
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The EU has developed a definition of terrorism, for legal/official purposes, which is 
set out in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). It 
states that terrorist offences are those criminal offences against persons and property 
which: 
 
given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international 
organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly 
compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. 
(Statewatch Bulletin 2001) 
 
Concrete action taken includes the following: A European Arrest Warrant was 
introduced „to reduce the ability of terrorists and other criminals to evade justice by 
exploiting differences in national legal systems‟. Furthermore, judicial orders with 
regard to financial transactions and their freezing were mutually recognised. The EU 
established a common definition of terrorist offences and a list of terrorist groups, 
individuals and entities. „Minimum sentences for terrorist offences were established 
and the direction of, support for and incitement to terrorist activity was 
criminalized‟. Eurojust was created to improve coordination between prosecutors in 
Europe, and Europol serves as a cooperative pool for police forces and to collect and 
analyse terrorist-related information (Council of the European Union n.d.). 
 
In the field of illegal immigration, all legislative instruments now have the „public 
order‟ clause which allows member states to extradite members of third states, if 
security demands this. Frontex, the European Agency for Management of External 
Borders, was set up to control the management and surveillance of Europe‟s external 
borders. A „regulation introducing minimum security standards and biometric 
identifiers into passports and other travel documents issued by Member States was 
created‟. The Visa Information System (VIS) „will allow the exchange of data 
regarding visa applications and applicants between member states‟, and Interpol is 
collecting data on stolen passports. Customs control has been strengthened and 
security legislation for aviation and shipping has been created, also under the 
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management of a new Energy and Transport Security Directorate (Council of the 
European Union n.d.). 
 
The main responsibility for the prevention of terrorist financing is vested in the 
member states. The established terrorism list facilitates the freezing of funds. 
Furthermore, „a new anti-money laundering directive was adopted to extend the anti-
money laundering defences to cover financing of terrorism‟. Exchange of 
information between member states‟ financial investigative units has been enhanced, 
and an electronic database on all persons subject to EU financial sanctions 
established (Council of the European Union n.d.). 
 
External relations 
Firstly, the EU supports the key role of the UN and promotes the implementation by 
all states of the international conventions on counterterrorism. Furthermore, it 
collaborates with the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime, OSCE, the Council of Europe, the G8 and the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF). It has developed counterterrorism related technical assistance 
for third countries (some 80 countries in total, including a number of specially 
selected priority-target countries), „including for the drafting of counterterrorism 
legislation; financial law and practice; customs law and practice; immigration law 
and practice; extradition law and practice; police and law enforcement work; illegal 
arms trafficking and judicial capacity building‟. All agreements with third countries 
entail counterterrorism clauses to promote effective policies against terrorism. In 
order to help prevent the growth of terrorism and to tackle its root causes, 
development aid is used, with a „focus on poverty reduction, good government and 
participatory democracy‟. The EU is funding regional capacity-building in Africa 
and Asia to counter terrorism (e.g. through the African Union Terrorism Research 
Centre in Algiers, and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 
JCLEC), and finally, as already mentioned, is participating in training missions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Council of the European Union n.d.). 
 
Specific cooperation with the USA 
The EU and the USA work closely together to combat terrorism; their cooperation is 
based on the EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism (White House 2004). This 
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document states that:  
 
 EU and US will work together to deepen the international consensus and enhance 
international efforts to combat terrorism; 
 EU and US reaffirm their total commitment to prevent access by terrorists to financial and 
other economic resources; 
 EU and US commit to working together to develop measures to maximize their capacities to 
detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks; 
 EU and US will seek to further protect the security of international transport and ensure 
effective systems of border control; 
 EU and US will work together to develop further their capabilities to deal with the 
consequences of a terrorist attack; 
 EU and US will work in close cooperation to diminish the underlying conditions that 
terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit to their advantage; and 
 EU and US will target their external relations actions towards priority third countries where 
counterterrorist capacity of commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced.  
(White House 2004)  
 
In practice, EU member states are cooperating in the FATF, are sharing flight-
passenger data with the USA, and are cooperating in containing security. They work 
together on the establishment of global security standards, have set up a Policy 
Dialogue on Border and Transport Security, and established contacts between 
Eurojust and the US Department of Justice. Europol and its US counterparts have 
strategic agreements, including the sharing of intelligence and personal data. 
 
The EU and the USA have successfully: 
 
 Completed bilateral protocols to implement the US-EU Extradition/Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreements with twelve Member States;  
 Developed joint biometric standards to enhance the security of travel documents and 
closely consulted to ensure the future interoperability of border control systems; 
 Concluded the US-EU Passenger Name Record agreement, which allows airlines to 
provide EU-origin passenger data for flights to the US; 
 Established an informal dialog on terrorism finance issues and initiated implementation 
of an expert-level work program to encourage sharing of information, promote 
cooperation on Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issues, and explore options for joint 
technical assistance initiatives; and  
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 Finalized cargo screening and inspection procedures under the Container Security 
Initiative with several Member States, further protecting the security of international 
transport.  
(US Mission to the EU 2005) 
 
Promotion of counterterrorism 
Overall, the EU is deeply committed to international cooperation in the sphere of 
counterterrorism, and there has been close cooperation in particular with the USA 
(e.g. American representatives participate in the second and third pillar meetings). 
Cooperation mechanisms with other states have been established, for example with 
Russia, and a number of common declarations issued. The EU provides many of 
these states with technical aid in order to improve the implementation of Resolution 
1373. As Keohane points out, the EU strongly promotes counterterrorism in its 
external dealings with other states (Keohane, interview with the author, 2007). 
According to Kahl, the EU promotes global standards in counterterrorism, 
particularly within the FATF and UN frameworks, and this applies particularly to the 
so-called „rogue states‟ (Kahl, interview with the author, 2007). However, Lindstrom 
(interview with the author, 2007) states that the EU takes more indirect measures, 
compared to the USA, such as the non-proliferation clause on WMD in negotiations 
with other countries. It does not „go out there proactively‟ to promote 
counterterrorism (Lindstrom, interview with the author, 2007).  
 
It should be mentioned that, with regard to norm compliance, claims emerged that 
human rights in the EU are not always adhered to. 
 
After surveying a wide range of counterterrorism initiatives at EU level, it is clear that the 
lack of concrete, legally-binding human rights safeguards is not only leading to serious 
breaches of human rights but has created legal confusion and uncertainty. Cross-border 
cooperation to prosecute and remove people suspected of terrorist involvement is increasing, 
but fundamental human rights safeguards are being left behind at the borders. (Amnesty 
International 2005) 
 
Generally it can be stated that at the EU (i.e. supranational) level, norm compliance 
is often demanded and referred to, though of course the EU itself does not have the 
means to require absolute compliance at the level of member states. This situation is 
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comparable to the situation in ASEAN, with the difference that it contains non-
democracies which it is safe to assume comply even less with human rights norms 
than non-compliant democracies in the EU.  
 
Passive participation  
The EU and other main actors generally agree on the threat of terrorism and the need 
to counter it, and they also use common rhetoric: 
 
Rhetorically, the United States and Europe are united in their opposition to terrorism. 
Governments on each side of the Atlantic frequently assert that counterterrorism cooperation 
is essential to solving the problem, and they join together to condemn outrages such as the 
July 7, 2005 attacks in London. In terms of doctrine, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 
2002 and European Union Security Strategy of 2003 are remarkably similar in their 
descriptions of the new threats to national security. Both highlight international terrorism, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ungoverned spaces that might 
foster terrorism as the central security concerns for the future. (Shapiro and Byman 2006: 33) 
 
Javier Solana agrees with the US administration that international terrorism is an 
attack on Western values and freedoms: 
 
It was often said that terrorism represents an attack against the values and principles on 
which our societies are based: freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Maybe this basic 
truth would sometimes get overlooked because we said this so often, almost like a mantra. 
Still, it was worth making this basic point, once again. Terrorists aimed to undermine our 
societies and our way of life. By using violence to attain their ends, they showed their 
complete disregard for national and international law, the democratic process and, most of 
all, the sanctity of human life. (Solana 2005)  
 
Solana demands respect for these values even in the fight against terrorism: „we must 
not jeopardize our values and principles‟ (Solana 2005), a point rarely made in US 
rhetoric. A failure to preserve these values would be regarded as a „victory for the 
terrorists‟. Therefore, all states would have to „ensure that any measures they take 
comply with their obligations under international law, in particular international 
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law‟ (Solana 2005). 
 
In addition, there is a difference with regard to the role of state sponsors. The EU 
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writes that well organised terrorist groups were receiving support from „sympathizer 
networks in many countries‟, and had rear bases and sizeable financial resources 
(Council of the European Union 2006). Particular states are not named in this 
context. Generally, the terms „haven state‟ and „state sponsor‟ are not used as widely 
in the EU as in the USA. Thus, the role of particular states as sponsors or havens of 
terrorists is not made as explicit as it is with the USA. In addition, the EU takes a 
slightly different and more focused view on the root causes of terrorism. Causes are 
seen to be, for example, „terrorist propaganda in the media, youth vulnerability, and 
integration failure‟ (Council of the European Union 2006). These root causes have to 
be addressed: „After all, people are not born as terrorist, they become one‟ (Solana 
2005). Therefore, so Solana, one „should reflect on what factors drive people to 
commit atrocities and ask whether we can do something about that or not‟ (Solana 
2005). 
 
Further, it was highlighted by Solana that terrorism is not the only threat the EU or 
the global community faces.  
 
But terrorism is by no means the only threat facing the international community. Think for a 
moment on the tragic events created by the tsunami. The threat of proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction gets a lot of attention on the international conference circuit – and rightly 
so. The same is true for long-standing regional conflicts on Europe's doorstep and further 
afield. On top of that, millions of lives are blighted by civil wars, collapsing states, infectious 
diseases or, simply, the absence of clean water. We all know this, and it should not be 
forgotten. It is my firm belief that we need to pay attention to all the threats to people‟s lives 
and livelihoods. This is no doubt difficult. Our resources and attention spans are limited. But 
that is what we try to do in the EU, seeking comprehensive solutions to the full range of 
security problems we face. (Solana 2005) 
 
Generally, also, terrorism and terrorist attacks are referred to in the EU as crimes, 
crises or disasters, not as warfare, in contrast to the US coinage „the Global War on 
Terror‟.  
 
Causes of counterterrorism participation 
 
In the following, the results of the interviews conducted with EU scholars and 
practitioners with regard to the evaluation of factors causal for participation in 
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counterterrorism are presented. 
 
Relative power
23
  
Bauer (interview with the author, 2007) maintains that the EU is an important actor 
in counterterrorism, and a powerful one. This can be seen in its action plans and 
strategies. However, bureaucratic problems limit the power of the EU, for example 
in disaster management, and there are often problems in formulating a common 
standpoint. Still, at the international level the EU‟s economic standing makes it 
powerful. Its power can be used (particularly in relation to neighbouring states) to 
exert pressure on other actors and to impose the EU‟s will and policies. This does 
not apply to dealings with the USA, though, which is a stronger actor than the EU. 
On the military plane, the EU is very weak compared to the USA, and to others. On 
the world stage the EU deals with terrorism more on a political level. For instance, it 
is trying to negotiate with Iran and to help to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its 
actorness and power are therefore to be found at lower levels than those of the USA, 
i.e. more at the economic, diplomatic and political level.  
 
Keohane (interview with the author, 2007), on the other hand, contends that the EU 
as an organisation is not a strong actor in comparison to the nation states which 
comprise it, or to the USA. The main responsibility to counter terrorism rests with 
the nation states. However, on the international level the EU is more adapted to 
countering terrorism than other IOs – such as NATO, or even the UN – due to its 
internal integration, control over resources, ability to legislate internally, and so 
forth. 
  
Kahl (interview with the author, 2007) confirms the leadership role of the USA and 
states that the EU has relatively little competence in the fight against terrorism. It has 
only a coordinating role. Some elements of counterterrorism, belonging to the first 
pillar, are under the responsibility of the EU: tackling external terrorism through 
border security, for example. Other aspects of counterterrorism, which fall into the 
second (foreign policy) and third (policing and intelligence) pillars, depend more on 
the nation state.  
 
The strategies developed by the EU serve the member states as visions of how to 
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pursue counterterrorism, says Lindstrom (interview with the author, 2007), though 
the member states themselves decide on ways of implementing those strategies. The 
EU‟s role is to try to find synergies, to harmonise and to overcome specific 
constraints. Internally, it is more a clearing house, leaving the member states to 
realise the policies.The EU is therefore a relatively weak actor, unless the members 
act in concert. 
  
This concurs with Singore‟s view (Signore, interview with the author, 2007) that the 
EU is strong when able to take common decisions. This is more a practical problem: 
proposals are adopted in a short time when all parties agree (such as the European 
Parliament (EP), the member states, and so forth) and in such cases the EU is able to 
act quickly and can be regarded as very strong. When the member states fail to 
agree, the EU is weak. However, failure – in opposition to the common perception – 
is not very frequent in EU decision making. The EU is usually able to find a 
solution. However, internationally, the EU still derives its strength from its close 
links with the USA, the latter being the strongest actor on the international scene and 
in counterterrorism.  
 
Active coercion or pressure 
Kahl (interview with the author, 2007) claims that the example of passenger data 
sharing shows clearly US pressure on the EU to cooperate. Such informal pressure 
can be severe and is exerted through diplomatic channels. As Kahl points out, this 
was observed particularly over participation in the Iraq war. 
 
Lindstrom (interview with the author, 2007) also contends that the USA certainly 
exerts pressure on other actors: examples are Personal Name Records (PNR), visa 
regimes, and many others. There is very strong pressure from the USA particularly 
regarding the visa issue, where the USA is pushing the EU to take certain measures. 
Moreover, this pressure is having an effect: the Europeans are trying to address these 
requests. 
  
In Bauer‟s view (Bauer, interview with the author, 2007), on the other hand, pressure 
is not exerted, at least officially. Also according to Kuhne (interview with the author, 
2007) there is no pressure from the USA to cooperate. The EU participates in global 
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counterterrorism for its own rational reasons and in its own interest, though there 
might be exceptions to this general rule. Also, Singore (interview with the author, 
2007) states that there was no pressure on the EU to cooperate. There was no need 
for it, as the fight against terrorism was a top priority for the EU, and it was not 
external pressure which made that the case.  
 
According to Keohane (interview with the author, 2007), the USA certainly wants to 
work with the Europeans to counter terrorism. He states that there is no overt 
pressure to be found in the dealings of the Americans with the EU, but he also states 
that such pressure was exerted on national governments, e.g. those of France, Italy, 
Spain and the UK. Pressure is more likely to be exercised bilaterally.  
 
Interdependence and passive coercion 
Bauer (interview with the author, 2007) argues that interdependence sometimes 
plays a role. It was observed in the case of the sharing of passenger data. Here, costs 
were feared in the event of non-cooperation.  
 
According to Lindstrom (interview with the author, 2007), interdependence is only 
effective to a certain extent, depending on the measures to be implemented. He 
understands interdependence with the USA being less important than other factors. 
The decision to counter terrorism is not economically motivated, but based on self-
interest. The EU sees itself as a possible target of terrorism and therefore has to 
cooperate. Interdependence can be understood only in the sense of a common 
exposure to threat. 
 
In Keohane‟s view (Keohane, interview with the author, 2007), economic 
interdependence is not likely to be a factor for participation. Interdependence could 
be found, nonetheless, in the EU‟s entanglement with American intelligence 
services. Kahl (interview with the author, 2007) states that in his experience EU 
officials have never mentioned interdependence as a cause for cooperation. 
Economic repercussions were threatened by the USA at the beginning of the Iraq 
war, but were without consequences. In his perspective, this is an indication of 
highly symmetric interdependence, which is harder to utilise as a tool of coercion. 
Singore (interview with the author, 2007) could not confirm the interdependence 
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hypothesis (it being a cause for participation) either.  
 
Authority and legitimacy  
Generally, the USA in particular is seen as a legitimate actor, according to Keohane, 
though „it depends on which government you ask‟ (Keohane, interview with the 
author, 2007). The Europeans are not much in favour of the GWOT and think that 
the Iraq war has not helped the cause of tackling terrorism. It is even thought that US 
foreign policy has increased the threat. The EU is principally not supportive of all 
aspects of US foreign policy. It is particularly critical of the USA „[lumping] 
together all Islamist groups‟ under the category of „terrorists‟ (Keohane, interview 
with the author, 2007), and there is ongoing transatlantic dialogue on this topic. But 
the USA is generally understood to be the real target of international terrorism, so it 
is regarded a legitimate leader in global counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, the 
EU and the USA agree on the severity of the threat.  
 
Kahl (interview with the author, 2007), however, claims that the USA has lost 
authority with the Iraq war and the failure to legitimate it. He mentions particularly 
the question of WMD and the fact that none were found after the intervention. Bauer 
(interview with the author, 2007) explains that the authority of the USA plays a role 
in participation, but this factor is limited. This can be seen in the case of Iraq where 
there was overt opposition to the interventions. On the other hand, the strategies of 
the EU directly refer to the UN, which has a higher level of legitimacy than the USA. 
According to Kuhne (interview with the author, 2007), both the USA and the UN are 
seen as legitimate actors in global counterterrorism. The UN in particular is the 
reference point concerning legitimacy, and cooperation with it in turn serves to raise 
the legitimacy of the EU. The USA is also seen as an undoubtedly legitimate actor, 
though there are practical and political differences between the EU and the USA.  
  
Lindstrom (interview with the author, 2007) says that some of the measures the USA 
takes against terrorism raise serious concerns about freedoms, and it is felt that some 
degree of legitimacy has been eroded. Meanwhile, the USA will react to external 
pressure: for example, there is no longer much rhetoric about the „War on Terror‟, 
for which now other terms are used. This proves that efforts have been made to 
accommodate European concerns. Finally, some governments see the USA as a 
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legitimate authority, others object to this view. Only on the UN they seem to 
generally agree: it is seen as legitimate, but as less than powerful.  
 
To elaborate on that, Singore (interview with the author, 2007) contends that there 
are differences of approach between the USA and the EU in countering terrorism. 
That said, the fight against terrorism is now an international priority in which the 
USA is a frontrunner, but not the leader. The risk of terrorism is general, faced by 
the states of the Middle East, Russia, the EU and others, and there is no need for a 
specific leadership in this struggle. However, there is a specific role for the UN to 
coordinate the efforts of the different regions and countries. According to Kuhne, 
cooperation is more about a common „fate‟. There is cooperation because the 
Western states „sit in the same boat‟ (Kuhne, interview with the author, 2007). 
Terrorists regard the West as an entity, which compels Western countries to 
cooperate. Bauer (interview with the author, 2007) speaks of a common identity, the 
EU and the USA having much in common – more than the EU and China, for 
example – which facilitates counterterrorism cooperation. 
 
Perceived threat of terrorism 
Keohane (interview with the author, 2007) states that the threat of terrorism in 
Europe is an important motivator for counterterrorism, and the greatest cause of 
counterterrorism cooperation are terrorist attacks. This became apparent after 9/11 
and the later attacks in Europe. „Nothing is better than a disaster to get people to do 
something‟ (Keohane, interview with the author, 2007). However, of course, the 
threat differs between states with respect to their history of terrorism. Therefore, for 
example, Spain and the UK have a large interest in countering terrorism, whereas 
other states are more negligent. At the European level terrorism is just one priority 
among others. Keohane sees it as an important priority, but other security interests 
are even more important. Kahl (interview with the author, 2007) agrees with the 
assertion that terrorism is seen as an important problem, and that the perceived threat 
is causal for participation in global governance. Cooperation and compliance occur 
because terrorism cannot be tackled by unilateral measures alone, as is understood in 
the EU. However, the style and extent of participation depends on the nation‟s 
political culture and understanding of the nature of the threat. Kahl reiterates that it 
even depends on different actors in different nations who influence the national 
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decision making processes. The reponses to terrorism differ from those of the USA 
because terrorism in the EU is understood more as a crime than a military problem. 
For example, the attacks in London and Madrid are phenomena which pose a 
problem for intelligence and police forces, but not for the military. Further attacks 
are expected, not large attacks like 9/11 but smaller attacks as in the past, and the EU 
is preparing for these smaller, but more likely attacks. The EU generally, according 
to Kahl, seems not to be threatened by attacks coming from foreign countries but by 
internally generated attacks. This is another reason for less consideration of military 
options and the stronger focus on policing in the EU. 
  
Bauer (interview with the author, 2007) also states that terrorism is an important 
issue for the political agenda in Europe. He also asserts that the EU differs with the 
USA insofar as terrorism is more understood as a criminal threat and less a military 
issue. While terrorism is lower on the agenda in the EU than it is in the USA, as he 
claims, the threat of terrorism is in fact higher in the EU than in the USA due to the 
EU‟s large immigrant communities, problems with integration, the proximity to the 
Middle East, and the general closeness of the societies to, and more freedom for, 
potential terrorists.  
 
According to Kuhne (interview with the author, 2007), it is essentially the factor of a 
common threat perception that causes counterterrorism cooperation and compliance. 
Lindstrom (interview with the author, 2007) also contends that the threat of 
international terrorism is particularly important for counterterrorism cooperation. 
The perception of the threat, however, differs between EU member states. Threat 
perception is higher in countries like Spain and the UK, and lower in others, such as 
Sweden and Finland. Therefore, it is difficult to speak of a general sense of a threat 
shared by all member states to the same extent. However: „If you look at some of the 
public opinion data concerning the main threat Europeans face, terrorism is high on 
the list‟ (Lindstrom, interview with the author, 2007). Moreover, in the EU security 
strategy, terrorism is mentioned as one of the five key threats that the EU faces. To 
some extent, therefore, there is a common perception of threat.  
 
Singore (interview with the author, 2007) contends that countering terrorism is a top 
priority of the EU, along with climate change, energy security and migration. The 
42 
 
Vice President of the Commission has described the risk of terrorism as very high. It 
is thought to be higher, of course, in some member states than in others, but 
substantial throughout the EU.  
 
Conclusion 
  
Even though the USA is clearly dominant, the EU is seemingly a strong collective 
actor in the field of counterterrorism. It is furthermore apparently to a high degree 
under discursive influence: In the case of the EU, „threat perception‟ is arguably a 
strong indicator of US influence. The main motivation for fighting terrorism, it was 
stated, is the threat that it poses to the security of Europe.
 
According to Kuhne 
(interview with the author, 2007), it is essentially the factor of a common threat that 
causes counterterrorism cooperation and compliance (indicating influence or 
discursive power). This threat is thought to be shared with the USA in particular, but 
also with other nations, and can be understood here as an external factor, which 
provokes a defence community between the EU and USA. With respect to the above 
mentioned threat scenario, which does not indicate an increase in terrorist threat, it 
cold be argued that the high threat perception is actually a sign of influence of the 
USA. The high threat perception, therefore, would be regarded as an indicator of 
hegemony. 
 
Furthermore, also supporting the hegemony hypothesis, pressure from the USA on 
the EU was confirmed as a factor for participation by half the interviewees. Also, the 
interviews seemed to indicate that the authority and legitimacy of the USA are still 
present in the EU, even given the criticism raised in the context of the Iraq 
intervention. 
  
In opposition to the hegemony assumption, economic interdependence does not seem 
to be of causal importance for counterterrorism participation by the EU. 
Interdependence between the USA and the EU seems to be relatively symmetric, 
which makes the possibility of domination in this sphere less likely.  
In conclusion, we can speak of some indications for hegemony and the exercise of 
power. Factors that were confirmed were: dominance, discursive power (influence), 
authority, legitimacy and probably some active coercion (pressure); passive coercion 
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as a factor was negated. The author interprets the interviews, therefore, as overall 
providing confirmation for the hegemony hypothesis. This would even hold if „threat 
perception‟ was not regarded an indicator of hegemonic influence but as an 
independent factor. 
 
The results of the interview are summarised in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Presentation of the causal factors for participation (EU) 
 
Factor/interview Keohane Kahl Bauer Lindstrom Singore Kuhne 
Test variables 
External power
24
 +  + + + – +     
Pressure (active 
coercion) 
+ + – + – – 
Interdependence  
(passive coercion) 
+ – – +  – –   
Authority (influence) + + – +  + – + – + 
Threat (influence) + + +  + + + 
 
Legend: 
  
+ Positive 
response 
+ – Neutral 
response 
– Negative 
response 
  Not answered 
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5 
ASEAN Counterterrorism Participation and Causes25 
 
The threat scenario 
 
In the 1990s, the problem of terrorism in the Asia–Pacific region became a serious 
one (Gunaratna 2002: 129): there are now terrorist elements in Central Asia 
(Tajikistan and Afghanistan), South Asia (Kashmir and Pakistan) and Southeast Asia 
(the Philippines and Indonesia). Thus, there arose a threat potential within as well as 
outside the region. Within the region there are foreign groups such as the Islamist 
Sunni, as well as indigenous, ethno-nationalist groups. The Southeast Asian region 
has had to deal with a number of security issues since the end of the Cold War, 
terrorism being only one: others are crime, the drug trade, piracy, ethno-nationalism, 
religious fundamentalism, migration and refugees, and the trade in small arms. At 
the beginning of the third millennium piracy posed one of the biggest problems; it is 
of special interest as pirates can collaborate with terrorists. There were 189 pirate 
attacks in Southeast Asian waters in 2003 alone (Frost 2006).  
  
Terrorist attacks in general have increased in Southeast Asia since 1997, and there 
has been a diversity of governmental responses to the problem. Islamists, especially 
from Afghanistan and the Middle East, have visited the region in the past and 
established links with local groups. Countries with large Muslim populations, such 
as Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, became recruiting grounds for 
these groups. Thailand is even counted as a safe haven for terrorists and criminal 
groups by the USA (Heiduk and Moeller 2004: 4ff). 
 
Gunaratna considers that overall the threat of terrorism is on the increase:  
 
The threat is increasing. Because of three reasons: The Muslims after 9/11 perceive that 
America is attacking Islam and killing Muslims. This is not true, but their perception is that. 
Second is that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq has angered Muslims, which has been 
exploited by terrorist groups. Third is that the American leaders have failed to explain in 
very clear English to the world that this is not a fight against Islam and this is not a fight 
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against Muslims. Also the regional leaders have failed in their public relations campaigns. 
(Gunaratna, interview with the author, 2006)  
 
There are a number of additional causes for the increase of radical Islamist groups in 
Southeast Asia. One of them is seen in globalisation (and the USA is often held 
responsible for the dangers it poses). There is also the frustration caused by 
government oppression of these groups. Also, ideology and the idea of a pan-Islamic 
Southeast Asia play a central role (Gunaratna, interview with the author, 2006).  
 
Table 5. Statistics of terrorist attacks in selected countries of Southeast Asia 
(September 2001 to January 2006) 
 
 
Country Attacks Victims Fatalities 
Cambodia  6  1  5 
Indonesia  131  1,044  358 
Laos  8  8  1 
Malaysia  2  0  5 
Philippines  140  1,050  357 
 
Source: The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, which also counts threats of attacks. 
 
Over the five years before and the five years after 9/11 terrorist incidents increased 
about threefold in the region (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base), or alternatively at 
least from 97.5 attacks or threats of attacks per year (2,633 between 1970 and 1997) 
to 199 per year (714 between 1998 and 2004, according to START). 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established in 1967, with Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand as founding members. Brunei 
Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao, Myanmar (Burma) and Cambodia joined later. The aims 
and purposes of ASEAN, according to its Declaration are:  
 
(1) To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region and (2) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among the countries in the region and adherence 
to the principles of the United Nations charter. (ASEAN Secretariat, n.d. a) 
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ASEAN adheres to a number of fundamental principles, according to its Secretariat, 
such as: „mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, 
and national identity of all actors‟; „the right of every State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion‟; „non-interference 
in the internal affairs of one another‟; „settlement of differences or disputes by 
peaceful manner [sic]‟; „renunciation of the threat or use of force‟; and „effective 
cooperation among themselves‟ (ASEAN Secretariat n.d. a). 
 
In 2003, the ASEAN leaders promoted their organisation as comprising three pillars: 
a security community, an economic community and a social-cultural community. If 
this was realised, ASEAN would ressemble the EU even more than does any other 
international regional organisation. The Meeting of the Heads of State and 
Government is the highest decision-making body of ASEAN; a Summit is convened 
each year, as is a Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN Secretariat n.d. a). Ministerial 
meetings on terrorism and transnational crime, among other issues, are held 
regularly.  
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Figure 4. The organisational structure of ASEAN 
 
 
AEM : ASEAN Economic Ministers 
AMM : ASEAN Ministerial Meeting  
AFMM : ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting  
SEOM : Senior Economic Officials Meeting 
ASC : ASEAN Standing Committee 
SOM : Senior Officials Meeting 
ASFOM : ASEAN Senior Finance Officials Meeting 
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat n.d. a 
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Counterterrorism in ASEAN  
 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 shocked not only the USA, but also the rest of the 
world, including Southeast Asian countries. For example, Singapore strongly 
supported the USA in its declaration of war against terrorism from early on. At an 
assembly in the national stadium, before an audience of 15,000, Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong confirmed that Singapore would join the USA in the GWOT, even 
though he would have to consider the regional and domestic situation. In addition, 
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia condemned the attacks (September 11 News 
n.d.). The opposition in his country supported Osama bin Laden, and Mahathir, in 
the following period, went to some lengths to fight militant Muslims in Malaysia. 
Indonesia‟s President Megawati was the first head of state to visit the USA after the 
attacks; this was a symbolically very strong gesture of support, given that her 
country has the world‟s largest Muslim population. On her visit, Megawati 
condemned the attacks and promised to support the GWOT. Yet public opinion in 
Indonesia at this point was strongly anti-American; there have been a number of 
demonstrations against the USA and for the expulsion of US citizens. Even the large, 
moderate parties in Indonesia joined this chorus, whereas in the mosques, there was 
sometimes a call for jihad. With this background in mind, it is understandable that 
Indonesia kept a low profile over the intervention in Afghanistan, viewing it with a 
degree of concern. Overall, the ASEAN states condemned the 9/11 attacks and 
supported the GWOT. In November 2001 ASEAN issued a common declaration to 
condemn terrorism and to work together in the fight against it (Chow 2005).  
 
ASEAN’s strategy and concrete measures in the fight against terrorism  
ASEAN has been dealing since the early 1970s with the problem of transnational 
crime, of which terrorism is seen as one manifestation. The general term also 
encompasses drug-trafficking, people-trafficking, money-laundering, piracy, 
international economic crime and cyber crime. However, terrorism receives special 
attention from ASEAN. 
  
In the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (ASEAN Secretariat 1997), 
issued at a conference held by the ministers of the interior in 1997, terrorism is 
clearly mentioned. The exchange of information and the coordination of policies are 
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particularly identified as important in reacting to crime and terrorism. The 
declaration showed that ASEAN was convinced regional cooperation was necessary 
in order to fight transnational crime effectively, and the document details a number 
of measures to be taken to that end:  
 
 strengthening the obligation of member states to participate in regional crime-
fighting activities; 
 establishment of meetings of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational 
Crime at least every two years, in order to coordinate the activities of the relevant 
organs (e.g. the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters and the ASEAN 
Chiefs of National Police, or ASEANPOL; 
 agreements on mutual legal assistance, treaties, memoranda of understanding, 
and other such matters; 
 establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime (ACOT) to 
coordinate regional attempts to fight crime and to engage in the exchange of 
critical information, harmonisation of policies and the coordination of operations; 
 establishment of an ad-hoc expert group, which, with the support of the ASEAN 
Secretariat, would fulfil the following tasks in the years to come: to develop an 
ASEAN Action Plan on Transnational Crime; to develop plans for an 
institutional framework for Asean countries‟ cooperation in this field; and to 
conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of ACOT; 
 a request for each member state to name representatives and coordinators for 
cooperation; 
 networking between the relevant national institutions; 
 strenthening of member states‟ efforts in the fight against transnational crime, 
with the ASEAN Secretary-General requested to integrate this field into his 
working programme; 
 the necessity of cooperation with other international institutions, such as the UN, 
and with intraregional organsisations; and   
 strengthening of Secretariat resources, necessary to support the member states in 
their fight against transnational crime.  
(ASEAN Secretariat 1997) 
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Most of the measures outlined above have been implemented to varying extents, 
though the idea of ACOT has been abandoned (Tatik, interview with the author, 
2006). Some ASEAN member countries, notably Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, 
have established centres dedicated to countering terrorism: the Jakarta Centre for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Indonesia, the Southeast Asia Regional 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia, and the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Thailand. However, these centres belong to the 
respective ASEAN member countries, not ASEAN as a regional grouping. 
 
The 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (ASEAN 
Secretariat 1999a) described the threat of transnational crime as being connected to 
economic well-being in ASEAN countries and as having evolved as a consequence 
of globalisation. It proposed measures to fight transnational crime which were 
explained in detail. In a working programme (ASEAN Secretariat 2002e), concrete 
steps were described that would be necessary for the fulfilment of the Plan of Action. 
For example, all member states should make their national law accessible to all other 
member states and inform them if resolutions have been signed. Further, overall 
measures were established for the prevention of trafficking in drugs and in people, 
and other security threats were also dealt with. Finally, the document referred to 
terrorism. The ASEAN Secretariat was called upon to analyse in which ways 
cooperation with and within ASEANAPOL and with other international institutions 
could be made possible. Another aim was to improve the exchange of information 
between ASEAN and the member states with respect to the use, and possible misuse, 
of critical technologies for relevant security-policy practices and by terrorist 
organisations. A database of international agreements and treaties was to be 
established by the secretariat. The working programme further set out steps to be 
taken by police in the legal sphere, and measures regarding extra-regional 
cooperation.  
 
Legal measures The member states have been called upon to provide information 
about legal instruments in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, it was to be 
established whether there were possibilities for cooperation in the legal sphere to 
facilitate the arrest, prosecution and conviction of terrorists. Common seminars and 
exchange visits were planned to further this aim. All relevant conventions were to be 
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signed and ratified. The ASEAN Secretariat was to provide an assemblage of the 
important conventions, as well as a study on how these were compatible with the law 
in ASEAN countries. An ASEAN convention on the fight against terrorism was 
mooted, as was an agreement on mutual legal assistance.  
 
Police The ASEAN Secretariat was made responsible for naming focal points to 
provide coordination for the member states in respect of counterterrorism, and a 
common seminar for police forces on counterterrorism measures was planned. 
  
Training Member states were called upon to make proposals for regional training 
programmes and conferences, while states that had already mounted training 
programmes were asked to open these to others. 
  
Institutional capacity-building The ASEAN Secretariat was made responsible for 
supporting member states in improvement of national mechanisms. Also, 
cooperation within and between the organs of ASEAN itself was to be improved. 
Programmes for the improvement of capacities were to be proposed by the member 
states. Scientific institutes were to work together, particularly in producing a list of 
biological and chemical weapons that could be used by terrorists and thus be 
regarded as a potential threat. 
  
Extra-regional cooperation Possible methods of integrating the „Plus Three‟ states 
(China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) in the GWOT were considered. Also, the 
secretariat was made responsible for analysing how the implementation of UN 
resolutions could be facilitated.  
 
Because of the increase in terrorism in Southeast Asia, after 9/11 the USA declared 
the region the „second front‟ in the GWOT. At the same time, it became clear that 
only by regional and multilateral cooperation would effective measures against 
terrorism be possible. For this reason, a number of initiatives have been taken at the 
regional level. The infrastructure for the fight against terrorism at the level of 
ASEAN itself was underdeveloped until 2001, but has since improved. Until 2001, 
the main focus was piracy, but the new threat was rapidly understood and ASEAN 
began to work towards a better way of fighting terrorism. 
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In reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to 
Counter Terrorism was issued (ASEAN Secretariat 2001c). The terrorist attacks on 
the USA were condemned, and understood as an attack on the whole of humanity. 
Terrorism was described as a threat to peace and international security, in line with 
the declarations of the UN. At the same time, and this was repeated over the 
following years, any connection between religion or race and terrorism was denied: 
„We reject any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race‟ (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2001c). In this, ASEAN departs from the line followed by the USA, 
which is somewhat casual about delinking terrorism from Islam. In the declaration, 
ASEAN also committed itself to the Charter of the UN: 
 
We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks in New 
York City, Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 and consider such acts 
as an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us;  
 
We view acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever 
and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which requires 
concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;  
 
We believe terrorism to be a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and 
prosperity of ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020. (ASEAN Secretariat 
2001c) 
 
The 9/11 attacks were understood as attacks on humanity, and thus also as attacks on 
ASEAN, which committed itself to the fight against terrorism: „We commit to 
counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and other international law, especially taking into 
account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions‟ (ASEAN Secretariat 2001c). 
 
ASEAN committed itself also to effective policies and strategies to promote the 
well-being of its populations, which was regarded as an element in the fight against 
terrorism. The declaration thus understood terrorism as a threat both to peace and 
stability in the region and and to its economic development. It was acknowledged 
that this threat could only be confronted by regional as well as international 
cooperation. In the declaration, the following measures were established. The states 
were to test and check their national measures against terrorism and strengthen them. 
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Any international conventions with reference to terrorism were to be signed and 
ratified as soon as possible. Relevant international conventions on terrorism were to 
be studied „with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on 
combating international terrorism‟ (ASEAN Secretariat 2001c). Information 
exchange and cooperation, both between ASEAN member states and with other 
regional institutions, were to be improved. Regional programmes for the increase of 
capacities in the fight against terrorism were to be established. Police cooperation 
was to be strengthened, including the sharing of best practice. Information exchange 
between the relevant agencies and cooperation within ASEAN and between organs 
that dealt with counterterrorism was to be improved. ASEAN would support member 
states in their fight against terrorism (by detecting, investigating, monitoring and 
reporting on terrorist acts). „Practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN‟s role 
in and involvement with the international community‟ were to be discussed and 
explored, „including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the 
ASEAN + 3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners, and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour‟ 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2001c). ASEAN‟s role at the international level in the fight 
against terrorism was to be strengthened, as was regional and international 
cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat 2001c). 
 
With respect to the results, Ms Tatik made the following statement: 
 
There are a large number of concrete activities that ASEAN Member Countries need to 
implement in their joint efforts to counter terrorism. These include capacity-building 
programs aimed at enhancing the capability of ASEAN law enforcement agencies in 
handling the threats of terrorism. Each year, during the annual meeting of the SOMTC 
(ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime), each Member Countries reports 
their progress in implementing the Work Programme. The Work Programme was revised at 
the 6th SOMTC, held in Bali, Indonesia last June, to maintain its relevance in responding to 
the current situations. (Tatik, interview with the author, 2006)  
 
It can be seen from this statement that the implementation process is ongoing, and 
not yet completed. 
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In the ensuing period, there has been multilateral cooperation at diverse levels, with 
cooperation between intelligence agencies, the establishment of a common set of 
rules and laws, and a work programme on the Joint Action Plan. This programme 
envisions the training of intelligence officers, workshops on the fight against 
terrorism, and logistical support for the detection of bombs, document fraud and 
airport security. Singapore proposed the creation of an anti-terrorism team in each 
member state, which was generally accepted.  
 
During the ASEAN Summit of October 2002, measures for the fight against money-
laundering and the funding of terrorism were established. In addition, the regional 
Counter-Terrorism Centre (SEARCCT) was established in Kuala Lumpur. 
  
However, Tan (2006) claims that regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
up to this point was not well-coordinated. The reasons for this were conflicting 
national interests, restrictions and policies, and mutual mistrust. Whereas Singapore, 
Malaysia and the Philippines promoted enhanced cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, there was repeated opposition, especially from Indonesia (Ramakrishna 
and Tan 2003: 130). General tensions between the member states have hindered 
cooperation so far, the historically-rooted tensions between Malaysia and Singapore 
meriting particular mention here.  
 
In reaction to the attacks in Bali in October 2002, the Declaration on Terrorism of 
the Eighth ASEAN Summit was issued in November 2002 (ASEAN Secretariat 
2002d); here also, any connection between terrorism and any specific religion was 
denied. The commitment to the measures established in the Declaration on Joint 
Action to Counter Terrorism was reiterated. The international community was also 
called upon to support ASEAN in its fight against terrorism.  
 
In 2004, there was a regional ministerial meeting in Bali (ASEAN Secretariat 2004d) 
to deal with counterterrorism. It produced a voluminous document in which the 
member states were called upon to adopt a number of measures. Once again, any 
connection between a particular religion or race with terrorism was denied, and 
ASEAN re-committed itself to the principles of the UN. The ministers also 
committed themselves to regional cooperation and to the coordination of relevant 
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national institutions, especially of the police, the military, the judiciary, customs and 
immigration agencies, and other relevant bodies. The states were asked to take 
practical steps to improve the cooperation of these institutions, to improve their 
capacities, and to analyse terrorist attacks more thoroughly. It was established that 
members of the judiciary would have to be better educated in the effective 
prosecution and punishment of terrorists. Mutual assistance was to be improved; 
diverse measures were to be taken to improve maritime security; and terrorists were 
to be interdicted from access to WMD. Member states should also cooperate more 
closely in the prevention of terrorist funding.  
 
Finally at this meeting, various ad-hoc working groups were established to evaluate 
the measures taken and to propose further measures for improvement.  
 
In the meantime, there has been an agreement and a treaty (ASEAN Secretariat 
2004e; 2002g). The agreement refers to the „exchange of information and the 
establishment of communication procedures‟ (ASEAN Secretariat 2004e), and with 
regard to terrorism, among other offences, establishes the following:  
 
[to facilitate proper coordination and collaboration] where individual resources of a party 
may be inadequate; to establish common understanding and approaches; to strengthen 
national and subregional capacities to manage terrorism and other crimes through 
information exchanges, agreed communication procedures and training; to review and 
enhance internal rules and regulations, both legal and administrative; to ensure proper, 
effective, and timely collaboration, and in times of operational constraints in the 
implementation of defence, border and security arrangements; provide opportunities for the 
parties‟ duly authorized representatives to establish linkages to facilitate cooperation; 
facilitate dialogue among the parties on criminal and crime-related activities committed in 
their respective territories which may adversely affect the interests of any or all of the other 
parties; and establish mechanisms for immediate response and assistance among the parties. 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2002g)  
 
The treaty refers to mutual assistance in the fight against crime, the prosecution of 
offenders and the resulting procedures. Mutual assistance can mean:  
 
taking of evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons, making arrangements for 
persons to give evidence or to assist in criminal matters, effecting service of judicial 
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documents, executing searches and seizures, examining objects and sites, providing original 
or certified copies of relevant documents, records and items of evidence, identifying or 
tracing property derived from the commission of an offence and instrumentalities of crime, 
the restraining of dealings in property or the freezing of property derived from the 
commission of an offence that may be recovered, forfeited or confiscated, the recovery, 
forfeiture or confiscation of property derived from the commission of an offence, locating 
and identifying witnesses and suspects; and the provision of such other assistance as may be 
agreed and which is consistent with the objects of this Treaty and the laws of the Requested 
Party. (ASEAN Secretariat 2002g) 
 
Cooperation does not extend to offences of a political nature, and this opens the way 
for disagreement and non-cooperation if terrorism was defined as a political offence. 
It could be argued that terrorism is by definition a political act, and the treaty would 
therefore not apply. However, the ASEAN Secretariat maintains that the treaty is 
aimed particularly at terrorism.  
 
The ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism was not established until 2007. In 
this document, the need to address root causes was mentioned; apart from this, it 
reads less like a strategic paper and more as a defence of national states‟ authority 
over counterterrorism. Article II, for example, deals with sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity and non-interference, and article 4 with the preservation of 
sovereignty. Meanwhile, a number of areas of cooperation are established, with 
states undertaking to: 
 
 Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by the 
provision of early warning to the other Parties through the exchange of information; 
 Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts from using their 
respective territories for those purposes against the other Parties and/or the citizens of 
the other Parties;  
 Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; 
 Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border control and 
controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for 
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel 
documents; 
 Promote capacity-building including training and technical cooperation and the holding 
of regional meetings;  
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 Promote public awareness and participation in efforts to counter terrorism, as well as 
enhance inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue and dialogue among civilisations; 
 Enhance cross-border cooperation; 
 Enhance intelligence exchange and sharing of information;  
 Enhance existing cooperation towards developing regional databases under the purview 
of the relevant ASEAN bodies; 
 Strengthen capability and readiness to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, cyber terrorism and any new forms of terrorism; 
 Undertake research and development on measures to counter terrorism; 
 Encourage the use of video conference or teleconference facilities for court proceedings, 
where appropriate; and 
 Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2007)  
 
The document goes on to deal with states‟ jurisdiction and with the distribution of 
authority and responsibility for responding to an attack. Fair treatment and 
compliance with human rights are ensured in the treaty, for the first time. The status 
of refugees is dealt with, again in accordance with human rights and international 
law, and the parties are called upon to promote the sharing of best practice in 
rehabilitation programmes. Mutual assistance in criminal matters is addressed, and 
the issue of extradition is solved. However, an opt-out clause ensures that each party 
can leave the treaty at any time. This is ASEAN‟s strongest proclamation so far of 
compliance with human rights and of cooperation in the field of counterterrorism, 
but like many of its other declarations in essence leaves the sovereignty of the state 
untouched. 
 
International cooperation 
In January 2003, a meeting of ASEAN and EU foreign ministers was held in 
Brussels, and a declaration was subsequently issued (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). The 
parties pointed out the leading role of the UN in the fight against terrorism and 
committed themselves to implementing UN resolutions and supporting the Counter-
Terrorism Committee. The GWOT would have to be waged within the framework of 
international law and norms. Human and humanitarian rights must be observed. 
Terrorism could not be defeated at the military level alone, but would have to be 
tackled through economic, diplomatic, legal and military measures, and by attention 
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to its root causes. The parties also committed themselves to further cooperation in 
the GWOT, especially to the universal implementation of the relevant Security 
Council resolutions and UN conventions and protocols against terrorism, and to 
addressing the funding of terrorism and further mutual assistance and cooperation 
(for example with regard to information exchange). Furthermore: „The cooperation 
of the police agencies of the EU and ASEAN should be improved, between the 
single member states as well as between ASEANAPOL and EUROPOL‟ (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2003).  
 
Along the same lines, there have been agreements between ASEAN and the USA, 
Japan and Australia on cooperation in the fight against terrorism, for example on the 
sharing of information. With the USA, cooperation runs as follows: the ASEAN 
states reaffirm the importance of a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and 
combat international terrorism through the exchange of information and intelligence. 
This cooperation is to be enhanced and to be made more efficient. ASEAN and the 
USA are committed to „continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing 
information-sharing on counterterrorism measures, including the development of 
more effective counterterrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative 
counterterrorism regimes‟, to „enhance liaison relationships amongst their law 
enforcement agencies to engender practical counterterrorism regimes‟, to „strengthen 
capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between 
officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint operations 
as appropriate‟, to „provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration 
control challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the 
flow of terrorist-related material, money and people‟, to „comply with United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and other United Nations 
resolutions or declarations on international terrorism‟, and to „explore on a mutual 
basis additional areas of cooperation‟ (ASEAN Secretariat 2002f). In July 2002, the 
USA and ASEAN signed a common declaration on improving cooperation between 
intelligence agencies. ASEAN has also signed Joint Declarations on cooperation 
with all ten of its Dialogue Partners, including Australia and China. With China, 
ASEAN has also signed a declaration on cooperation over non-traditional security 
issues. To follow up on the Joint Declarations, annual work plans were developed 
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setting out concrete plans for joint activities in various areas relating to 
counterterrorism and combating transnational crime.  
 
The Secretariat states: 
 
We have developed annual work plans with China and the US, and are implementing them. 
We are developing a similar work plan with Australia and Russia. We are now working on a 
joint cooperation project on border management and document security with the EU. We 
have also just concluded [the] ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue, held in Tokyo on 
28–29 June 2009. Various joint projects had been proposed to be funded under the JAIF 
(Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund) for 2007 fiscal year. (Tatik, interview with the author, 
2006) 
 
Finally, there has been some active counterterrorism participation through military 
and political cooperation. Military cooperation at the supranational level is not 
possible since ASEAN has no forces at its disposal. However, several member states 
support the GWOT militarily. The Philippines cooperate with the Special Operations 
Centre, Pacific Command (SOCPAC), which supports the government in its fight 
against terrorism. In Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, special forces of the 
Philippines are deployed for countering Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. Thailand 
participated in the context of the Iraq intervention with joint military exercises with 
the USA. Malaysia and Thailand enabled use of its airspace, provided fuel for 
aircraft and logistical support. Singapore supplied police training personnel, a C-130 
aircraft, three deployments of KC-135 aerial refuelling tankers and three 
deployments of Landing Ship Tanks (LST) to the USA in the context of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. It furthermore cooperates with the USA in respect of cargo security 
(Thayer 2005: 11). In political terms, ASEAN member states participate, for 
example, by implementing counterterrorism legislation, surveillance policies, or 
legislation on the prevention and persecution of terrorist finances, and by policing 
terrorism (Thayer 2005). 
 
Similarly to the EU, the issue of Iraq in particular divided the member states: „The 
deep split among the members was apparent during the annual retreat of the ASEAN 
foreign ministers who met in Sabah on the eve of the war with the aim to find a 
common ground on the issue‟ (Prawindarti 2008: 20). On the other hand, however, 
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„US high involvement in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia in general has 
induced a better regional cooperation in this matter . . . sharing of meaningful 
information . . . is improving‟ (2008: 21) and cooperation may be facilitated by 
participation in the joint exercise Cobra Gold, as well as generally improved in the 
context of the GWOT.  
 
Within ASEAN, there has been a modest increase in multilateral defense cooperation. For 
instance, in November 2001, ASEAN army chiefs met and pledged to increase military-to-
military cooperation and intelligence sharing. Counterterrorism also led to the first ever 
meeting of regional defense intelligence chiefs … and subsequently led to the first meeting 
of ASEAN ministers of defense in April 2006‟. (2008: 21) 
 
Evaluation of the counterterrorism measures 
  
Is ASEAN therefore active in the fight against terrorism? What has been said so far 
indicates that there remain serious problems. However, the organisation has been 
very effective in improving relations between the member states: „ASEAN has not 
been able to solve many problems or to come up with conflict resolution 
mechanisms. But to some extent it has been very successful in improving relations 
and in managing those disputes‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). On the 
other hand, and this problem can also be seen in the EU as well, ASEAN is 
dominated by elites. „Frankly, I think if you go to remote parts of Cambodia, 
Thailand or the Philippines, they may never have heard of ASEAN‟ (Emmers, 
interview with the author, 2006). ASEAN is a project of the urban elite in the capital 
cities (Liow, interview with the author, 2006). This, of course, makes it difficult for 
the organisation to assert itself among the populations at large, and it will depend on 
those populations whether ASEAN can develop into a genuine security community 
(Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). Other actors, such as civil society 
groups, NGOs and so forth, will have to be better integrated in the processes. Only if 
this proviso is met will ASEAN be able to fight the root causes of terrorism. 
  
Furthermore, ASEAN is in particular an instrument for rhetorical participation, by 
issuing declarations and agreements. ASEAN itself has stated repeatedly that 
terrorism poses a problem for Southeast Asia that has to be addressed. There is 
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consensus among the ASEAN states, and also common interest, in the fight against 
terrorism within the region, and in this way the global and national „wars on terror‟ 
are supported. In a sense, the organisation is relevant even if it lacks a military pillar, 
but centralised structures that could be used politically in the GWOT are also lacking 
(Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). There is a lack of will to create just these 
supranational structures: „this is primarily because the countries in the region do not 
want to establish them. They don‟t want to give up sovereignty‟ (Emmers, interview 
with the author, 2006). The principle that ASEAN was founded on is that of national 
resilience (Hock, interview with the author, 2006). This implies that ASEAN will 
only be as strong as its member states. While there is the political will to integrate 
economic cooperation, in the sphere of security sovereignty remains strictly with the 
national states. Finally, there is no sanctionising mechanism in ASEAN. In the event 
of non-cooperation by certain states, there is no way of changing their behaviour 
apart from diplomatic efforts; there is not even a possibility of sanctions against non-
cooperation (Liow, interview with the author, 2006). 
 
However, „ASEAN also offers an opportunity for discreet discussions among various 
home ministries among officials at the highest level, so that the multilateral 
gathering can then actually be translated into a bilateral and trilateral series of 
agreements‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). In this way, cooperation 
was inspired between Singapore and Malaysia, and also between Indonesia and other 
states. At the multilateral level, ASEAN is a forum to generate trust, which in turn 
facilitates cooperation between member states. This trust and cooperation then 
makes the member states capable of action. In addition, ASEAN can be understood 
as a forum for engagement with third parties, in particular the USA and the EU.  
 
In its strategy and the measures that followed, ASEAN took the role of promoting 
counterterrorism cooperation. At the same time, its rhetoric departed from that of the 
USA: a common definition of terrorism was not established (Ramakrishna 2003), 
and race, culture and religion were rejected as root causes, with poverty and 
underdevelopment being highlighted instead. 
 
Terrorism was linked to transnational crime, which made it particularly threatening. 
ASEAN committed itself to the following principles in the fight against terrorism: 
63 
 
„consensus through consultation on the basis of equality, mutual respect for 
sovereignty, gradual process, and flexibility and effectiveness in our cooperation‟ 
(ASEAN Secretariat 2004a). China, Japan and the Republic of Korea would have to 
be integrated in its efforts. With the declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali 
Concord II) at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003, it was decided to 
build ASEAN into a security community with the aim inter alia of fighting terrorism 
more effectively.  
 
Also, among ASEAN member states multilateral cooperation in the sphere of 
security is increasing since 2001. The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia started 
cooperation in information exchange, for example. Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Signapore agreed on coordination in the combat of piracy (Thayer 2005: 4). 
However, much of the cooperation within the GWOT seems to be taking place rather 
bilaterally than between ASEAN and the USA. Many ASEAN nations participated 
in the GWOT by cooperating directly with the USA in intelligence information 
sharing, in border security, against money laundering, and so forth (Thayer 2005). 
 
Furthermore, ASEAN has been broadly cooperating with other actors on the world 
stage, for example with the USA, China, Japan and the EU. Most of this cooperation 
was aimed at creating declarations and at the implementation of, for example, 
information-sharing, border management, and document security. There has also 
been active participation in the promotion of counterterrorism. ASEAN has 
promoted the fight against terrorism vis-à-vis both its own member states and other 
actors. However, ASEAN could do more in this role, and its seeming reluctance may 
be due to respect for the principle of non-interference in the concerns of its member 
(or possibly other) states. Finally, ASEAN participated on the regional level with 
regard to compliance with norms. The norms of the international community have 
been referred to repeatedly, as has ASEAN‟s willingness to abide by the principles 
and declarations of the UN. Even if criticism on the possible violation of human 
rights in the fight against terrorism might be raised with regard to member countries, 
ASEAN itself is committed to the principles and declarations of the UN. On the state 
level, however, serious concerns are raised with regard to human rights violations.  
According to Human Rights Watch, for example:  
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The Indonesian parliament is now considering . . . anti-terror legislation. The decrees and 
draft legislation threaten to seriously curb fundamental rights, invoking broad definitions of 
terrorism that could be used to target political opponents. Critics argue that existing 
Indonesian criminal laws are sufficient to address the country's security needs. Under the 
draft law, suspected terrorists can be detained by the police for up to seven days on the basis 
of scant preliminary evidence and then for a further six months for questioning and 
prosecution. The draft law would allow intelligence reports to be admitted as prima facie 
evidence in order to detain suspects. The military would be allowed to conduct arrests, 
bringing the Indonesian military back into direct involvement in policing and criminal 
investigations, powers it abused in the Soeharto era. Investigators would also have the 
authority to go through personal mail and parcels and to tap telephone conversations or other 
forms of communication. While intelligence-gathering actions have to be reviewed by a 
judge, the Indonesian court system is so weak and corrupt that judicial review cannot be 
relied upon to constitute a meaningful safeguard. The draft law allows for the death penalty. 
(2003)  
 
There has also been some passive participation, i.e. common rhetoric: terrorism was 
understood as a first-rank security threat endangering the peace and security of the 
world community. Yet, differences remain regarding the definition of terrorism 
(ASEAN itself has yet to find a common one) and its root causes. Regarding the 
latter, ASEAN‟s approach, as we have seen, differs from that of the USA, citing 
poverty and underdevelopment and rejecting race, religion and culture. 
 
Causes for participation in ASEAN  
 
Relative power  
Regarding relative power on the world stage, the interviewees conclude that ASEAN 
is a medium power. Some evidence is provided by Tatik:  
 
ASEAN has been the driving force behind regional initiatives such as the ARF (ASEAN 
Regional Forum), ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN + China, Japan, the Republic of Korea) and 
the newly-launched initiative of East Asian Summit (ASEAN, Plus Three Countries, 
Australia, New Zealand and India). (Tatik, interview with the author, 2006)  
 
Nathan even states that it is an important power; otherwise Condoleezza Rice would 
not have come to visit ASEAN recently. Moreover, he thinks it is growing in 
importance. Emmers states that: „[It is] a very popular idea . . . that ASEAN was the 
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most successful example of cooperation outside of the EU. I think to a large extent 
that is probably still true‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). (Hock argues 
similarly, further stating that ASEAN has looked to the EU constantly to learn from 
its history.) However, Mercosur is also in competition for the position of the second 
most successful regional organisation. There, more has been achieved in the last 20 
years than is even aimed at by ASEAN, especially in the sphere of economic 
cooperation. But ASEAN remains influential, and has just proved this by trying to 
build further regional organisations in the wider East Asia. However, again the 
limitations of ASEAN are mentioned, which also translate into an international 
weakness. ASEAN after all is composed of small to medium powers and still lacks 
tangible structures to address their own problems. Another source of weakness, 
according to Emmers, is that many bilateral relations, internally and externally, are 
still less than ideal. However, ASEAN is giving the Southeast Asian countries a 
voice: 
 
But of course it does give a voice to the Southeast Asian (SEA) countries, a voice which it 
would not have otherwise. Dr Rice would not be coming to SEA every year, I suspect, unless 
there was this organisation which was managing to pull in the big powers like China, India, 
Japan and others. But it is a credible actor in the international politics in East Asia; it has 
been given a lot of attention. But whether it is really capable of changing the structure of 
politics in East Asia, I would be doubtful. (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006)  
 
ASEAN has become at least a relevant actor, especially given its relations with 
China, Japan and India. But it remains questionable whether the organisation has the 
power to change the political situation in the region (Emmers, interview with the 
author, 2006).  
 
Liow describes ASEAN as a „pressure group‟. The organisation has been especially 
successful (on the internal as well as on the international level) when it dealt with 
issues that are of common interest and likely to prove consensual. An example he 
gives is the question of Cambodia.  
 
Singh concludes that ASEAN is not a strong actor in international affairs:  
 
ASEAN is not as strong. It is a regional organisation and it is not [as] cohesive an entity like 
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a nation state, it is not like the European Union. It is an organisation of sovereign 
independent states. There is no political union or attempt to political union. So, they don‟t 
always agree. Sometimes they agree and they cooperate. So, it can not be as strong as nation 
states, like China or so. But compared to other regional organisations in the developing 
world, it is quite strong. (Singh, interview with the author, 2006) 
 
Not surprisingly, all interviews indicate that the USA is clearly the dominant power 
in this relation. 
 
Active coercion or pressure 
Officially, there is no pressure to participate in the GWOT: „ASEAN commits itself 
to rooting out terrorism from the region because it poses grave threat to its security, 
progress and prosperity. There is no external pressure on this‟ (Tatik, interview with 
the author, 2006). 
  
Singh confirms that some countries do not need any pressure: Malaysia does not 
need pressure; Singapore does not need it. But he also qualifies this statement: „I am 
sure there was pressure on President Megawati, especially when Indonesia was in a 
state of denial‟ (Singh, interview with the author, 2006). 
  
Emmers explains that the USA is pursuing a mainly bilateral approach to 
cooperation with the states of ASEAN. This is rational, as the main field for 
cooperation is intelligence sharing, which can best be done by single states. For this 
reason, one cannot really speak of pressure on ASEAN itself. At the bilateral level, 
there is often some kind of „soft pressure‟ exerted: training and funding is offered 
and some information shared, and mutual relations, especially between the USA and 
Indonesia, have improved as a result. However, cooperation is not always mutual 
(possibly another indicator of unilateralism and hegemony): „And this of course 
often also leads to frustration in SEA because there is not always that much 
information being given to the SEA countries‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 
2006). With respect to ASEAN overall, maybe there was some discursive pressure 
involved, as the USA has stated again and again at ASEAN meetings that the GWOT 
is very important and cooperation is in the US interest.  
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Liow, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion that pressure was definitely exerted 
at ASEAN. It was exerted especially through the Senior Officials Meetings, but also 
bilaterally. In ASEAN, the reaction has been uneven. There was no real willingness 
to be the „second front‟ in the GWOT, but the attention paid by the USA was 
welcome. There has been conflict with Indonesia and Malaysia, who were irritated 
and even possibly felt threatened by the „with us or against us‟ rhetoric. Still, these 
countries had to be included in order to make the GWOT not seem a war on Islam 
per se.  
 
Nathan confirms Liow‟s impression and states that of course there was pressure, 
even if only informally. That said, the USA, due to its prominent role in the region, 
does not really have to exert pressure. States will anyway go along with American 
policies: 
 
Of course, the US will not give anything for free. There is no free lunch as they say. So, if 
you want access to their markets, you will buy their support. Many of these countries have 
higher level of prosperity because of their relations with the US. It‟s quite important . . . 
[Pressure is] not directly exerted, it shows itself more in confidential discussions. But it is 
quite clear that many of the countries here go along, because the US can exert another kind 
of pressure on them: economic pressure, diplomatic pressure, even military pressure. Not 
that people here hate the US . . . but they learn to go along with it. (Nathan, interview with 
the author, 2006, also hinting at passive coercion) 
 
Ramakrishna (interview with the author, 2006) follows this line of argument that the 
USA does not really need to put pressure on ASEAN governments to do more on 
counterterrorism. The latter see that it is in their interest to appear firm. Otherwise, 
there would be strong economic repercussions (i.e. passive coercion).  
 
Interdependence and passive coercion 
For Emmers, it is clear whom the ASEAN states depend on: „It is essentially the big 
powers‟. The most important of these, for ASEAN, are the USA and China. Still, he 
claims that individual states do not always take the same position. The relations 
between Singapore and the USA, for example, are fundamentally different from 
those between the USA and Cambodia. ASEAN takes note of other actors, especially 
China and the USA. The former‟s rise is a cause for concern, and leads to a wish for 
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the USA to maintain an ongoing presence in the region, as a security guarantee. In 
addition, Japan is also an important power after the USA, especially economically. 
China is in this sense still backward. Moreover, there is a big unknown: how India 
will develop. The rise of India has been anticipated for the last 15 years, and only 
now can it finally be observed. „But how the rise of India is actually going to have an 
impact on SEA security relations is still very unclear, is still undefined‟ (Emmers, 
interview with the author, 2006). These are the states that ASEAN has to pay 
attention to, which can be practically observed in the activities of the ARF and other 
institutions. 
 
Singh comes to the conclusion that in economic terms the USA is no longer the only 
actor in the region. Only in the security sphere the USA still looms large. Most 
ASEAN countries are quite small, they are not powerful, and they are very much 
dependent on outside trade and investments. But in this they are not just dependent 
on one partner, such as the USA. In their foreign policy decisions they have to bear 
in mind other actors, such as China and Japan, the latter of which is a big investor in 
Southeast Asia. In the future there will be India, and also the EU is important as an 
investor and due to its markets. The rationale for how to engage in these interstate 
relations differs from country to country, but it is generally multifactoral. For 
example, for Laos and Vietnam, China features very prominently. Indonesia, on the 
other hand, considers the USA as much more important. It needs its investments, its 
goodwill, its cooperation in international bodies like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and so forth. The USA furthermore is a security guarantor in a general 
sense, by maintaining the balance of power in the region with regard to China. 
Nevertheless, security guarantees for particular countries only exist in respect of 
Thailand and the Philippines.  
 
Ramakrishna again hints at economic asymmetric interdependence: 
 
ASEAN governments recognise that if they are seen not to be taking a firm stand against 
terrorism, there will be a negative political impact, both domestically as in terms of foreign 
direct investment, and this is very important to ASEAN, especially because it sees itself in 
competition with other Asian regions and states. So they have to show that they are serious 
in dealing with terrorism. (Ramakrishna, interview with the author, 2006)  
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Nathan believes that dependence on the USA is declining because other actors are 
entering the picture: „ASEAN is now also getting more leverage, because of the rise 
of other actors . . . for example China, India. The United States in the economic 
dimension is no longer the supermom. The United States is not in the position to 
control‟ (Nathan, interview with the author, 2006). However, he goes on to state that:  
 
These governments have a stake in the international system, in which the US is a big player. 
So, they do fight with the international system. You fight to protect your own assets, you 
cooperate with the big powers, and there is a strategic consensus.  
 
According to Liow, globalisation has increased mutual relations and thus 
dependency on other actors. It is ASEAN‟s strategy to bring itself „in‟ to remain 
relevant. The aim is to engage partners in order to secure ASEAN‟s voice and 
relevance. This is the more important as ASEAN does not have a foreign policy as 
such, but is trying to speak with one voice.  
 
Hock (interview with the author, 2006) states that, generally, ASEAN‟s 
interdependence with far distant states is less strong. However, again, an exception is 
the USA (a „leader‟ of ASEAN). The region is dependent on its military presence for 
the security of all its states.  
 
Authority and legitimacy  
Emmers argues that one has to make a distinction between public opinion and the 
views of decision makers when thinking about authority of the USA:  
 
Mahathir for instance was always very critical of the US, primarily because this is what 
public opinion wanted to hear. But at the same time Malaysia had extremely close military 
ties with the US and Malaysia wanted the US to be part of the region. (Emmers, interview 
with the author, 2006)  
 
However, the legitimacy question is „a huge one‟ and it is true that the USA has lost 
a large part of its legitimacy in the Muslim states of Southeast Asia as a result of the 
war in Iraq and (less so) of that in Afghanistan. „The war in Iraq in particular had 
cost a lot of political good will in SEA‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). 
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The backlash against the Iraq war was comparable to that in Europe, but is now less 
at the forefront: „but there was a big backlash and there was a lot of anti-
Americanism. That sentiment was on the rise in SEA, but I would not argue, 
however, that this has been automatically translated into a shift of thinking in some 
of the ASEAN countries‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). Nonetheless, 
the political view that the USA acted as the region‟s security guarantor remains 
unchallenged. While interventions are not always welcome, the US presence in the 
region is regarded as very important. „I think those capitals would be wary of seeing 
the United States disengaging from the region‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 
2006). Emmers also believes that the Bush administration became more careful in its 
second term about how to prosecute the GWOT, and the effects can be felt in 
ASEAN. „So, I think relations and this very strong sense of anti-Americanism might 
not be on the decline but might be stabilising at least‟ (Emmers, interview with the 
author, 2006). 
 
Ramakrishna takes a more historical perspective:  
 
There has been a generational change perhaps in the past. In the decolonisation phase, they 
were more suspicious about the colonial masters. This was in the 1950s and early 1960s. But 
since then you have a generational change. I don‟t think these kinds of considerations are in 
effect now. (Ramakrishna, interview with the author, 2006)  
 
Liow (interview with the author, 2006) says that one cannot speak of a common 
ASEAN position. Indonesia and Malaysia have important reservations about the 
GWOT, for example over the issue of Muslim immigration. And while the war in 
Afghanistan was accepted, the intervention in Iraq continues to be seen as unlawful. 
Meanwhile, the Philippines and Singapore joined the US bandwaggon, while 
Thailand first sent troops to participate in the Iraq intervention, then withdrew them 
following internal pressure and criticism. There is thus a broad spectrum of policies 
within ASEAN, reflecting the differences of views on US authority and US 
legitimacy.  
  
Nathan introduces a further dimension: a distinction should be drawn between the 
elite and the populations. The elite still rely on the US presence in the region, and 
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support close security relations with it. Even for purposes of internal control in their 
countries, they have an interest in maintaining ties with the USA. The USA has 
tremendous resources; it can provide training; and then there are the economic 
benefits of cooperation with the USA, which all in the long term can benefit the 
development of ASEAN countries. To a certain extent there is also commonality of 
interests with the USA. With particular focus on counterterrorism, however, there is 
a lack of congruence between some, especially the Muslim dominated, ASEAN 
states and the USA. „I think the Islamic factor also gets in with Indonesia and 
Malaysia, they don‟t agree with the Global War on Terror, with Iraq, and with the 
situation in Israel to 100 per cent‟ (Nathan, interview with the author, 2006). 
However, overall the presence and influence of the USA is accepted. Even the 
military presence of the USA in the region is not seen as a threat. 
 
I don‟t think anyone is asking the US to get out. Everybody recognises the importance of the 
US. Even Vietnam does not [ask it to get out]. As China‟s importance grows, [the] US might 
be seen in a more positive light as a balancer, as the EU too. (Nathan, interview with the 
author, 2006)  
 
Singh thinks that the USA has lost some of its authority because of the Bush 
administration‟s policies, but most governments still regard it as legitimate. The 
Singapore government, for example, may say: „Bush may be an idiot. But still, we 
want you around‟ (Singh, interview with the author, 2006). This is due to the 
dominant power of the USA, which is needed for economic development and 
security. Compared to the USA, the UN, for example, features less prominently. It 
has a good image and is supported, though it is not seen as very effective. 
  
Because they are repeatedly mentioned in the interviews, the factors of political 
culture and religion will be briefly considered here. Tatik discounts the negative 
influence of this factor: „The fact that ASEAN is home to the world‟s largest Muslim 
community, for instance, does not prohibit its relations with the other countries and 
regional organisations‟ (Tatik, interview with the author, 2006). The 
complementarity of the elite is an important question more within ASEAN itself 
(Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). ASEAN today is different from the 
ASEAN of ten years ago. Now there are three legitimate democracies in Southeast 
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Asia: Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia regards human 
rights and democratisation as elements in the concept of security. Still, there are 
differences with new members like Myanmar (also Hock, interview with the author, 
2006). For this reason, the interactions within ASEAN are in a state of flux, 
especially in the cases of Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar. Regarding external 
relations, the effect is different. Here, political cultures are less a factor, particularly 
because after 9/11 the USA largely abandoned its human rights policies. Other 
values, such as security, currently loom larger in interactions, which makes political 
culture less of an issue. 
 
Human rights, democratisation . . . all of that sounds very 1990s, Clinton administration. The 
Bush administration has not been pushing for real hard-core democratisation of SEA. I think, 
if anything, this is happening within SEA itself, [it is] within public opinion itself. This has 
not been an area where the US has been particularly engaged in SEA. (Emmers, interview 
with the author, 2006)  
 
Liow concludes that religious differences and differences in political culture can 
even be conducive to the relations especially with the USA. „If you have a Muslim 
dominated government in Malaysia, then it is better not to have democracy there, 
given the security interests of the United States‟ (Liow, interview with the author, 
2006). The „hawks‟ in the US administration are particularly eager to cooperate with 
authoritarian regimes, as these are more effective in the fight against terrorism, so 
Liow. Islam, therefore, does not necessarily hinder cooperation. According to 
Huntington (1996), one could suspect such an effect, but in reality, the opposite was 
to be observed. Yet, Liow also states that many Islamic leaders perceive the GWOT 
as a war on Islam, and therefore only cooperate out of necessity. Counteracting this 
effect is the knowledge that ASEAN needs the US presence in the region to balance 
China‟s power and to secure peace within the region itself. For this reason, the 
Islamic leaders policies are more pragmatic. They also depend on investment and 
technology from the West (compare the section on interdependence and passive 
coercion above). More an issue of concern are the religious leaders, not the political 
elites. Religious leaders can be very anti-American, and their popularity brings them 
political immunity. The real difference, therefore, is to be found less in the political, 
more in the civil sphere (Nathan, Liow, interviews with the author, 2006). 
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Nathan supports the opposing argument that religion might lead in particular to non-
cooperation in counterterrorism:  
 
I think a problem arises with Islam itself. You are dealing with certain members in SEA who 
are seeing everything through the prism of Islam. The Islamic ideology does interfere in a 
certain way – in Indonesia, Malaysian leaders are trying to process everything through a 
religious lens. They say: there are no Muslim terrorists! . . . As well, the element of 
Islamisation is growing in certain states among the leaders, for example Malaysia. (Nathan, 
interview with the author, 2006)  
 
Hock tries to solve this dispute in stating that the dichotomy between Islam and 
democracy is a false one. There were many interpretations of Islam and many of 
these are inherently democratic. He also states that the USA has to be sensitive in its 
handling of the cultural situations in the region. The USA needs to understand that 
the opposition of Islam to the US interest in democratisation is only superficial: „I 
don‟t see there is a problem unless the United States is blind to all these local 
contexts‟ (Hock, interview with the author, 2006). 
  
Singh states that religion overall does not have any impact on counterterrorism 
cooperation:  
 
It (religion) does not lead to a difference in the sense that both ASEAN and [the] US 
recognise that terrorism is a problem. There is a threat and that must be stopped. So, whether 
you are an Islamic country in SEA, that makes no difference. (Singh, interview with the 
author, 2006)  
 
However, the difference which does remain is that the Islamic countries do not agree 
on how to deal with terrorism. Each of their religious leaders will have very clear 
ideas on how the problem should be addressed (Singh, interview with the author, 
2006). The USA, of course, has a negative reputation among a large part of the 
Muslim populations. Their leaders therefore have to consider fighting terrorism very 
subtly, and finding their own policies. An extreme example of this is that in 
Indonesia the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is not a declared terrorist 
organisation. For a long time (until the Bali bombing) the authorities had been in 
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„complete denial‟. But „the way of dealing with terrorists and the perceptions about 
the causes of terrorism might be different, but not on the threat as such‟ (Singh, 
interview with the author, 2006).  
 
Finally, Ramakrishna confirms the impression that three is no major negative effect 
of religion on cooperation.  
 
More important than political culture or religious factors are the points of interest. We have a 
lot in common with [the] EU and US, because there is a shared threat. It is the shared sense 
of interest that is contributing to the real cooperation. (Ramakrishna, interview with the 
author, 2006)  
 
Perception of a terrorist threat as influence 
Tatik responds to the question of rhetorical influence as follows: „ASEAN views 
terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and a direct 
challenge to the attainment of its own goal of peace, progress and prosperity‟ (Tatik, 
interview with the author, 2006). Ramakrishna elaborates that terrorism is not a new 
threat within ASEAN. For example, during the Cold War many countries in 
ASEAN, especially Malaysia and Singapore, had to combat Communist led 
terrorism. And in the Indochina conflict, the Communists sought power through 
terrorism as well as guerrilla warfare. This was a phenomenon affecting the whole 
Southeast Asian region. Regarding the threat perception, he supports Tatik‟s 
statement: 
 
Especially since the end of the Cold War and the rise of religiously motivated terrorism 
ASEAN takes the threat very seriously, because any successful attack in the region tends to 
cause a great deal of political concern, especially over the prospect of FDI. This is very 
important to the region. So, ASEAN governments are very confident to fight terrorism. 
(Ramakrishna, interview with the author, 2006) 
 
Terrorism is therefore perceived as a prominent problem in ASEAN. However, the 
perceptions of various governments in ASEAN differ. Some of them have taken the 
threat very seriously (the Singaporean and Malaysian authorities have mobilised 
substantial resources in the fight against terrorism) others have not, preferring to 
consider their own domestic political situation (Ramakrishna, interview with the 
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author, 2006). 
 
Gunaratna confirms once more that, even if the direct risk of an attack can be 
regarded as low, preventing terrorist attacks is of high importance. 
 
We have identified 47 terrorist and extremist groups. If you look at the national security 
threats, there are four principal threats. One is terrorism, second is crime, and third is 
proliferation, and fourth there are another range of security issues like smuggling and piracy 
and all that. But in terms of classification, terrorism is the most serious security threat. It is 
the tier-one security threat. But still the probability of an attack is very low. But, if an attack 
occurs, it will have grave consequences for the stability. Thus we have to prevent terrorism. 
(Gunaratna, interview with the author, 2006)  
 
Nathan maintains that the perception of terrorist threat, the relations to the USA and 
participation in the GWOT are all interdependent. Singapore has very close 
connections with the USA, and therefore willingness to cooperate is high. The 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have less close relations, and 
therefore less inclination to participate. Furthermore, Indonesia and Malaysia do not 
agree on terrorism being a threat because the majority of their populations are 
Muslim. They „don‟t buy how the United States defines terrorism and what is done‟ 
(Nathan, interview with the author, 2006). Other states „just go along with what is 
done‟ (Nathan, interview with the author, 2006). Vietnam, for example, has no 
terrorist threat, nor does Cambodia, but they comply with any ASEAN declaration.  
  
Emmers furthermore qualifies the above statements by pointing out that terrorism is 
not a problem that all states face to the same extent. „Even organisations such as 
Jemaah Islamiyah, for instance, are very small in terms of their numbers, capabilities 
and so forth. So, it is a significant problem, but I would not argue that it is a critical 
one. It is a problem which is particularly significant for some countries‟ (Emmers, 
interview with the author, 2006). Terrorism is a particularly urgent problem for three 
states: the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand (Emmers, interview with the author, 
2006). In southern Thailand, the government has to deal with a traditional conflict 
that started well before 9/11, and in the southern Philippines there is a conflict that is 
no less than 500 years old. However, there is currently a terrorist component in these 
conflicts that makes them more problematic. The developments in Indonesia, 
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meanwhile, are more recent, stemming mainly from the Suharto period. These three 
states in particular, as Emmers explains, are facing the threat of terrorism, and 
therefore they take that threat very seriously. However, „Terrorism is not a big issue 
for most SEA countries‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). For this reason, 
the states in question resort particularly to bilateral and trilateral cooperation, since 
they cannot count on the cooperation of the wider community. At this level, 
therefore, there has been more cooperation than within ASEAN itself: „This is where 
the most interesting forms of cooperation have been taking place. Not at the 
multilateral level, including all the Southeast Asian countries, but increasingly at the 
bilateral and trilateral level‟ (Emmers, interview with the author, 2006). Finally, 
Southeast Asia does not see itself as a „second front‟ in the GWOT, as it is the US 
perspective on Southeast Asia. This might indicate that US influence on threat 
perception or, according to Emmers, even the threat itself are not overly strong.  
 
Singh confirms this perception:  
 
[The threat] exists mostly in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines (and 
Thailand, even if Thailand has a different threat). Even within these four countries the 
priority given to the threat varies. Although serious in the Philippines and Indonesia, 
Indonesia does not regard it as [a] number one security threat. Their challenges are really 
political stability and such. To Singapore, terrorism is very high on the agenda, even though 
they did not have a terrorist attack. They take it very seriously, more than any other country, 
even if the threat is more in other parts like Indonesia and Philippines. (Singh, interview with 
the author, 2006) 
 
Liow further explains that terrorism is seen more as a short- rather than a long-term 
threat, even though it has continued, notably in the Philippines:  
 
I think that ASEAN leaders see it as an immediate problem, short term. But I think they have 
articulated a number of occasions really that in the longer term they have bigger concerns: 
integration, rise of China, Sino-Japanese relations, American engagement etc. In the short 
term I think it is a security problem. . . . But I think the regional states have adjusted to these 
new security realities over the past three, four years. Therefore, while they still see it as an 
immediate problem, it is not such a major one as it was in October 2002. (Liow, interview 
with the author, 2006)  
 
77 
 
Gunaratna concludes that terrorism is still underestimated in the ASEAN states, even 
if they take the threat very seriously.  
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Conclusion 
 
ASEAN is in part under the influence of the USA and its participation in the global 
efforts to counter terrorism is in part motivated by US hegemony and ASEAN‟s 
dependence on the USA. As the ASEAN nations are heavily dependent on US 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and protection, they are more willing to cooperate 
than they would otherwise be. Furthermore, even though the increase in threat is 
higher than for the EU, the threat perception is lower. Influence, therefore, could be a 
factor (as well as pressure) but the evidence is weak. Limits on participation are most 
likely attributable to the lack of internal political strength within ASEAN. 
 
Overall, the argument can be made that there are internal as well as strong external 
systemic factors responsible for counterterrorism. According to an analysis of the 
interviews, the main external factors might be the US dominance and asymmetric 
interdependence with the USA (by a very large margin) hence passive coercion, but 
also legitimacy and authority. The most probable explanation for participation in the 
GWOT is that there is some pressure, even if mostly informal, by the USA to go 
along with its policies. Participation then occurs because non-cooperation would lead 
(or is expected to lead) to economic repercussions in the form of loss of foreign 
direct investments. Also, the security oriented relations with the USA could be 
compromised by non-participation, which is not in the interest of ASEAN states. For 
each state, the prominent role of the USA was emphasised, as was its dependency on 
the USA in several dimensions. The USA serves as a security guarantor as well as 
providing open markets, technology and so forth. Therefore, we find dominance, 
passive coercion and authority in this case study as the main causes for participation 
in counterterrorism. 
  
In conclusion, the interviews provided clear indications of dominance, the exertion 
of power via passive coercion, and the use of authority. Therefore it is argued that 
the assumption of hegemonic governance bears explanatory power for participation 
by ASEAN in the GWOT under George W. Bush. The results of the interviews are 
summarised in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6. Presentation of the causal factors for participation (ASEAN) 
 
Factor/interview Emmers Liow Singh Nathan Hock/ 
Guna-
ratna 
Rama- 
krishna 
Tatik 
Test variables 
Power external
26
 
 
+ + + +  + + + 
Pressure (active 
coercion) 
+ – + + – +  – – 
Interdependence 
(passive coercion) 
+ + – + + + +  
Authority (influence) + + – + +  +  
Threat (influence) + – + – + – + –   +27   + + 
 
Legend:  
+ Positive 
response 
+ – Neutral 
response 
– Negative 
response 
  Not answered 
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6 
The Global Governance of Counterterrorism28 
       
Coercion is difficult to measure. (Byman and Waxman 2002: 31) 
 
Global counterterrorism is regarded here as a policy field of global governance. 
Counterterrorism is pursued internationally through multinational cooperation in 
order to manage national policies aiming to reduce terrorism worldwide. This 
multinational cooperation is marked by the leading role played by the USA. Even in 
the UN, the USA is the leading power, and sometimes acts unilaterally in the pursuit 
of counterterrorism. Of course, here the term „hegemonic governance‟ does not 
exclude the possibility that the hegemon is interacting with other states as equals and 
cooperating in a multilateral manner. Yet, the term includes the notion that, finally, 
the hegemon holds the prerogative of exercising its power or acting unilaterally, at 
times even against the principles of the international community. In the following 
sections, the main global actors in counterterrorism are presented and their strategies, 
policies and rhetoric evaluated. Even alongside the well-reported military actions 
and ambitions of the USA, power in the GWOT is also exerted elsewhere, even on 
allies and other (neutral, or at least not target) states. This chapter will firstly define 
the GWOT as an emergent area of global governance, and then look at the use of 
power (force, coercion, and influence) as measurements of hegemonic governance in 
the GWOT. This chapter argues that hegemony can be discerned in different 
dimensions in the GWOT. Firstly, the USA plays an independent and leading role in 
this undertaking, itself a sign of power. Power is further exerted by using force 
against declared adversaries, and by coercion and influence via others. The USA acts 
here partly as a policy entrepreneur, convincing other nations, IOs and regions to 
participate in the GWOT and to go along with most of its policies. Therefore, a 
hegemonic relationship seems to exist.  
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The GWOT as global governance 
 
Cooperation in global counterterrorism, hence the GWOT, is certainly more than a 
regime. Ruggie talks about regimes as „a set of mutual expectations, rules and 
regulations, organisational plans, energies and financial commitments that have been 
accepted by a group of states‟. Another definition stems from Krasner, regimes are 
„sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which the actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations‟ (both cited in Leonard 2005: 108ff). Whereas the first of these definitions 
comes close to describing counterterrorism in the global sphere, the second is 
certainly not broad enough. Global counterterrorism cooperation encompasses more 
than certain rules of behaviour over a particular issue. For one, counterterrorism 
cooperation is reflected in a large number of areas (as mentioned in Chapter 4), such 
as financial control, border control, immigration regulation, intelligence cooperation, 
traditional security policies and so forth. Many other areas, such as health policy, 
media control, etc., are affected by cooperation in counterterrorism, and therefore 
belong in the broad sense to the GWOT. It therefore seems unjustified to speak here 
of a „given area‟. The term „war on terror‟ has been used to capture so many policies 
under a large political-ideological umbrella, that a single-issue area is hardly 
discernable. Furthermore, it encompasses more than „rules and regulations‟, „plans‟ 
and „energies‟ affecting cooperation. While rules and regulations are clearly present 
in the UN counterterrorism conventions, for example, and strategies (including 
„plans‟) are frequently mentioned and discussed here, counterterrorism cooperation 
goes further. It encompasses external and internal policies, rhetoric, and a whole 
ideology comparable to the ideology and discourse on globalisation prominent in the 
1990s. Rosenau speaks of „order plus intentionality‟ as a marker for governance, and 
suggests that it is comprised of fundamental markers (the distribution of power, for 
example) and routinised actions (trade, postal and passport procedures), whereas 
regimes in comparison consist of „more specialised arrangements that pertain to 
well-defined activities, resources or geographical areas and often involve only some 
subset of the members of international society‟ (Rosenau 1992: 9). For all these 
reasons, here the choice has been made to speak of global governance in, rather than 
a regime of, counterterrorism. Welch and Kennedy-Pipe even speak in the case of 
counterterrorism about global „government‟ rather than „governance‟ (2005: 144). 
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The term used in this study, „hegemonic governance‟, in turn tries to bridge the 
divide between governance and government by suggesting a hierarchy in global 
governance headed by one superior actor, though one which does not exercise 
absolute control. 
 
The US strategy against terrorism 
 
The USA was the state directly attacked on 9/11, and is even thought to be one of the 
main targets of transnational terrorism.
29
 In addition, its international power makes it 
only natural that it is the main actor in pursuing terrorism.  
 
The US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 refers to the problem of 
international terrorism.
30
 It starts by emphasising that the principles of freedom and 
equality relevant to all societies must be defended on a global scale. Reference to 
terrorism is made in the second paragraph, from which one sentence became widely 
known: „We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists‟ (White House 2002: 6). 
This willingness to take unilateral action was greeted by international dissent. 
Beyond this, intervention in haven states is mentioned in the strategy as:  
 
direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our 
immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state 
sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or 
their precursors. (White House 2002: 6)  
 
The decision was thus to adopt a military approach to terrorism in taking 
preventative measures and in responding to attacks; the pre-emptive option is 
explicit here. Another section of the strategy deals with rogue states, and mentions 
Iraq in this context. Iraq and similar states threatened the USA and for this reason a 
proactive strategy was necessary: „We must deter and defend against the threat 
before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities – detection, active and 
passive defences, and counterforce capabilities – are integrated into our defense 
transformation‟ (White House 2002: 14). Support for free markets follows as a 
further element in the strategy. It was hoped that this would lead to an increase in 
global wealth (Hobsons‟s second criterion for hegemony, chs. 1, 7). As terrorism is 
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understood as stemming from the embitterment of a few, this could be seen as part 
of a strategy against it. Yet the connection between development and terrorism is 
only made indirectly: „Economic growth . . . reinforces the habits of liberty‟ (White 
House 2002: 17). 
 
Finally, there is also reference to development as such. A world, it is argued, where 
half the people live on less than two dollars a day is neither just nor stable. 
Development has thus been one of the highest priorities for the USA, but classic 
development aid is abandoned, as it has so far led not to success but simply to 
malpractice and misuse. For this reason, all measures are to be coupled with 
political changes. Resources will only be made available to those nations that show 
political reform (again, this can be interpreted as an intention to restructure and 
change other states according to US interests, ch. 7).  
 
In 2003, the US administration presented its National Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism, this time designed to address terrorism specifically. It was again stressed 
that the USA would not hesitate to act unilaterally and pre-emptively: „If necessary . 
. . we will not hesitate to act alone, to exercise our right to self-defense, including 
acting pre-emptively against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm to our 
people and our country‟ (White House 2003: 2), reinforcing its proclivity for 
unilateralism. Some countries are again understood as haven states in this context: 
„States around the world still offer havens‟ (White House 2003: 2). US behaviour 
towards states would differ according to their willingness to cooperate: „We will 
reinvigorate old partnerships . . . we will support them . . . convince them . . . we 
will act decisively to counter the threat they pose‟ (White House 2003: 12). 
Counterterrorism needs further impetus: „we must continue to take aggressive 
action‟ (White House 2003: 5), clearly a sign of power politics based on US military 
predominance, though not as such necessarily a sign of hegemony, and „extending 
our defenses‟ (White House 2003: 12). Beyond the interdiction of safe havens, the 
direct fight against terrorism, the fight against root causes, as well as the defence of 
the homeland are elements of a „4D-strategy‟ (defeat terrorist organisations; deny 
further sponsorship, support and sanctuary; diminish the underlying conditions; 
defend the USA).  
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The first of these elements refers to military and police deployment against terrorist 
organisations. In addition, control of terrorist finances as well as intelligence 
operations are hinted at here. The second refers implicitly to military interventions 
in states that harbour terrorism (this could possibly be interpreted as an attempt at 
imperialism, rather than hegemony). States that were not cooperative were to be 
held accountable. On the fight against underlying causes, the administration‟s 
intention is to mount a policy of development as well as to wage a war of ideas. 
Nevertheless, in the same paragraph, it is made clear that the USA is not willing to 
carry out this part of its strategy alone (contrary to the military pillar, where the 
wish for or necessity of multilateralism is not even mentioned, in all likelihood 
another hint at unilateralism). Other states concerned about terrorism must take part 
in aid programmes and in the war of ideas, though no further elaboration of these 
two aims is given, apart from the statement that development aid is in any event 
ongoing. (In this context it should perhaps be remembered that the USA, like many 
other states, is far beneath the internationally agreed target allocation for 
development aid of 0.7 per cent of GNP (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development n.d.). On the war of ideas, it is stated that the aim is to defeat the 
ideology of terrorism, and to delegitimise it, so the terrorists will no longer be able 
to recruit. 
  
In 2006 another NSS was published, which does not greatly differ from that of 
2002. The pre-emptive option is restated, but without a reference to unilateralism. 
Yet from the earlier NSS can be construed a policy that might continue the GWOT 
against Iran, and possibly Syria: „We make no distinction between terrorists and 
those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them‟ (White House 2002). Under 
„further steps‟, it is claimed that: „In the short run, the fight [against terrorism] 
involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or 
capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation‟ (White House 
2006a: 9). Particularly in the Middle East, the following is to be achieved: 
prevention of further attacks, of the possession of WMD for rogue states and 
terrorists, of safe haven for terrorists in rogue states and of terrorist control of such 
states. In this context, Syria and Iran are mentioned explicitly: they must be „held 
accountable‟ by the world (again indicating a rather imperialist, as opposed to 
hegemonic, approach). Finally, the paper addresses the root causes of terrorism. 
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Poverty, US foreign policy and the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians are 
dismissed as causes. It refers instead to authoritarian regimes and the resultant 
political alienation, lack of participatory rights, unjustified allegations, and 
subcultures characterised by conspiracy theories, disinformation, and an ideology 
that justifies murder. Democracy is presented as a solution to all these ills. 
  
The 2003 National Strategy for Countering Terrorism was revised in 2006. This 
new paper firstly describes successes in the GWOT, and the phenomenon of 
terrorism itself. What follows is a presentation of a concrete strategy against 
terrorism. The long-range strategy is to further the spread of democracy and to 
support democratic change (again, Hobson‟s second criterion for hegemony). 
Democracy is seen as the „antidote to the ideology of terrorism‟ (Embassy of the 
United States 2006). The causes of terrorism mentioned earlier are repeated, with 
the argument that democracy is capable of diminishing all of them. Political 
alienation is replaced by participation; frustration and allegations are replaced by the 
rule of law and peaceful conflict resolution; the culture of conspiracy theories finds 
a remedy in freedom of speech and the free exchange of ideas. Finally, an ideology 
that furthers violence is to be replaced by respect for human dignity. Democracy is 
therefore both the antithesis of and the solution to terrorism. In the short term, 
though, military means will continue to be used. Terrorist organisations will be 
attacked in all their manifestations, and their own offensive capability thus 
diminished.  
 
Measures in the fight against terrorism 
 
The US strategy and its policies in the GWOT can be divided into three pillars: a 
military, potentially unilateral pillar; a civil, more multilateral pillar; and finally, 
protection of the homeland as a pillar in its own right (which will not be discussed 
here). Presented here are the measures taken as part of hegemonic governance; the 
argument for hegemonic governance as such will be supported further in the next 
chapter.  
 
Military measures and the application of force 
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Force via military measures is mainly exerted by the USA by interventions. As soon 
as the USA throws in the weight of its predominant military, the latter‟s sheer size 
and power ensure that an element of pressure is always involved. Military force is, 
however, mainly exerted against countries declared to be „non-cooperative‟ or 
„haven‟ states in the GWOT, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the mere 
existence of these undertakings might suggest a rationale for other states and actors 
to comply with the policies of the USA, in order to avoid being targeted in the 
future. While it is unlikely that such a rationale would be relevant in an EU nation, 
for example, which considers itself a long-standing ally of the USA and coupled to it 
in a security community, it might well be relevant to another state or region that had 
weaker ties with the USA, a prospect furthered by the „with us or against us‟ rhetoric 
of the USA. So, one might ask whether these undertakings, particularly the 
intervention in Iraq, are part of global governance, even if a hegemonic one. 
Kustermanns argues that it can indeed be so understood: „Hegemonic law, [and, 
therefore, hegemonic governance] . . . is grounded on the recognition of inequality, 
on an exceptional position for the hegemonic power, and on the right to intervene‟ 
(2007: 14).  
 
This therefore would cover all the military measures that have been pursued in the 
GWOT. Whereas from a European perspective the intervention in Iraq has not been 
part of the fight against terrorism, the US administration has made an explicit 
connection between them (Garamone 2002).  
 
In the following, a short analysis will be presented of „Operation Enduring Freedom‟ 
and „Operation Iraqi Freedom‟ as the main elements, in the US understanding, of the 
GWOT. Directly after 9/11, the defence budget was raised to $379.4 billion (US 
Department of Defense 2002). Since then, it has increased further: in 2005 it was 
$450 billion (US Department of Defense 2005). The war in Afghanistan implies the 
spending of some $1.8 billion per month; overall, the cost of this war was estimated 
at $37 billion up to February 2003 alone (Byrd 2003). The Iraq war is estimated to 
have cost between $410 and $630 billion (Krueger 2006); some less conservative 
estimates give significantly higher figures.
31
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These two interventions can be regarded as expressions of hegemonic governance 
exerted in a partly unilateralist manner; the military sortie in Iraq, in particular, has 
been said to show a high degree of unilateralism (Sauer 2002).  
 
The last decade of the twentieth century began with an extraordinarily wide Security Council 
authorization to resort to force and ended with a massive unilateral use of force without any 
Security Council authorization at all. In both cases, the principal actors were exactly the 
same. The first decade of the new millennium also began with a large military operation, in 
response to the most horrific terrorist attack, outside the framework of the collective security 
system set up by the Charter. And again, the principal actors remained the same. (Kohen 
2003: 226) 
 
And: 
 
Indeed, some might see in recent developments the incipient demise of sovereign equality as 
the organizing principle of the international order. The increased ability and willingness of 
the United States . . . to use force, without recourse to established procedures and without the 
felt need to give legal explanations responsive to established doctrines, might be taken as 
evidence . . . of the emergence of a different kind of peace and security order – one in which 
the United States participate in, but is not subject to, international legal institutions. (Roth 
2003: 261) 
 
Afghanistan 
A kind of loose coalition, and one to be determined after the mission began, was 
aimed at after the attacks of 9/11. According to Donald Rumsfeld, then US Secretary 
of Defense:  
 
This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an 
axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may 
change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. 
Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military. 
Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us 
privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the coalition – not the other way 
around. (US Department of Defense 2001) 
 
Yet the intervention was backed by a Security Council resolution
32
 (Greenwood 
2002). States from all over the world participated in the war and its aftermath. 
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Turkey, for example, sent more than 1,300 soldiers to Kabul to take over the 
leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); it is the only 
country that has twice been in charge of ISAF. Overall, the following NATO and 
non-NATO countries have participated in the Afghanistan operation (NATO 2005). 
 
 NATO nations: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA;  
 „partner‟ nations: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland; 
 non-NATO nation: New Zealand.  
 
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands sent F-16 fighter jets to Kyrgyzstan for air 
operations over Afghanistan, and Romania sent an infantry battalion to the country. 
Special troops from Canada, Germany as well as other nations have served on the 
ground in the search and prosecution of the Taleban as well as in intelligence 
operations. Australia, France, Greece, Germany and other nations sent air force to 
monitor the airspace of Afghanistan as well as elsewhere (NATO 2005). Some of the 
captured Taleban and members (and supposed members) of al Qaeda were taken to 
the US base of Guantánamo in Cuba. This proceeding is highly debatable under 
international law, and was met with protests from human rights organisations. Also 
the bombardments in the context of the war in Afghanistan, which claimed numerous 
civilian deaths, have been criticised by these organisations. Terrorist attacks and 
hijackings are common since the intervention and the nation is in a state of 
insurgency. On the other hand, there were free elections under the supervision of the 
ISAF forces, in October 2004 and September 2005, and again in August 2009. Even 
if the intervention was apparently based on multilateralism, the war has frequently 
been referred to as an instance of US imperialism (Stabile and Kumar 2005; Mallaby 
2002; Petras 2002). Since Western presence has been established in Afghanistan, the 
USA and other nations helped to train the Afghan national army and police force. By 
2003, a total of 18 battalions of troops had been trained, i.e. more than 10,000 
soldiers; and 38 countries had promised weapons, munitions and financial support 
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for this exercise. The task of establishing an Afghan national army aims to be 
completed by 2010.  
 
Iraq 
The war against Iraq started differently. The Project of the New American Century, 
an American think-tank, had lobbied for an invasion of Iraq since 1998 (Washington 
Times 1998). In 2003, together with the UK, the USA proposed a resolution in the 
Security Council arguing that Iraq possessed WMD, apart from its connections with 
terrorism. It was emphasised that an intervention would prevent the possibility of the 
regime providing terrorists with such weapons (Human Rights Constitutional 2003). 
Yet proof of these accusations was weak (USA Today 2005), so the other Security 
Council members vetoed a resolution to intervene militarily in Iraq, and in the 
following period employed soft-balancing to prevent such an intervention (Pape 
2005). Some, particularly American, scholars, argue that the intervention was still 
justified by international law (Yoo 2003), though many experts dispute this claim.
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Christine Gray, for instance, argues that precedents are to be found in the 
intervention in Iraq in 1998 and that in Kosovo in 1999, when the USA and UK in 
particular used Security Council resolutions with a degree of flexibility (Gray 2002). 
It would follow from this that there has been a polarisation in the field of collective 
security. International law in the aftermath of 2003 is also referred to as „hegemonic 
international law‟ („HIL‟, Vagts 2001). HIL could here be counted as evidence of 
unilateralism and (general) hegemony. The issue of hegemony in the creation of 
international law is extensively discussed in Byers and Nolte (2003). Ignoring the 
absence of legitimisation by international law and the international community, the 
USA declared war on Iraq and intervened, with many states refusing to cooperate in 
the military project due precisely to this lack of legitimacy under international law. 
The states that participated formed the so-called „Coalition of the Willing‟ (BBC 
2003; White House 2003b). Some of them ended their participation after increasing 
internal or external opposition (e.g. Spain, Ukraine and Nicaragua). Turkey 
threatened to end its participation after repeated attacks on the northern Iraqi city of 
Talafar, where many Turks live.  
 
Anderson et al. (2003) argued in the wake of the Iraq war that coercion on other 
nations to participate was likely: 
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Although Administration officials have said publicly that they will not attempt to bully 
nations into supporting their Iraq policy, there is ample precedent for the United States using 
coercion to garner support for its military actions overseas. (2003: 1) 
 
Coercion was indeed effective in the creation of internal (in the USA) and (to lesser 
extent) external consent in the run-up to the intervention in Iraq:  
 
[Accounts of the Iraq war] have emphasized the effects of international unipolarity, the 
political polarization that supplied incentives to deploy Iraq as a wedge issue, presidents‟ 
capacity to speak with unquestioned authority with regard to foreign policy, the 
administration‟s embrace of neoconservative ideas about international affairs, its 
manipulation of classified information, the fracturing of the Democratic opposition, the 
uncritical stance of the mainstream media, internal and external pressures that led 
intelligence agencies around the globe to misread and exaggerate Iraq‟s weapons of mass 
destruction programs and stocks, and individuals‟ reasoning errors with regard to risk. 
(Krebs and Lobasz 2007: 410) 
 
The invasion furthermore led to an insurgency with increased and seemingly 
unending violence and fighting in Iraq. Terrorist attacks occurr on nearly a daily 
basis, and in 2006 the UN referred to a civil war-like situation in the country. In 
September 2005, for example, more than 200 people were killed in only three days 
(USA Today 2009). In securing the country, Coalition forces are supported by a 
number of private security firms. Estimates of numbers of these private military 
contractors in Iraq differ, but it could be assumed that they might present a larger 
force than the US troops engaged there (Miller 2007). Military bases were 
established on a semi-permanent basis in both Iraq and Afghanistan; and overall, the 
USA has close to 800 military installations in other foreign countries (Johnson 
2009). The latter clearly supports the hegemony thesis. 
 
The war against Iraq was also criticised for the justification advanced for it. After 
referring to the terrorist threat and an alleged connection between Saddam Hussein 
and al Qaeda, and thus a link with 9/11, the Bush administration claimed to be 
threatened by Iraqi WMD. Yet, none of these accusations could be proven (CNN 
2004; Washington Post 2006). Indeed, the connection to al Qaeda has come to be 
seen as non-existent, and since the invasion no WMD have been found in Iraq. A 
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later justification presented included bringing democracy to a country that had 
suffered under dictatorship. 
  
Both interventions show a high level of the application of force as a use of power, in 
the case of Iraq without legitimacy under international law. This is clearly a case of 
hegemonic behavior, some might even argue an imperialist one. (The author has 
argued before that this behaviour is more imperialist towards specific regions, but 
can generally be termed hegemonic; Beyer 2008.) It is a case of hegemonic and 
therefore global governance, as it implies global ordering activities by parts of the 
world community, or at least by the most powerful state. Furthermore, it is also a 
case of the creation and implementation of international rules with a claim to global 
validity, as these interventions can be understood as a precedent for further such 
actions, and as marking the development of an emerging rule of pre-emptive 
intervention (similar to the norm of „humanitarian intervention‟ which emerged in 
the 1990s; Molier 2006). Interventions here are understood to be one prime example 
of hegemonic governance. 
 
Apart from the interventions discussed above, operations under the GWOT have 
taken place in the following countries: Georgia, Indonesia, Yemen, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Djibouti, Kenya, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Colombia 
(Feickert 2005). Such operations have comprised the use of airports or harbours, 
stationing of soldiers, financial support for the army (in Indonesia and the 
Philippines), unspecified support for the army (in Georgia and the Philippines) and 
support in operations against terrorists (in the Philippines) as well as joint 
cooperation against terrorists (in Yemen and Pakistan) (Schneckener 2003: 8ff). 
 
Coercion and multilateral measures 
Coercion can be understood as being based on potential sanctions (i.e. active 
coercion), or making use of asymmetric interdependence (i.e. passive coercion). A 
number of the multilateral measures put forward by the USA most probably entail 
one of the two versions of coercion. Multilateral measures will be discussed in what 
follows. One can describe the multilateralism of the US government as „selective‟ 
(ch. 7). Cooperation is only aimed at where partners are compliant in following US 
interests. This selective or instrumental multilateralism retains at its core a strong 
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unilateral component (Winter 2004: 26). With respect to cooperation in the sphere of 
soft policies, for example, the USA pursues a policy of selective multilateralism. 
There is a tendency to decline international agreements that could bind the USA and 
limit its capacity to act independently and in its own interests. For example, it did not 
support the establishment of the International Criminal Court and claimed not to be 
under its jurisdiction; yet the Court might develop into a powerful tool in the fight 
against terrorism (Banchik 2003; Goldstone and Simpson 2003). In this context, 
coercion was used by the USA, as will be explained in the following chapter. 
 
Multilateral, civil measures are generally regarded as more appropriate in fighting 
terrorism which springs itself from a multinational, transnational network. However, 
the US government relegated such measures to a secondary role, behind military 
force. Among the multilateral policies, for example, were cooperation in the 
implementation of international law, in the control of terrorist financial 
organisations, and in support for other nations in prosecuting terrorists. A 
multilateral strategy was also based on cooperation with the international 
community, particularly through the UN, which has long attempted to mobilise the 
international community in the fight against terrorism. There are more than a dozen 
conventions and protocols on terrorism in existence which have been written under 
the umbrella of the UN or its affiliated organisations. Resolution 1373 obliges all 
member states to cooperate against terrorism, against its finances, by denying it safe 
haven, against its acquisition of weapons and by border protection. These measures 
were pursued by the USA in cooperation with the international community. It also 
has supported other states, in many ways, in complying with anti-terrorism laws. For 
example, there has been strong cooperation with a number of regional as well as 
issue-specific organisations over the exchange of information that could lead to the 
capture of terrorists, over improvements in border security and over the interdiction 
of terrorist financing (US Department of State 2003). 
 
Finally, mention should be made of preventive measures. At the end of 2002, US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell presented an initiative involving cooperation with 
Arab states, particularly in the sphere of democratisation (Olivastro 2002). This 
encompassed economic reforms, development of the private sector, the strengthening 
of civil society and political participation, and support for education. The initiative, 
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which derived from European démarches like the Barcelona Process and European 
Gulf Cooperation, evolved into the Broader Middle East Initiative, in which the core 
element is a forum for dialogue („Forum for the Future‟), organised by the USA with 
European participation. This might be one of the more promising attempts to 
countering terrorism long-term, but it also elicited criticism. In 2007, $120 million 
overall was planned to be spent for this purpose (White House 2006c). Positive 
coercion, in the sense of rewards, is clearly present here and is used to support 
efforts to counter terrorism. 
 
Cooperation in the sphere of international law and financial control 
Since 9/11, the US government has cooperated with states and in IOs to improve 
cooperation in implementing the law and in taking financial action against terrorism. 
Efforts in respect of the latter have led to the freezing of terrorists‟ accounts.34 In the 
first 16 weeks after 9/11, the USA froze around $68 million of terrorist 
organisations‟ funds; and in the first two years after 9/11, a total of $113 million was 
frozen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, Schneckener 2003: 4). The 
financial war against terrorism was supported by some 208 states, and 167 have 
acted by freezing terrorists‟ accounts. Others have asked the USA for help in 
improving their legal and regulatory systems for the control and prevention of 
terrorist financial activity. The participating states have together frozen an additional 
$77.9 million (White House 2002b). In 2003, $10 million has been spent on 
improving the capability of nearly two dozen countries to deny terrorists the funding 
they need for their activities, clearly another case of positive coercion.  
 
In addition, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been established, with the 
USA playing a major role. The FATF is an „inter-governmental body whose 
purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing‟ (Financial Action Task Force 
2006).  
 
Cooperation has also aimed at preventing the recruitment of terrorists, their transit 
and the establishment of safe havens, and at the prosecution of terrorism as a 
criminal act. The US Department of Justice, in cooperation with the Department of 
State, works on issues of criminal prosecution. The main bureaux of the FBI have 
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established closer working relationships with foreign intelligence agencies, and 
international police cooperation between over 90 states has been improved, with 
more than 2,400 suspects arrested.  
 
The USA has cooperated further with the Organisation of American States (OAS), 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Egmont Group, in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G8, the Counter-Terrorism Experts Group 
and the Lyon Group, for example. In the area of international aviation security, it has 
participated in the Aviation Security (AVSEC) panel of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) (Consulate General of the United States to Hong 
Kong and Macau n.d.). 
 
Positive coercion via foreign aid 
Positive coercion, via rewards, is potentially to be seen in the provision of US 
foreign aid as an incentive to counter terrorism. 
 
In the 1970s, the USA (and other Western nations) committed themselves to 
spending 0.7 per cent of GNP on foreign aid. In 2003, the USA achieved no more 
than 0.14 per cent ($16,136 million). In 2006, this had improved somewhat to about 
0.17 per cent ($22,828 million). While the USA, of all states worldwide, 
undoubtedly spends the largest amount in foreign aid, this is still far below the help 
it could be expected to provide for poorer nations. It must also be mentioned that the 
biggest share of foreign aid is directed to the Middle East, particularly to Egypt and 
Israel (more than two thirds of the total goes to these two; Beyer 2006). 
 
At an international conference in 2002 on development financing in Monterrey, 
Mexico, President Bush proposed to increase US foreign aid by 50 per cent; so 
whereas in 2001 the USA spent only about 0.15 percent of its GNP ($14 billion) on 
foreign aid, the figure had reached about 0.17 per cent ($23 billion) by 2006. 
  
There has been special and intensive aid since 2002 towards Afghanistan. „In 
January of 2002 the United States pledged $297 million in humanitarian and 
reconstruction aid to help the people of Afghanistan. Since October 2001, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided over $350 
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million in aid assistance to Afghanistan‟ (United States Agency for International 
Development 2008). The USA has provided aid in terms of foodstuffs, supplies, 
healthcare, transport and communications. Furthermore, it is engaged in 
reconstruction with regard to supply housing, roads, water systems and support for 
agriculture.  
 
In the case of Iraq, $28.9 billion aid has been provided in the years 2003–6, $17.6 
billion of which for economic and political reconstruction (Serafino, et al. 2006: 2). 
USAID in 2008 provided estimated $6,782 million on security assistance and $2,235 
million on economic aid (United States Agency for International Development 2009: 
4). The US State Department‟s budget for the goal „achieving peace and security‟, of 
which countering terrorism is a part, comprised $11.2 billion. Compared to all other 
strategic goals, such as „promoting economic growth and prosperity‟ ($3 billion) and 
„governing justly and democratically ($2.6 billion), this item is therefore the best 
funded (US Department of State 2008).   
 
Foreign aid, it can be argued, is still not a primary tool for coercion. It figures in US 
foreign policy, but is not a dominant factor. However, what may be interesting is the 
focus on military aid and aid for security purposes and therefore the attempt to use 
foreign aid as a new tool in the GWOT. There has been:  
 
[a] revival of security assistance within the mix of US development/military aid. The latter 
has been on the decline since the Cold War, in line with the normative expectations of the 
OECD-ODA regime, but has returned as a central element of the US war on terrorism. 
(Hook and Rothstein 2004)  
 
Therefore, it could be argued that foreign aid (even if generally not a dominant factor 
in US strategy) is increasingly used as a tool for exerting power in the GWOT. 
 
Generally, it can be discerned that in many of its cooperative measures, the 
application of active or passive, positive or negative coercion was clearly or 
probably present. This is particularly the case with respect to Pakistan, China and 
Australia, and also Belgium (Archik 2006: 4), and has been confirmed in the two 
preceding case studies. Coercion, however, has been less reported and researched 
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than military action. It is also reported that in many cases pressure from (or at least 
the influence of) the USA led to a depletion in respect for norms of human rights as 
the price paid for effectiveness in counterterrorism measures (Foot 2005). The case 
that coercion is at least at times used in cooperative measures, for example in IOs, is 
illustrated by Stephen Rademaker with regard to the IAEA‟s dealings with Iran: 
„[t]he best illustration of this is the two votes India cast against Iran at the IAEA. I 
am the first person to admit that the votes were coerced‟ (Campaign Against 
Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran 2007). Later chapters contain more 
discussion of general coercion in hegemonic governance. 
 
Influence: the rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration  
In the following section, the US administration‟s rhetoric on terrorism will be 
discussed (Beyer 2006). Generally, it can be said that terrorism was mainly thought 
of as located in haven states. The connection to such states was frequently made, 
particularly in the period preceding the two interventions. There was much less 
reference to transnational terrorism as a multinational network, and even less talk 
about terrorism being located in the home country.  
 
To reach conclusions on the main themes of the US rhetoric, a vast number of 
statements and speeches have been selectively scanned. A collection of 30 examples 
referring to the GWOT and published by the Department of State between 2001 and 
2006 were analysed: only five of these documents referred to terrorism as being 
present in the USA itself; nine to terrorism as a transnational network; and 16 
referred to terrorism as an external national phenomenon to be found in haven 
states. Even though the US rhetoric is not adopted wholesale, generally a stated 
need to „wage war on terrorism‟ can be understood as a sign that this rhetoric has 
had an influence. Certain characteristics of the US description of terrorism reappear 
in the rhetoric of the UN, the EU and other organisations; in some important 
respects these descriptions also differ. 
 
The haven-states thesis 
Of particular interest to the USA, seemingly, were haven states. Where al Qaeda was 
understood as a transnational network, it was nonetheless presented in relation to 
haven states. It was thought to be harboured and funded by such haven states as 
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Afghanistan and Iraq (which might even provide the network with WMD):  
 
There are still al-Qaeda scattered around Afghanistan. There are, I‟m sure, going to be 
efforts by them to try to organize themselves enough so that they can launch an attack at 
least on our forces in Afghanistan. We see intelligence to that effect . . . [we must ensure that 
Afghanistan] can never again become a sanctuary for a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda. 
(CNN 2002) 
 
Moreover, al-Qaeda is not the only global terrorist network. And terrorist networks have 
growing relationships with terrorist states that harbor and finance them – and may one day 
share weapons of mass destruction with them. What this means is that Afghanistan is only 
the first stage in a long, difficult and dangerous war on terrorism. (US Department of 
Defense 2002a) 
 
With this, and in the context of the war against Iraq, a new category had been 
created: „terrorist states‟, which may be „sponsor states‟ or „haven states‟ (which 
„harbor and finance‟ terrorists). Transnational terrorism was thus seen in relation to 
specific states, which then became targets.  
 
This argument was highlighted with respect to the so-called „axis of evil‟, and 
became particularly obvious in the case of Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, for example, 
stated that Iraq could not be seen as separate from the GWOT (Garamone 2002). 
Instead, it was a part of this war. The intervention in Iraq was understood to be a key 
factor in hindering other so-called haven states from developing, using or spreading 
WMD. Again according to Rumsfeld, the threat scenario then current was 
characterised as follows: there is on the one hand unipolarity, on the other WMD 
produced by rogue states, and finally proliferation. Here the link to transnational 
terrorism enters the equation. Rogue states were thought to have relations with 
terrorist networks, and even to harbour their members. To make this connection even 
more obvious, these states (particularly Iraq) were termed „terrorist states‟. They 
were said to pose a „grave and growing danger‟ for the USA, a claim made in an 
attempt to legitimise an otherwise unlawful intervention. A number of states count as 
haven states,
35
 and as Colin Powell put it in 2002: „The war on terrorism is not 
confined to the Middle East‟ (Olivastro 2002). 
  
With the intervention in Iraq, the US rhetoric changed: the former haven state was 
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now presented as a threat in itself – the connection to terrorism had become 
secondary:  
 
Confronting Saddam Hussein was also essential. His regime posed a threat to the security of 
the United States and the world. This was a regime that pursued, had used, and possessed 
weapons of mass destruction . . . He had links to terror. (White House 2003a)  
 
With the increase in terrorist attacks in Iraq the argument was revived that 
international terrorism was the main target of US policy; but the erstwhile 
connection between Saddam Hussein‟s regime and terrorism was no longer drawn. 
Instead, the regime was presented as undemocratic, inhuman and an enemy of the 
USA:  
 
This brutal and dangerous dictator against whom we went to war in 1991, against whom we 
used military force in 1998, who was shooting at our forces in no-fly zones to try and keep 
his forces down, that brutal dictator is gone. (US Department of Defense 2004)  
 
Since Iraq could no longer count as a haven state the argument on the terrorist threat 
had changed. Now the discourse referred to haven-seeking by the terrorists. 
President Bush said:  
 
As they once did in Afghanistan and are trying to do now in Iraq, they will seek to gain 
control of an entire country – a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war 
against non-radical Muslim governments. (White House 2006b) 
 
Thus it was implicitly acknowledged that the location of terrorists in a haven state 
and the subsequent attack on that state had not been successful in the fight against 
terrorism. With the haven state no longer in existence, the danger now came from the 
ensuing vacuum. Instead of a general strategic adjustment, the previous rhetoric had 
simply been shifted to other states: „They are sheltered and supported by 
authoritarian regimes – allies of convenience like Syria and Iran . . . State sponsors 
like Syria and Iran have a long history of collaboration with terrorists – and they 
deserve no patience from the victims of terror‟ (White House 2006b); „The Iranian 
regime is today the world‟s leading state sponsor of terrorism‟ (Münchener 
Konferenz für Sicherheitspolitik 2006). 
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Transnational networks 
Transnational terrorism – so the US administration claims – had its roots in 
Afghanistan, but has since evolved into a well-financed international conspiracy (US 
Department of State 2001). So terrorism was to be understood as a transnational 
phenomenon represented all over the world by its financial transactions, networks 
and so-called „sleepers‟. Donald Rumsfeld stated: „. . . they have trained literally 
thousands of terrorists who are now at large across the globe. These “sleeper” cells 
undoubtedly have plans for further attacks‟ (n.d.). 
  
Overall, international terrorism is said to have spread in the past few years, and the 
linkages between the single organisations to have improved and intensified, 
particularly with respect to al Qaeda. US Attorney General John Ashcroft stated: „If 
you look carefully at the face of terrorism in the last several years, there have been 
cross reinforcing links between the al-Qaeda organization and a number of other 
terrorist groups‟ (US Department of State 2001). 
 
Terrorism presents itself as a transnational pattern of single groups linked by 
networks, or so goes the assumption. It remains a matter of further research as to 
how the groups are organised and if a cell is connected to different groups. 
Regarding its structure, international terrorism (most often this refers to al Qaeda) is 
thought to be independent of a single leader (e.g. Osama bin Laden). Rumsfeld 
claimed: 
 
He‟s important, but there are plenty of people – six, eight, 10, 12 people, probably – who 
could take over the al-Qaida. They know where the bank accounts are. They know the names 
of people who were trained. They know the sleeper cells that exist around the world . . . the 
key task is not a manhunt for bin Laden, but rather a continuing effort to deal with the 
terrorists and the countries that are providing safe haven to them. (United States Mission to 
the European Union 2002) 
 
Terrorism is thus not a phenomenon led by a single individual, who can figure as the 
fount of all evil. Instead, terrorist structures are understood to consist of an 
agglomeration of groups and cells all over the globe. Yet, even in this description, 
the strong link to haven states was observable in the rhetoric.  
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Domestic terrorism  
The 9/11 attacks originated in the US „homeland‟, and were partly planned and 
prepared there: „The four planes were hijacked by between 3 and 6 individuals per 
plane, using knives and box cutters and in some cases, making bomb threats. A 
number of the suspected hijackers were trained as pilots in the United States‟ (US 
Department of Justice 2001).  
 
The US administration saw the country exposed after 9/11 to a „wave of terrorism‟; 
and terrorism was also understood as present in the USA. As Dick Cheney said: „For 
the first time in our history, we will probably suffer more casualties here at home 
than will our troops overseas‟ (cited in New York Times 2001). Even President Bush 
referred to terrorism as a domestic issue: „Today, terror cells exist on nearly every 
continent and in dozens of countries, including our own‟ (US Department of State 
2003). While talk of domestic terrorism was common directly after 9/11, the 
distinction between the internal and external dimensions was not been made at the 
time of the Iraq war – most probably this would not have had served to raise support 
for the war and was thus seen as inopportune. Only after the intervention did the 
issue of domestic terrorism become visible again, with Donald Rumsfeld stating: 
„The battle . . . is less Iraq and less Afghanistan and more here in the United States 
and the capitals of Western nations‟ (US Department of Defense 2006).  
 
 ‘Root causes’ of terrorism 
As to the motivation and causes of terrorism, few explanations have come from the 
US administration. Terrorism – according to the official standpoints – cannot be 
explained by the predominance of the USA, nor does it have any connection to its 
foreign policies (Beyer 2008 on the discussion of root causes and the relation to 
foreign policy).  
 
Failed or failing democratisation was seen as an explanatory variable for terrorism, 
President George W. Bush claiming: „America is now threatened less by conquering 
states than we are by failing ones‟ (White House 2002c). A political motivation also 
was ascribed to terrorism. In the National Security Strategy of 2001, terrorism was 
defined as „premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
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innocents‟ (White House 2001a, emphasis added). This political motivation was not 
further elaborated upon. 
  
Furthermore, hatred presumed to be directed at modern democracies and at the 
values of Western civilisation itself was highlighted. Colin Powell said: „[The 
attackers] will never be allowed to kill the spirit of democracy. They cannot destroy 
our society. They cannot destroy our belief in the democratic way‟ (Johnson 2001). 
The US President made his understanding of the underlying conflict very explicit 
when he stated: „They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of 
speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other‟ (White 
House 2001). 
 
The US rhetoric on international terrorism has arguably, and for a long time, been 
highly influential in the GWOT (many states worldwide have strengthened their anti-
terrorism policies and laws after 9/11, even if they were not themselves directly 
threatened). Therefore, in the discussion of influence here the notion of „discursive 
power‟ will be used (Jackson 2004). Due to the rhetoric on terrorism since 9/11, the 
discourse on „globalisation‟ (which was formerly a measure of US influence) has 
been replaced (Solana 2005a: 169ff), presenting terrorism as the dominant security 
threat (before any other but linked to all others). This discourse is referred to by 
Thrall and Cramer (2009) as „threat inflation‟. 
 
Also, propaganda has been widely used in the struggle for influence, particularly 
with respect to the Middle East, as „part of a broad effort underway within the Bush 
administration to use information to its advantage in the war on terrorism‟ (Mazzetti 
2004; also Taylor 2002). Directly after 9/11, the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) 
was established for this purpose, but shut down in 2002 „after reports that the office 
intended to plant false news stories in the international media‟ (Mazzetti 2004). 
Plans had been established „such as e-mailing journalists and community leaders 
abroad with information that undermines governments hostile to the United States‟ 
and using „black propaganda‟ (i.e. the planting of fake stories in foreign newspapers, 
BBC 2002). However, Mazzetti goes on to state that the OSI‟s mission (using 
information as a tool of warfare) has been assumed by other offices in the US 
government. Hoffman claims that „diplomatic‟ efforts in the GWOT are still quite 
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weak compared to military operations, or to „diplomatic‟ efforts in the Cold War:  
 
[D]uring the Cold War, we used to have the United States Information Agency, whose 
mission was public diplomacy and information operations. Now that‟s just an office within 
the State Department, and that‟s a reflection of under-resourcing, and also a neglect of what I 
think is an important component in the war on terrorism. (Radio Free Europe 2006) 
 
As a concluding remark, it should be mentioned that some scholars even speak of an 
„expansion of the US sphere of influence‟ due to the GWOT (Peterson 2002) and of 
the „War on Terrorism‟ as „propaganda‟ with the purpose of establishing a 
„benevolent global hegemony‟ (Behan 2007; Kristol and Kagan 1996). 
 
Presented above are the counterterrorism policies of the USA, and an argument that 
these effectively constitute hegemonic governance. A more general claim of 
hegemonic governance is to be found in Chapter 7. The present chapter concludes 
with a description of the counterterrorism policies of other actors, on which the USA 
exerts a major influence.  
 
The UN as a dependent actor in counterterrorism 
 
The UN has always played a role in the global fight against terrorism, and has 
created the necessary political and legal standards. Only one day after the terrorist 
attacks of New York the General Assembly reacted with a consensual resolution that 
condemned the attacks and called for preventive and repressive measures to be 
taken.  
 
Resolution 1368 declares a threat to peace and security posed by named acts of 
international terrorism, and on these lines asserts the right to self-defence according 
to Article 51, Chapter VII, of the UN Charter. Resolution 1373 describes states‟ 
obligations with regard to countering terrorism. The focus is on the prevention of the 
financing of terrorist activities and on interdicting safe havens for the perpetrators. 
For example, it calls in the following terms for measures to be taken:  
 
Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision 
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of early warning to other states by exchange of information [and] Prevent those who finance, 
plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those 
purposes against other states or their citizens. [Further, it calls for states to] ensure that any 
person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist 
acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. (Security Council of the United 
Nations 2001)  
 
With these resolutions, the UN (at least in the US interpretation) gave legitimacy to 
retaliatory military action against so-called haven states.  
 
In a number of further resolutions, the highest organ of the UN, the Security Council, 
has declared the bomb attacks in Bali, Moscow, Mombasa, Bogotá, Istanbul, Madrid 
and Beslan to be terrorist attacks that pose a threat to world peace. It also again 
called for states to cooperate in the fight against terrorism (Security Council of the 
United Nations 2009). 
 
The foundations of prevention and suppression of terrorism are laid down in 
Resolutions 49/60 (1994) and 51/210 (1996). Overall, there are more than a dozen 
international conventions on terrorism that establish standards to counter the threat 
(Security Council of the United Nations 2001). Yet, a particular remaining problem 
is the lack of a common definition of terrorism by the UN. 
  
The UN has proposed measures for countering terrorism and has taken pains to 
ensure that these are more or less implemented in member states around the world. 
On the political level, the consensus on fighting terrorism (formed immediately after 
9/11) was transferred into legal structures that can be found in the conventions. The 
USA played a leading role in this formative process. The Security Council 
functioned overall as a vehicle to raise support for a number of measures applicable 
to all member states against persons and entities considered to be terrorist. 
Particularly to be mentioned here are the measures against the financing of terrorist 
networks, the effects of which are to be found in legal and administrative 
mechanisms against such financing world-wide. Also, the UN provided help to 
countries that needed support in the implementation of counterterrorism measures 
and facilitated the involvement of such relevant entities as the IMF and the World 
Bank in global counterterrorism (particularly with respect to the prevention of 
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terrorist financing and of money-laundering).  
 
To support the UN‟s efforts, a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC, Security 
Council of the United Nations 2009) was established which explicitly deals with 
countering terrorism within the framework of the UN. It particularly serves to 
improve inter-state communication on terrorism and to monitor the nations‟ 
progress. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task-Force coordinates UN bodies 
related to counterterrorism; the 1566 Working Group is „made up of all Council 
members to recommend practical measures against such individuals and groups, as 
well as to explore the possibility of setting up a compensation fund for victims of 
terrorism‟; the 1267 Group deals with legal issues; and the 1540 Group with 
preventing the proliferation of WMD. 
 
UN counterterrorism strategy 
The first UN strategy against terrorism was delivered in October 2002, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan proposing a three-pronged UN strategy for combating the 
scourge. This proposal called „for dissuading terrorists from carrying out their 
attacks, denying would-be perpetrators the chance to commit their crimes, and 
fostering international cooperation in fighting terrorism‟ (Europa World 2002). 
  
Annan also reminded UN members to keep the fight against terrorism within the 
bounds of human rights and international law: „to pursue security at the expense of 
human rights is short-sighted, self-contradictory, and, in the long run, self-defeating‟ 
(Europa World 2002). Meanwhile, the fight against terrorism would have to include 
„sub-regional, regional, and global organizations‟ (Europa World 2002).  
 
In March 2005 Kofi Annan proposed a second UN strategy in the fight against 
terrorism. Its first aim was „to dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism 
as a tactic to achieve their goals‟ (International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism 
and Security 2005). On this topic he delivered a keynote address to the Closing 
Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in March 
2005.  
 
He stated, in accord with the USA, that it was impossible to address all the 
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grievances, real or imagined, that terrorists use to advance their claims. On the other 
hand, he pointed out the need for convincing all those who might be susceptible to 
terrorist ideology, and thus to offering support to terrorists, that terrorism was 
„neither an acceptable nor an effective way to advance their cause‟ (International 
Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005). All authorities, whether 
moral or political, should make clear that terrorism is not acceptable under any 
circumstances and in any culture (International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism 
and Security 2005).  
 
The strategy‟s second aim was to deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks. 
Kofi Annan stressed that the UN had already played an important part in fighting 
terrorism, mentioning the Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism 
and measures taken by the Security Council, such as travel and financial sanctions 
against members of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups. Nevertheless, there was also a 
need for further action, for example effective measures against money-laundering 
(International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005).  
 
The third of the strategy‟s aims was to deter states from supporting terrorists. The 
UN had already acted in the past against haven states and states that supported 
terrorism, and the Security Council had repeatedly applied sanctions (International 
Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005). Annan stressed that the 
Security Council would have to maintain its firm stance against sponsor states, and 
that even his own role in this regard would have to be strengthened. „All states must 
know that, if they give any kind of support to terrorists, the Council will not hesitate 
to use coercive measures against them‟ (International Summit on Democracy, 
Terrorism and Security 2005).  
 
Fourthly, the strategy aimed to develop state capacity to prevent terrorism. Weak 
states were particularly prone to be exploited by terrorism, with terrorists using them 
for training and recruitment. Kofi Annan therefore emphasised the necessity of 
supporting all states in order to make them more capable and responsible. For this, 
good governance would have to be promoted as well as the rule of law.  
 
Fifthly, counterterrorism should not hinder or impede human rights (International 
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Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005). The Secretary-General 
expressed his regret at finding that many countries invoved in that struggle did not 
act according to universally-accepted principles, and failed to meet human rights 
norms (International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security 2005). 
 
Up to now the most comprehensive strategy paper was delivered in 2006. This was 
in the form of a resolution, with an annexed Plan of Action. Firstly, the strategy 
again emphasised the need for compliance with human rights norms in the fight 
against terrorism:  
 
Inherent to the rule of law is the defence of human rights – a core value of the United 
Nations and a fundamental pillar of our work. Effective counterterrorism measures and the 
protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually 
reinforcing ones. (United Nations 2006: 2)  
 
It went on to condemn terrorism and to call on leaders of member states to make 
more intensive use of the UN in stating clearly that terrorism would not be accepted. 
In that context, the voices of the victims should be heard more often and their stories 
made more visible and accessible. Civil society and religious leaders would have an 
important part to play in counterterrorism; the successes of civil society in the 
campaign against landmines were referred to. The mass media would also have an 
important role here in making visible the consequence of terrorism: „A civil society 
campaign will need to work to convince those with genuine grievances that there 
exist alternative, non-violent strategies, and that these have in most cases proved 
more effective‟ (United Nations 2006: 4). Success stories of peaceful change in this 
context had to be highlighted. It would be the role of the UN to assist in the 
development of such a civil society campaign, for example „through the culture of 
peace initiative of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization‟ 
(UNESCO). The UN was also to establish a focal point to be attached to the 
secretariat, its purpose being to support coordination of the efforts of civil society 
groups concerned by and dealing with terrorism.  
 
This last strategy referred also to the root causes of terrorism: extremist worldviews, 
regional or local violent conflicts, foreign occupation or perceived foreign 
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occupation, poor governance, lack of civil rights and human rights abuses, political 
exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation (United Nations 2006: 6).  
 
The document goes on to elaborate on deterring states from supporting terrorist 
groups. The 2005 World Summit called upon states to „refrain from organizing, 
financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist 
activities and to prevent that their territories are used for such activities‟. The 
decision of the Security Council was to be implemented in meeting this aim; it had 
applied sanctions against a number of states „found to be harbouring and assisting 
terrorists‟ and it passed a number of resolutions on the prevention of state 
sponsorship (1267/1999, 1373/2001, 1540/2004, 1566/2004, 1624/2005). Finally, 
state capacity to prevent terrorism was to be improved, for example by sharing best 
practice and lessons learned in capacity-building. Finally, the strategy described 
priority areas: identifying resources; „promoting UN-wide coherence in countering 
terrorism‟; and „defending human rights in the context of terrorism‟ and 
counterterrorism. 
 
In 2008, the General Assembly developed the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, which calls for the ratification of existing international 
conventions on counterterrorism and establishes measures, firstly, to address the 
conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. With respect to the prevention of 
terrorism and to focus on its root causes, the strategy envisages a stronger role for the 
UN in areas such as „conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peace building in order to 
contribute to the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged and 
unresolved conflicts‟. It goes on to focus on dialogue, tolerance and understanding 
among cultures, religions, etc. and to promote mutual respect and a culture of peace. 
This will be supported by the promotion of education, for example with the help of 
the UN organisations working in the field of education and culture, and the necessity 
of inter-faith dialogue is stressed. Also, development is being understood as a 
preventive measure against terrorism. Social inclusion is regarded as important, and 
is to be promoted by fighting unemployment and marginalisation. Good governance, 
the rule of law and human rights, and sustained social and economic development 
are furthermore understood to be important in relation to the prevention of terrorism 
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and extremism. Finally, national systems of assistance are to be developed which 
„would promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families‟. With this 
strategy, the UN reaffirms a stronger role than it adopted in the years directly 
following the 9/11 attacks. It has yet to be seen, however, how far states can, and 
will, implement the UN‟s strategy. 
 
Rhetoric in the UN 
In 2005, the UN Secretary-General took a tough stance on human rights and the rule 
of law: „We cannot compromise on core values‟, he said in Madrid on the first 
anniversary of the train bombings that had killed 191 people in the Spanish capital. 
„Human rights and the rule of law must always be respected‟ (Guardian 2005). 
Along the same lines and in the same year he condemned (unilateral) interventions, 
at least indirectly, as they fuelled terrorism rather than halting it:  
 
I think there are many Muslims that are extremely unhappy today. Unhappy because they 
feel victimized, they feel isolated, they feel victimized in their own society, they feel 
victimized in the West, and they feel this profiling against them. And the Iraqi situation has 
not helped matters . . . In fact, one used to be worried about Afghanistan being the centre of 
terrorist activities. My sense is that Iraq has become a major problem, and in fact, it‟s worse 
than Afghanistan. (Washington Times 2005)  
 
Regarding the definition of terrorism, a debate was waged in the UN. Up to the 
present there is still no commonly agreed definition, a situation which rests on a 
disagreement on whether to include or exclude those struggling against oppression or 
occupation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007). Several proposals 
have been made, but none could be agreed upon. Annan was accused by British 
diplomats of being less than fully supportive of a definition that offered „no excuses‟ 
(Laurence 2005).  
 
However, the Security Council was able pass a resolution that includes the following 
paragraph:  
 
[Terrorism means] criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a 
state of terror . . . are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
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philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. (Washington Post 
2004)  
 
However the resolution only applies to a series of international conventions 
outlawing specific terrorist acts (such as hijacking airliners), thus not providing a 
universal definition of terrorism. Indeed, it remains debatable whether a universal 
definition would be realistic and sensible, given that it would be a challenge to find 
one that could not be misused in the suppression of a justifiable struggle.  
 
The rhetoric of the main powers in the Security Council and the General Assembly 
can be described as highly idealistic. For example, Bush is quoted as having said the 
following: „We know that dictators are quick to choose aggression, while free 
nations strive to resolve differences in peace. We know that oppressive governments 
support terror, while free governments fight the terrorists in their midst‟ (Common 
Dreams 2004). The opposition between „free nations‟ and others is referred to again: 
„All civilized nations are in this struggle together, and all must fight the murderers‟ 
(Common Dreams 2004). This reminds one of the „with us or against us‟ rhetoric 
that was so heavily used in the aftermath of 9/11, and that leads to a global divide 
rather than facilitating the fight against terrorism. On the issue of root causes, little is 
said, though perhaps references to oppressive and undemocratic regimes are relevant 
here:  
 
For too long, many nations, including my own, tolerated, even excused, oppression in the 
Middle East in the name of stability. Oppression became common, but stability never arrived 
. . . This commitment to democratic reform is essential to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, tolerate 
corruption, and maintain ties to terrorist groups. (Common Dreams 2004)  
 
The root causes of terrorism were addressed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
who said that political disputes and long-standing conflicts that generate support for 
terrorism would have to be solved. Only then would terrorism be defeated: „If we do 
not, we shall find ourselves acting as a recruiting sergeant for the very terrorists we 
seek to suppress‟ (The Hindu 2003).  
 
The Security Council 
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International terrorism was placed on the agenda of the Security Council in the early 
1990s. On 30 January 1992, member states expressed their deep concern about 
terrorist acts and highlighted the necessity of dealing with this issue in the 
framework of the international community (Oudraat 2004: 151). In March 1992, 
commitment to this principle, up to then merely rhetorical, was confirmed by action: 
sanctions were imposed on Libya, as a state accused of participation in terrorist 
activities. The Security Council also took action in 1996 against Sudan and in 1999 
against the Taleban. 
  
While every member of the Security Council has been concerned with terrorism, the 
USA has taken the lead and been the driving power behind its efforts. The USA 
became first active in the aftermath of the attacks on the American embassies in east 
Africa. In a speech in the General Assembly in 1998, President Clinton presented the 
fight against terrorism as a priority for the USA (Oudraat 2004: 151). After 9/11, of 
course, terrorism became the top priority. Since then, the Security Council was used 
by the USA to legitimise the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the weeks 
after 9/11, the USA inspired Resolution 1373, which obliged member states to join 
the all-encompassing fight against terrorism. Some of the special measures were 
already established in earlier conventions from the late 1990s. In order to monitor the 
progress of implementation, the Counter-Terrorism Committee was asked to 
assemble yearly reports on the counterterrorism efforts of the member states. On the 
intervention in Iraq, the USA, the UK and Spain proposed a resolution legitimising 
the military operations. France and Russia opposed this resolution in the Security 
Council, as did Germany from outside it. The intervention thus took place without 
being legitimised under international law (compare the discussion above). Since the 
war, the Security Council has passed 12 resolutions, lifting the non-military 
sanctions and recognising the USA and Britain as occupying powers (1483), 
extending the oil for food programme (1472), mandating the UN mission to Iraq 
(1700 and others), endorsing the formation of an interim government (1546) and 
addressing the financing of and trade with Iraq (1518). Furthermore, the Security 
Council has passed a resolution on preventing the proliferation of WMD 
(1540/2004) and another calling for the states to enhance dialogue and broaden 
understanding among civilisations (1624/2005, Security Council 2009).  
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The UN General Assembly  
 
The General Assembly (GA) cannot function as a direct coordinator in the fight 
against terrorism. It lacks the authority to give directives to governments or other 
influential actors (Peterson 2004: 173). Beyond this, the GA does not preside over an 
administrative structure that would enable it to implement policies, and it also lacks 
the resources to reward compliant behaviour or to sanction deviancy. Thus the GA is 
not a powerful organ with regard to counterterrorism in the UN, but it does have 
political influence, which lies more in the normative sphere. The GA is a forum 
where debates about terms and strategies are held involving all the nations 
concerned. Examples of such discussions have been the debate about the definition 
of terrorism, as well as others on how to counter it, how to engage in preventive 
actions, and about the root causes of terrorism. The resolutions that derive from these 
debates at least have the support of the majority of the member states (Peterson 
2004: 174). 
 
The GA first defined terrorism as a problem in 1972, though it took two more 
decades for the issue to be taken up with any frequency. For example, a debate on 
the definition of terrorism was held: terrorism was categorised as criminal and 
unjustifiable, as well as a breach of the UN‟s principles. Yet what still remained 
problematic was finding a profound definition of which cases could be classified as 
terrorism. Conservative positions that understood terrorism as an illegitimate form of 
violence were opposed by more radical positions which sought to differentiate 
between „freedom fighters‟ and terrorists. 
  
The GA, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, was a strong supporter of the argument 
that the root causes of terrorism had to be addressed in order to counter it. 
Paragraphs with statements on this perspective were introduced into the resolutions. 
The GA vis-à-vis the Security Council again and again affirmed that „just and 
peaceful solutions to the underlying causes which give rise to such acts of violence‟ 
would have to be found (Mani 2004: 231). This rhetoric was abandoned at the end of 
the 1990s, due to the influence of the USA, and since then debate has mostly focused 
on measures to eliminate terrorism. Overall, a range of different resolutions on 
112 
 
terrorism have emerged from the GA; examples are those aimed at preventive 
measures (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s), those focusing on the protection of 
human rights (particularly in the 1990s), and those on concrete measures to eliminate 
terrorists (in the late 1990s onwards).  
 
Hegemony of the USA in the UN 
 
Alistair Millar, Co-director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 
stated with regard to US hegemony in the UN that the USA played an extremely 
strong role in what took place after 9/11, a role of which the rest of the UN 
community (at least outside the Security Council) was highly critical. He mentioned 
in an interview with the author that there was certainly pressure from the USA with 
regard to Security Council resolutions after 2001.  
 
Let‟s give an example: Security Council resolution 1540 that deals with WMD. The 
Pakistanis were very reluctant to support that partially because the timing of the resolutions 
was when A.Q. Khan was caught, the guy who was transporting materials, and the 
Pakistanis kind of thought of it as a resolution which pointed the finger on them. And they 
were very reluctant to be on board. And the US – you know the US don‟t often do these 
things alone, they work with the UK and sometimes the French – they pushed pretty hard to 
have Pakistan‟s resolution. (Millar, interview with the author, 2009)  
 
He further stated that the US pressure mechanisms generally operate in cases of 
narrower US interests, such as seeking to go to war in Iraq. There was certainly 
pressure in this case, strong pressure, though even that failed to work against certain 
member states. The GA, on the other hand, is not highly valued by the USA, which 
uses it merely as a tool. To paraphrase Millar: the USA is not necessarily in 
opposition to it, it is simply not very supportive of it. It still sees the Security 
Council as the driving force on action to prevent terrorism.  
 
For example, there was a movement made by certain member states – Costa Rica, 
Switzerland, Egypt and others – over the period between 2001 and 2006, which 
articulated concerns about the narrower membership of the Council not speaking for 
the broader membership of the UN. Also, on the other hand, the Security Council 
had a high-level panel which produced a report highlighted in 2005 at a Madrid 
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summit. In order to build consensus and support amongst the wider GA, it added 
elements to the UN counterterrorism programme beyond what had been adopted by 
the Council. What the Council had adopted were measures to combat terrorism, and 
subsequently there were measures to build capacity, to help in efforts to combat 
terrorism. And those essentially became the second and the third pillars of the broad 
strategy:  
 
The first one is what they call conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and that 
meant dealing with what the Islamic states often call root causes. Education, good 
governance, conflict resolution, those kind of things. And the fourth one was human rights. 
So, putting this package together, the two existing compontents that were from the Council, 
and the two new ones, root causes and human rights, they managed to get a consensus in the 
General Assembly around the strategy which was in place since September 2006. The US 
never did much to support it. They were happy that they managed to maintain the two 
crucial elements that they had ever since 2001. Obviously they see some value in having the 
whole UN membership at least willing to support their counterterrorism programme in the 
UN. But they still maintain their focus on the Council. (Millar, interview with the author, 
2009) 
 
With regard to the influence in the UN generally, Millar stated that the pressure the 
USA exerts in counterterrorism is usually through bilateral capacity-building. „It‟s 
setting up programmes in the Horn of Africa . . . in places in Southeast Asia, the 
Philippines, where they came in and bought influence. But that was more on a 
bilateral basis.‟ In terms of what the USA has done within the UN: „It‟s subtle . . . 
obviously; they block attempts by other states to correct the course of Council 
decisions.‟ For example, there was a controversy about the listing and delisting of 
terrorist names, in which the European Court of Justice questioned the UN 
resolution 1267‟s lists, and there were several states trying to reform the Council to 
be more in line with EU concerns about due process. „And the US and Russia and 
others just said “no”‟ (Millar, interview with the author, 2009). 
 
Finally, whereas the UN is diluting the „narrower‟ military policies of the USA in 
global counterterrorism, until at least 2006 and with respect to human rights and to 
the discourse on capacity-building, the power of the USA was in the order of ten 
times greater than the UN‟s, and it brought that influence to bear on the UN. As 
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Millar said: „Under the Bush administration, [while] they did not really care about 
the UN . . . they had enormous influence still‟. Others come to even more pointed 
conclusions:  
 
The prime example of a privileged position in international law is the UN Security Council. 
The United States has increasingly made use of the Council in the last decade, which has 
provoked serious charges that it serves as a tool of United States foreign policy rather than as 
a truly international organ. (Krisch 2003: 156) 
 
And: 
 
Excluded from solving the Bosnian conflict and from the decision to have recourse to force 
in Kosovo, by contrast convened immediately after the 11 September attacks, the United 
Nations Security Council henceforth will have to rely first and foremost on the role allotted 
to it by the single superpower. (Dupuy, et al. 2003: 183) 
 
Research on US hegemony and influence in the UN is not new (Gareau 1994; Riggs 
1984). Generally, the USA is thought to be highly influential in the UN, if only 
through its (still) strong contribution to the organisation‟s budget (22 per cent, 
according to McCaleb 2001). US foreign aid has also proven an effective instrument 
in „induce[ing] voting compliance in the UN General Assembly‟ (Dreher et al. 
2008). Thirdly, compliance with the USA brings advantages for many countries in 
very concrete financial terms:  
 
The recent empirical literature on political influences on the IMF clearly shows that 
developing countries get better terms from the IMF when they have closer ties with the US, 
as measured by their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Dreher et al. 2006: 5, 
emphasis added) 
 
Bennis even claims that „US influence in (and often control of) the UN comes in the 
form of coercing the organization to take one or another position, or to reject some 
other position, or pressuring a country or countries to vote a certain way in the 
General Assembly‟ (Dreher, et al. 2008: 140, emphasis added), and Cortright states 
regarding the US influence in the UN with regard to counterterrorism:  
 
For the United States, addressing root causes of terrorism would mean confronting the 
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consequences of its own foreign policies, especially its uncritical support of Israeli 
occupation, its military aggression against Iraq, and its military encroachment into Muslim 
countries. Unwilling to change its foreign policies or adopt a preventive strategy that 
addresses root causes, the U.S. has concentrated on protective measures. It has used its 
influence at the United Nations to shape international policy along the same lines. (Cortright 
2005: 22, emphasis added) 
 
To take a final example: some anti-terrorism resolutions in the GA were openly 
„sponsored by the US‟ (Lynch 2004; BBC 2001), and pressure was arguably also 
exerted in the Security Council (Phares 2006). In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
the USA succeeded in reaching out to the UN, in particular the Security Council, to 
help globalise the „war on terror‟. Since then, however, despite the fact that the USA 
has much to gain from an effective and well coordinated UN-led effort, US attention 
is supposed to have waned (Rosamond 2007: 2).  
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
Only one day after 9/11, „the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) unconditionally condemned the terrorist attacks on the USA and 
pledged to undertake all efforts to combat [terrorism]‟ (NATO 2002). Following 
this, the Partnership Action Plan was endorsed, in which the members of the 
alliance stated that:  
 
[They] will make all efforts within their power to prevent and suppress terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations, in accordance with the universally recognised norms and 
principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1373. (NATO 2002)  
 
The will to comply with human rights standards is set out in this document, which 
goes on to present some concrete steps for cooperation: to intensify information-
sharing and consultation in the spheres of politics, armament and civil emergency 
planning, to cooperate on scientific methods of identifying and mitigating new 
threats; to enhance preparedness to combat terrorism (security-sector reform, force-
planning, training and exercises, air-defence and air-traffic management, and 
cooperation in information-sharing, armaments and); to impede support for terrorist 
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groups, by employing border controls, arms control, the prevention of terrorist 
financing and of weapons exchange; to enhance capabilities for consequence 
management in respect of WMD terrorism and for civil-emergency management, 
for example by sharing scientific activities and mutual support in the development 
of equipment; and generally to provide mutual assistance (NATO 2002).  
 
In December 2001 NATO defence ministers tasked the alliance‟s military authorities 
with preparing a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism. This was to be 
based on the Washington Treaty, the 1999 Alliance Strategic Concept (which had 
already identified terrorism as a threat to NATO), the NATO Threat Assessment on 
Terrorism, and political guidance by the Council (NATO 2005a). The NATO Threat 
Assessment on Terrorism comprised the following statements: religious extremism is 
the likely cause of most terrorism, yet other causes are also imaginable, such as 
economic, social, demographic and political causes; state sponsorship of terrorism is 
declining, yet this trend could reverse; and terrorists in the future might also use 
WMD (NATO 2005a). Building on these assumptions, four different roles for 
NATO military operations in defence against terrorism are established:  
 
 Anti Terrorism, essentially defensive measures. 
 Consequence Management, which is dealing with, and reducing, the effects of a terrorist 
attack once it has taken place.  
 Counter Terrorism, primarily offensive measures.  
 Military Co-operation.  
                  (NATO 2005a) 
 
Counterterrorism operations were mainly to be joint operations against those who 
provide a base for, train for, plan, stage and execute terrorist actions. Psychological 
and information operations are seen as central to winning the support of the affected 
populations (NATO 2005a). It was also stated that countering terrorism might 
include the necessity of employing diplomatic, economic, social, legal, and 
information initiatives. Thus NATO was to harmonise its procedures and efforts with 
civil authorities to maximise its effectiveness against terrorism. Finally, it was stated 
that NATO had the primary responsibility for protecting its nations and populations, 
and should be prepared to conduct military operations.  
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Less than five hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center, NATO had invoked 
Article 5 for the first time in its history, declaring the attack to be an attack on all 
NATO members. Subsequently, NATO has supported the war in Afghanistan with 
troops, aircraft and ships. Coming to the aid of the USA, NATO aircraft flew more 
than 350 missions, logging overall more than 4,300 flying hours as part of operation 
Noble Eagle (White House 2004a). After the first phase of the war, „NATO took 
command and coordination of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
August 2003‟ (International Security Assistance Force 2007). ISAF was created by 
the UN Security Council in 2001 (Morelli and Belkin 2009: 4), and it was at UN 
request that NATO took over command in 2003; Afghanistan is NATO‟s first 
mission outside Europe. ISAF‟s purposes, following the intervention, are the 
stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
 
The Group of Eight (G8) 
 
The G8 also plays a role in the global governance of counterterrorism,
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 this being 
one of its priorities. After the 9/11 attacks, the heads of government of the member 
states emphasised their obligation to act in common against terrorism (Government 
of Canada 2008) and concrete initiatives against terrorism were conducted in the 
following period. In 2003, the Counterterrorism Action Group established that the 
G8 would support cooperation on counterterrorism at the international level.  
 
With the 2002 „Recommendations on Counterterrorism‟, the G8 established 
principles of counterterrorism. After the attacks in London, during the Gleneagles 
summit the G8 emphasised their common obligation to take measures to counter 
terrorism. The core elements of the strategy are: to stop terrorists; to prevent the 
evolution of new generations of terrorists by applying measures to fight the root 
causes of terrorism; to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks; and to prepare for 
such attacks so as to be able to respond to them effectively.  
 
A key priority of the G8 is the implementation of Resolution 1373 and the 
commitment to implementing all 12 counterterrorism conventions. Further, the G8 
cooperates closely with the CTC to monitor that implementation. Thirdly, „G8 
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members are providing technical and legal assistance to third countries for training 
and capacity building in the areas covered by Resolution 1373, through international 
frameworks such as regional institutions, in cooperation with the UN Counter-
Terrorism Committee‟ (Government of Canada 2008). The main spheres of action 
are preventing terrorist funding, interdicting communication between terrorists, 
destroying terrorist networks in Afghanistan, improving travel safety, preventing 
safe havens for terrorists, assessing the terrorist threat and preparing for possible 
attacks (Government of Canada 2008). With respect to these aims, a number of 
measures have been taken. 
 
G8 members are working closely with the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan and other 
donors and are taking leadership roles to define strategies and marshal resources in the 
security sector . . . The G8 is sharing best practices for improving border controls and for 
intercepting terrorists and criminals before they arrive at borders. G8 members are assisting 
other countries to improve their control measures . . . The G8 has agreed to undertake work 
on consequence management with regard to incidents involving industrial plants and 
transportation of toxic agents, as well as simulation training exercises. Work is also 
underway with the World Health Organization (WHO) to strengthen global health security 
against threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents. (Government of 
Canada 2008)  
 
Meetings with non-G8-states are held frequently. 
 
US hegemony in IOs  
 
Rosamond states that the USA has increasingly shifted its influence to the regional 
organisations of which it is a member: „The US has continued to be the driving force 
behind many of the counterterrorism efforts of regional bodies where it is a member 
(OSCE, OAS, APEC) and in other bodies such as the G8 and FATF‟ (2007: 2). US 
leadership in NATO (for example) is researched by McCormack who comes to the 
conclusion that „[i]t is unlikely that U.S. leadership will change‟ (2005: 14), even if 
Europe will increasingly be given a stronger and more independent role in NATO. 
Finally, on the role and influence of the USA in NATO the Pentagon asserted in its 
1994-9 Defense Planning Guidance: 
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[The US] must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which 
would undermine NATO . . . Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO 
as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. 
influence and participation in European security affairs. (United States Department of 
Defense 1992, emphasis added) 
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An important contribution to this issue is US Hegemony and International 
Organizations (Foot et al.), which comes to the following conclusions: 
 
One of the most strinking aspects of the evolution of international society since the end of 
the Second World War has been the multiplication of multilateral organizations linking states 
in cooperative arrangements to address shared problems. Since these are, by and large, inter-
state arrangements, their effectiveness depends on the attitudes and policies of major states 
within them. Over the same period, the United States has been a dominant force in world 
politics, even more so in the post-cold war era. Its perspectives and actions thus have had a 
substantial impact not only on those institutions of which it is a part but on those of which it 
is not, but with which it interacts. (2003: 265)  
 
With regard to the impact of the USA on multilateral organisations, Foot and her 
colleagues mention the following factors: 
 
 the USA often directly or indirectly contributed to the creation of 
international organisations.  
 „The United States also has profound disabling or enabling effects on the 
operation of institutions once they are established‟. 
 „The United States additionally has a major influence both in shaping the 
agendas of institutions where its interests are at stake and, even more 
fundamentally, in shaping and reshaping the actual character of the 
institutions themselves. . . the US exercises strong control over what these 
institutions consider‟. 
 „. . . the US has often had profound effects on multilateral institutions, not so 
much as a result of its deliberate pursuit of objectives with respect to, or 
through, international organizations, but as unintended consequences of 
decisions taken for reasons unrelated to them‟.  
(2003: 270ff). 
 
121 
 
7 
Hegemonic Governance: Power and Hierarchy  
in Global Governance 
 
All states are equal. But some states are more equal than others. (Orwell 1946: 112) 
 
 
This chapter reflects on the USA in a system of global governance, a role which is 
understood here as that of a hegemon. Firstly, hegemony will be defined, and then 
additional possibilities for its measurement will be described. US dominance is 
examined with respect to the period 2001–8 here, i.e. leaving out of account current 
economic problems and the new administration. Secondly, the arguments for the 
existence of hegemony in global governance will be presented. Thirdly, the theory of 
hegemonic governance in IR is reflected upon. 
 
Hegemony37 
 
Hegemony, according to the Greek root egemon, is the dominance of one state over 
another, meaning literally „leader, ruler, often in the sense of a state other than his 
own‟ (Williams 1985: 144). An international perspective is thus implied, to which 
we will return after looking also at the very common use of the term by Gramsci. He 
describes hegemony as „a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of 
consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organisation of 
consent‟ (Simon 1991: 22). Gramsci first considered the hegemony of the working 
class and how it was achieved, and later shifted to analysing that of the bourgeoisie 
(Engel 2006: 2). In this later application of the notion, he introduced the idea of 
oppression or coercion, hegemony being based on „a combination of force and 
consent‟ (Engel 2006: 2). The hegemon would always attempt to make his leadership 
appear consensual, even if it was based on force (Cuneo 2007). He mentions that the 
application of force without the provision of leadership (i.e. in the absence of 
consensus) does not qualify as hegemony but is a form of „dictatorship‟: „It is one of 
the cases in which these groups have the function of “domination” without that of 
“leadership”: dictatorship without hegemony‟ (Cuneo 2007). In the following, 
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therefore, hegemony will be understood as the exercise of power by a superior actor 
in the international system, and furthermore as implicitly based on consensus.  
 
As opposed to the usage proposed here, Gramsci used the term „hegemony‟ basically 
to describe relations in the nation state, even if his analysis was not totally restricted 
to the nation state. It was the neo-Gramscian approach developed by Robert Cox 
(1996) which transferred the notion of hegemony to the international level. His 
relation to the ideas of Gramsci is explained by Engel: „Cox sees the current global 
hegemony as an outwards expansion of an American historical bloc, which he labels 
pax Americana. The legitimating ideology of pax Americana is, of course, 
neoliberalism‟, and „Cox also identified a range of ways in which hegemony is 
expressed by international organizations as both the products of the hegemonic 
world order and institutions that facilitate the expansion of the rules of that order, in 
this case neoliberalism‟ (2008: 162ff).  
 
Michael Cox, in an article entitled „Whatever happened to American decline? 
International relations and the new United States hegemony‟ (2001), develops a 
„security-based theory of hegemony‟. He bases hegemony on military and economic 
power, exerted by control – yet not absolute control – and implies the provision of 
stability: „There were limits to its power, but it is inconceivable to imagine the 
restoration and maintenance of international stability in the post-war period without 
it‟ (2001: 315). The hegemony of the USA contributed to world order by opposing 
the Cold War enemies of capitalism via containment, it rebuilt post-war Europe by 
providing financial aid through the Marshall Plan, it stabilised Asia and aided 
prosperity in the region.
38
 Apart from this, the USA created and essentially 
maintained a new international financial system, and promoted the liberalisation of 
markets on a global scale (Cox, M. 2001: 315). 
  
The continuance of the USA as a hegemon after the end of the Cold War is described 
by Michael Cox in terms of unipolarity, expressed by the maintenance of economic 
and military capabilities: 
 
If the establishment of a unipolar world without serious opposition within it to the United 
States laid the basis for American self-confidence in the 1990s, the long boom which began 
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in 1992 and continued more or less without disturbance until the „troubles‟ of 2001 gave it 
material meaning . . . [This was accompanied by] the collapse of the idea of the „Pacific 
Century‟ and with it the almost complete disintegration of the once popular (or unpopular) 
view that Japan represented a serious threat to US economic hegemony . . . Finally, any 
assessment of the new American hegemony has to take account of that most important 
instrument of power – the military capabilities needed to deter enemies, control allies, 
preserve influence and, if needs be, win wars. Here the collapse of the USSR and the 
inability of other countries to justify military spending to sceptical publics only emphasised 
the extent of US preponderance . . . In comparison to its many dependent allies (and largely 
backward rivals) it was simply in a league of its own. (2001: 329ff)  
 
Apart from Michael and Robert Cox, a great number of scholars, before and since, 
refer to the USA as a hegemon (to name but a few: Robinson 1996; Evans 1996; 
Weber 1999; Wade 2002; Posen 2003; Foot et al. 2003; Owen 2003; Bromley 2003).  
 
Meanwhile, Wilkinson was one of those scholars who rejected the hegemony thesis. 
He contended at the beginning of the 1990s that „the current power configuration of 
the world system is unipolarity without hegemony‟ (1991: 141). He understands 
hegemony as inequality in a relationship, and influence that might be based on 
coercion or consensus, commerce or legitimacy. His argument, that there is 
unipolarity (which he defends) but not hegemony, is based on the observation that 
the „preponderant capability‟ of the USA is not matched by „predominant influence‟. 
To measure this absence of „mastership‟ he proposes the following criteria: 
investiture, installation, appointment and deposition of local governments; 
adjudication and maintenance of order in the international system; and convocation, 
command, veto, subsidy, tribute and conversion (1991: 143ff). It follows from these 
criteria that, for example, local governments would have to be legitimised and even 
appointed by the hegemon; it would have to be a „stabiliser‟ in the sense that it 
suppressed or resolved local conflicts by its intervention; and it would have to train 
local elites and have command over the collective actions of states‟ armed forces. 
This is clearly a very demanding and complex description of hegemony, in terms of 
which hegemony is thought to have been achieved only rarely by any state before 
(Wilkinson 1991: 153). Even if the USA qualifies sometimes and in some regions as 
a hegemon, Wilkinson does not understand it to be a system-wide hegemon. His 
conceptualisation and discussion of hegemony is an interesting one, but differs from 
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the way the notion is commonly used. 
 
If we do not take up Wilkinson‟s concept here, we will have to find other 
measurements of hegemony. What exactly is hegemony based on? As mentioned 
before, it can be understood as a combination of a set of structural features, and of an 
actor‟s characteristics and behavioural features. The structural features refer to the 
hegemon‟s position in the world system, and to the term‟s normal use in the 
literature, hegemony is clearly based on unipolarity (in a certain regional frame, or 
even in the entire international system). Unipolarity implies domination, i.e. 
command of great power but not necessarily absolute control (Wartenberg 1990: 91).  
 
Hobson (2000), as mentioned in the first chapter, describes the criteria for hegemony 
in the following way: 
 
 A hegemon must have a preponderance of economic and military power.  
 A hegemon must be a liberal state „because only liberal states have the will to 
pursue hegemony: authoritarian states prefer imperialism, moreover, liberal 
states are concerned to create an open and liberal world order‟ (2000: 39).  
 A „rudimentary consensus‟ for hegemony among the major states is 
necessary.  
 A hegemon must have a long-term perspective to set-up international 
regimes. 
 A „hegemon must be willing to make short-term sacrifices in order to achieve 
benefit in the long-term‟ (2000: 40). 
 
For hegemony, therefore, material dominance, the exercise of power, and consensus 
are needed. Whereas material dominance can be measured in Waltzian terms of 
capabilities, power is exerted by means of „soft‟ power (such as ideology) or the 
application of „sticky‟ (economic) and hard power (military force). Whereas the use 
of soft power results in influence – a measurement of consensus – and thus the 
capacity to affect the policies and behaviours of other states without inspiring 
opposition, sticky and hard power result in control, or the ability to achieve goals 
even in the face of opposition. In discussing different aspects of power, the 
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conceptualisations of Wartenberg were applied here (ch. 2). Wartenberg, in his 
Forms of Power, firstly describes dominance as referring „not to a single exercise of 
power but to a relationship between two social agents that is constituted by the 
existence of a power differential between them‟ (1990: 117). Power then can be 
exerted in three distinguishably different forms: influence, coercion and force.  
 
Dominance and the exercise of power39  
 
Structural realism, as influenced by the discipline of economics,
40
 takes a distinctly 
materialist view of human affairs, and thus on international relations: Waltz argues 
that the structure of the international system is defined by the number and 
constellation of dominating powers. Dominance is based on the command of 
superior power resources (capabilities), which refer to factors such as „size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence‟ (Waltz 1979: 131). Political stability and 
competence, as the only factors not obviously material, remain relatively under-
explained and are often not used when structural realism is applied. All other factors 
are distinctly material in nature and have no relation to ideational factors such as 
ideology, aggressiveness, propensity to seek peace, and so forth, which are explicitly 
excluded as markers of power. These material „capabilities‟ then are measured 
relationally to describe the distribution of power within the system and thus to 
distinguish certain states as „poles of power‟ (and according to structural realism 
such states are the only important actors within the international system). In Waltz‟s 
words, „the structure of the system changes with changes in the distribution of 
capabilities across the system‟s units‟ (1979: 97). The international system is 
configured, therefore, in terms of material polarity. This describes the centre(s) of 
dominance and the number of dominant states (1979: 129ff). 
  
Historically, it is argued, we have already lived through different constellations of 
polarity (Waltz 1979: 62). However, with regard to the current international system 
we find an obvious anomaly: it is often referred to as being marked by „unipolarity‟ 
(McInerney 2002; Ikenberry 2005: 133; Brooks and Wohlforth 2002: 21), meaning 
that there is only one dominant power in the whole system (i.e. the USA) with no 
significant challenger(s). Waltz, in his Theory of International Politics, did not 
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initially think of unipolarity as a theoretical puzzle or even as a possibility. But he 
now argues that it is a global reality (Waltz 2002), and in this has some strong 
support (to name but a few further authors: Krauthammer 1990/91; Brooks and 
Wohlforth 2005; Wilkinson 1991). However, there is opposition elsewhere to 
viewing the current international system as unipolar: Mearsheimer and Huntington 
have both argued against this perspective, their opposition being essentially based on 
disagreeing with Waltz‟s definition of unipolarity. Neither disputes the reality of the 
USA being the materially most dominant power, but they oppose the understanding 
of its being the only materially powerful state. The existence of other great powers 
such as China, India, Russia, Japan and Brazil, even if comparatively much below 
the USA in terms of capability, was sufficient for them to argue for the current 
international system being multipolar (Mearsheimer 2006; Huntington 1999). Still, 
in support of Waltz it should be stated that, for example, although rates of growth in 
China‟s economy have been tremendous (International Monetary Fund 2008), its 
GDP is well behind that of the USA (Worldbank 2008), and the same is true of its 
military power. Russia is well equipped with natural resources (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2009) but can hardly compete in the military dimension (Delpech 1998/9; 
Karl 2007). Only the EU member states combined achieve an equal economic power 
than the USA (Central Intelligence Agency 2009), but not so in the military realm. In 
the combination of the most important factors, the USA still dominates 
internationally and it is thought to continue do so in the coming decades (National 
Intelligence Council 2008; for another analysis of dominance Black 2008: ch. 9, 
though in ch. 10 he takes a more sceptical outlook for a unipolar USA in the future). 
In the following, the US power is measured in Waltz‟s dimensions over the time 
period observed in this study (2001–8). 
 
Size of population and territory 
The USA is the „world‟s third-largest country by size (after Russia and Canada) and 
by population (after China and India)‟ (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). It being 
located between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans makes it less vulnerable to 
conventional military attacks. Its huge population is overall very well-educated and 
provides a very effective and competitive workforce, in which some 60 per cent of 
women participate (Karoly and Panis 2004: 11). The competitiveness of the 
workforce is also based on the fact that the USA tends to attract the elite of foreign 
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students and scientists.
41
  
 
Resource endowment 
Apart from human resources, the USA presides over untapped natural resources. It is 
estimated to have over 47 billion barrels of oil, 622 trillion cubic feet of gas and 11 
billion barrels of liquid gas (US Department of the Interior 2006a). In comparison, 
China has over 16 billion barrels of oil and 53 billion cubic feet of gas (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2009). The USA also imports large quantities of natural 
resources, particularly oil, from Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, 
Iraq and Angola, among others (Energy Information Administration 2009), 
amounting in total to nearly ten million barrels per day, compared to China‟s imports 
of three million barrels. Russia, however, „challenges‟ the USA with reserves of 79 
billion barrels of oil and 45 trillion cubic feet of gas. 
 
Economics
42
  
The USA has the most powerful national economy in the world, with a GDP of 
$14,260 billion in 2008. Only the EU member states combined challenge the USA in 
this regard with $14,910 billion. The next biggest economy is China, which achieves 
a mere $7,973 billion (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). The US economy is 
essentially based on services (estimated at 78.6 per cent of GDP in 2006), which 
gives it a competitive edge over other industry-based economies. In comparison, 
China generates 40 per cent of its GDP through industrial production and only 48 per 
cent through the services sector. US industry produces 27 per cent of the global total, 
equalling the sum of that produced by the three next-biggest economies (Japan, 
Germany and France) together; 59 of the world‟s 100 biggest enterprises are based in 
the USA (compared to 31 in Europe and seven in Japan), and 219 of the biggest 500 
(compared to 158 in Europe and 77 in Japan, Nye 2003: 162). Both US foreign 
investment and foreign investment in the USA are double the comparable figures for 
the next-largest country, the UK. American e-commerce is three times as large as the 
European; the seven biggest software firms are all American, as well as the ten 
leading investment banks (Nye 2003: 162). The majority of leading brands are 
American, as are the leading business schools – and so the list continues. Moreover, 
the US dollar is the leading global currency (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 473). 
Overall, US economic power is still far ahead of other national economies (except 
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the EU as an integrated economy, which equals it). Its economy accounts for roughly 
20 per cent of world economic output, whereas for example Brazil, Russia, India and 
China combined make up about 30 per cent of it. Furthermore: „Economic power is 
related to per capita income as well as size. According to this measure, the United 
States is by far the world‟s richest major country. Income per person in the United 
States, based on PPP, is about 30 percent higher than the average for the traditional 
15 member states of the European Union‟ (Julius 2005: 17). This lead Brooks and 
Wohlforth to the conclusion that, „America‟s economic dominance, meanwhile – 
relative to either the next several richest powers or the rest of the world combined – 
surpasses that of any power in modern history‟ (2002: 22). This economic 
preponderance is the basis of US military power.  
 
The US military  
„The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world‟s dominant air 
force, the only truly blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project power 
around the globe‟ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002: 21). Also, the USA spends more on 
defence than the „next 15 to 20 biggest spenders combined‟ (Brooks and Wohlforth 
2002: 21), and these figures were on the rise under the second Bush administration. 
This was accompanied by comparably high expenditure in the realm of research and 
development (Kupchan 2003: 58). The US armed forces are technologically very 
advanced, are present in many regions of the world (Monthly Review 2006), and 
even where they are not, the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps are capable of 
„rapid employment worldwide‟ (United States Air Force 2006). Under the second 
Bush Administration, this military supremacy was understood as the basis of 
American power and was strengthened even further. The strategy was based on the 
ideas that the deployment of military force must serve American interests. It should 
encompass the whole globe and thus enable the USA to exert power everywhere, any 
time and under any circumstances it wished. It should be perpetual, in the sense that 
technological and scientific progress would ensure that American military primacy 
was here to stay (Klare 2001).  
 
Further, the USA is politically highly stable (with no major disruptions since the 
mid-nineteenth century).
43
 It can be seen that the USA simultaneously meets the 
criteria for predominance in nearly all areas, which distinguishes it from former 
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poles in the system (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002: 23).  
 
One might argue against understanding the USA as a unipolar power, given its 
economic challengers – China and Europe – and the financial (inter-)dependence 
obtaining in the relationship with China (Murphy 2006). Indeed, Wallerstein takes 
such a position, and goes on to explain the ever more unilateralist and aggressive 
foreign policies of the USA with its supposed decline as a unipolar power: 
 
From 1945 until around 1970 the US exercised unquestioned hegemony in the world system. 
This began to decline during the period between 1970 and 2001, but the extent of the decline 
was limited by the strategy that the US evolved to delay and minimize the effects of its loss 
of ascendancy. Since 2001, the US has sought to recuperate its standing by more unilateralist 
policies, which have, however, boomeranged – indeed actually accelerating the speed and 
depth of its decline. (2006) 
 
Yet, following Waltz (2002: 350), the author contends that the USA still was – in the 
time period observed – a unipolar power, the superior one in the then-current world 
system. This unipolarity was based firstly on its military capabilities, then on its 
economy, natural resources and political system.  
 
The exercise of dominance  
Material factors such as those mentioned above, however, cannot alone explain the 
dominance of the USA in international affairs; other factors also have to be 
considered. As discussed in this work, the USA is not only a unipolar power, but 
also a hegemon. Hegemony, however, implies more than just having preponderant 
material capabilities at one‟s disposal. For hegemony, additional factors play a role, 
such as, the exercise of power based on these capabilities and, „soft‟ or ideological 
power or the ability to change others‟ behaviours by influencing their belief system, 
in essence their ways of thinking and their rationality (Gramsci 1992–2007; Foucault 
1980). This study of the causes of participation in the GWOT, for example, has 
shown that discursive power is important for the compliance and cooperation of 
other actors with the USA. Therefore we have to look at the dominance of the USA 
in international affairs in more of its aspects than simply through the material lens. 
The whole discourse about „new imperialism‟, for example, discusses the exercise of 
this dominant power via foreign policy (Harvey 2005); while constructivists and 
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some critical scholars focus on „soft power‟, ideas, discourse and norms (Wang 
2003; Robinson 1996) as the basis of US power. In the following, factors in the 
exercise of power, such as force, coercion and influence, will be examined. 
 
Force  
„The USA has little sympathy with the constraints of collective security, especially 
with the United Nations‟ (Black 2008: 219). 
 
Force is not generally discussed as an element of global governance.
44
 Its use is 
legally highly restricted within the world community and it can only be applied in 
defense. The most obvious examples are retaliatory military measures against 
aggressor states, authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Also, peacekeeping missions under the leadership of the UN feature here, as 
a regular occurrence in international politics. They serve to stabilise dangerous 
situations, particularly in intra-state conflict regions. As of December 2006, there 
were 18 such missions in operation under the auspices of the UN; generally, they are 
strongly supported by European powers, though not by the USA (Adebajo n.d.).  
 
To give an example, UNAMSIL (UNIOSIL from 2005–6) is one of the largest UN 
peacekeeping missions with 1,043 total uniformed personnel, including 944 troops, 
69 military observers and 30 police supported by 216 international civilian 
personnel, 369 local civilian staff and 83 United Nations volunteers working in 
Sierra Leone. Whereas a large number of states support this mission with troops 
(Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, the 
UK, Uruguay and Zambia, United Nations 2009a, n.d. a), the USA does not.
45
 Even 
if the mission is considered by the USA to be in its own interest, its absence from the 
mission is an expression of its reluctance towards international military cooperation 
under the auspices of the international community. With reference to the Sierra 
Leone mission, Ambassador Williamson, US Alternate Representative to the UN, 
stated:  
 
The UN and this [Security] Council rarely have the ability themselves to ensure a successful 
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peace process. Seldom can the UN on its own impose a successful solution. In most cases, 
the parties themselves must create facts on the ground that will allow the UN to contribute to 
a lasting peace. We neither strengthen the UN, the Security Council, nor help bring peace to 
any conflict by over-promising, raising unrealistic expectations, or over-extending the 
capacity of the UN to deliver on the ground. (Department of State 2002a) 
 
In all UN peacekeeping operations, the USA ranks 31st with respect to its military 
contribution (United Nations 2006a). The USA is clearly uninterested in using its 
military strength to seek peace in the world through the UN.  
 
Interestingly, it is much more active outside that framework, by directly employing 
its force. This can be understood as a form of unilateral approach to the use of force, 
based on inequality (Bhagwati 1990) and on the pursuit of national interest (Malone 
and Khong 2003; Holloway 2000). For example, when NATO intervened in Kosovo 
in 1995 and 1999, it had no UN mandate to do so (Adebajo n.d.). This was a clear 
violation of international law, given the principles on the use of force laid down in 
the UN Charter. While the NATO members participating in the operation proclaimed 
the interventions as exceptional, the USA stated that NATO actions would not need 
UN legitimisation of the application of force:  
 
Most of NATO‟s member states have argued that the situation was exceptional and should 
have no bearing on the future need for Security Council authorization. Not so the United 
States; US officials have not spoken of an exception. Several high-ranking officials of the 
Clinton Administration have stated that they do not recognize the necessity for Security 
Council authorization when NATO takes enforcement action. (O‟Connell 2000: 57)  
 
Overall, US interventions – frequently without a Security Council resolution – are 
quite common, in the Middle East and elsewhere (Beyer 2008: ch. 4). 
 
We can see that the USA does not use force intensely within the framework of 
traditional global governance. However, it frequently uses it outside that framework 
and often in a unilateral manner. As global governance, in strict terms, implies that 
states are constrained in their application of force by the UN Charter, we can speak 
here of the USA creating its own version of the governance of international affairs, 
hegemonic governance. 
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A word on exceptionalism and unilateralism in global governance seems justified 
here. According to Foot et al. (2003: 27), exceptionalism is marked by:  
 
 a predisposition to unilateralism – a willingness to „go it alone‟ without 
considering others‟ opposition;  
 a missionary drive to universalise domestic values and policies, including the 
conviction of being both right and superior;  
 a „nationalisation‟ of interest, meaning that foreign policy behaviour is 
determined by domestic considerations; this might even lead to accepting 
conflict with international obligations; and  
 a selective approach to multilateralism, based on the belief that multilateral 
cooperation is an option, not mandatory.  
 
According to these criteria, the USA (among other nations, such as the Soviet Union, 
China and France) can be termed an exceptionalist state. The study referred to comes 
to the conclusion that:  
 
There is no clear pattern or trend that signals a growing US rejection of multilateral 
organizations as venues for the promotion of US foreign policy interests. The United States 
picks and chooses from a range of possible approaches, depending on the issue, its interests, 
and changing international and domestic conditions, America can afford to be discriminating 
in this way. US hegemony affords it broad discretion to use unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral means to obtain its objectives. Hegemony provides it with the privilege of 
instrumental multilateralism. (Foot et al. 2003: 266)  
 
The USA makes „instrumental use‟ of IOs, showing high levels of unilateralism in 
the realm of security and the application of force. In particular, it uses force to 
implement its own understanding of „order‟ in international affairs (Owens 2006; 
Gill 2003). Furthermore, US unilateralism has been criticised as hampering the 
effectiveness of global governance, or of global cooperation in general (Maynes 
1999; Kellner 2002; Holloway 2000). 
 
Coercion 
Coercion in global governance is much less reported than force, yet presumably 
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more frequent.  
 
An obvious case of coercion in the field of global security (this time in cooperation 
with the UN) was the sanctions against Iraq which were imposed after it invaded 
Kuwait in 1990. The sanctions were not lifted after the intervention had evicted the 
Iraqi forces, though many civil society organisations argued for a partial or total 
lifting. Widespread concerns over the humanitarian situation in Iraq led to the „Oil 
for Food Programme‟ in 1997. However, „the US-UK blocked many contracts . . . 
and serious humanitarian problems remained‟ (Global Policy Forum n.d.). The USA, 
in collaboration with the UK, made it clear that the sanctions would not be lifted so 
long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The sanctions hit the general population 
in Iraq, particularly children (Nafeez 2003), and most likely forced the Iraqi regime 
to change its behaviour towards the USA.  
 
With regard to Iran, up to 2009, the USA has prevented negotiations for its accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO), to which Iran had applied a decade earlier. 
In the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the USA pushed for Iran‟s case 
to be referred to the Security Council. After some exertion of pressure – for instance, 
India was accepted as an official nuclear power and offered nuclear scientific 
exchanges in return for its support (Foreign Policy in Focus 2005, Campaign against 
Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran 2007) – the case was indeed referred to 
the Security Council and sanctions were duly imposed on Iran. At the time of 
writing, the USA has pushed for the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, which 
would entail the use of force against Iran. Also, direct threats were used, targeting 
international companies, nations and IOs, to end trade with Iran related to nuclear 
capability. This can be understood as a „tool of force‟ to make other actors comply 
with US policies (Dinmore and Edward 2005).  
 
Coercion in the field of global order was also to be found in proceedings over the 
establishment and functioning of the International Criminal Court (ICC):  
 
On the eve of an important Security Council vote, the United States threatened European 
Union nations of „very damaging‟ consequences in transatlantic relations should EU nations 
continue to oppose US actions aiming to guarantee impunity of US nationals before the 
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International Criminal Court. (Federation internationale des ligues des Droits de l‟Homme 
2003) 
 
In 2002, the US Congress passed the American Service Members‟ Protection Act 
which:  
 
contained a number of provisions, including prohibitions on the U.S. providing military aid 
to countries which had ratified the treaty establishing the court (exceptions granted), and 
permitting the President to authorize military force to free any U.S. military personnel held 
by the court. (European Parliament 2007: 4)  
 
Bilateral Immunity Agreements were established in order to prohibit the surrender of 
US Americans to the ICC. Presumably, many of the 101 signatories to these 
agreements have acted under pressure from the USA, which cut foreign aid to states 
that refused to sign (Coalition for the International Criminal Court 2003 and n.d.; 
Klein 2003). The USA also coerced the Security Council to grant immunity from 
prosecution in the ICC to US members of peacekeeping missions. As the USA 
otherwise would have vetoed the renewal of the peacekeeping mission, the Security 
Council obliged: 
 
The US threatened to pull its troops out of the UN force in Bosnia unless they were given 
immunity from prosecution by the ICC. In a much-criticised decision, the UN Security 
Council voted on 12 July 2002 on a compromise that gave US troops a 12-month exemption 
from prosecution – renewed annually. (BBC n.d.) 
 
Apart from these very well known occasions, coercion by the USA is likely to be 
frequent, even if not widely reported. Generally, cases of such coercion do not figure 
largely in the media. One reference was found on Liberia: „The United States last 
week threatened to cut its aid for Liberia‟s post-war reconstruction if the country‟s 
transitional parliament delayed elections scheduled for October 2005 by insisting on 
a new census‟ (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2004). The elections duly 
took place on 11 October 2005. 
 
With regard to global economic institutions, coercion by the USA was accurately 
described by Woods (2003). She measures „influence‟46 in terms of financial 
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structure (the „proportion of the core budget paid by the United States‟ or „how 
regularly US approval is sought‟, for example), use of resources (whether US 
approval is needed for lending decisions, and to what extent these reflect US 
priorities), staffing and management (composition of the institution‟s staff according 
to nationality, training, etc.) and formal structures of voting and power (the 
proportion of formal voting power allocated to the USA, the extent of its influence 
over informal procedures and conventions, etc.). Woods comes to the following 
conclusions:  
 
The US has substantial capabilities to bring to bear in shaping the mandates, policies, and 
modus operandi of the international financial institutions . . . At the core of US influence lies 
the financial structure of the institutions . . . in recent years both have, on occasion, fallen 
into the arms of [the] US Congress. The IMF‟s need for additional resources and the creation 
of the IDA within the World Bank have forced the institutions to ask their government 
members for additional contributions. In each case, the United States contribution has needed 
the approval of Congress. In turn, Congress has used the opportunity to impose conditions 
not just regarding the specific facilities for which the funds have been asked, but on the 
overall governance and direction of both the IMF and the World Bank. (Woods 2003: 113) 
 
According to Woods, in this situation threats were issued as an exercise of power 
(Woods 2003: 102). The strong presence of US interests in International Monetary 
Fund‟ (IMF) policies as well as the devastating effects on Russia‟s market transition 
was described by Stiglitz (2002). Also Dreher et al. (2006) and Dreher and Jensen 
(2007) wrote on US influence in the IMF. The use of the World Bank as a tool of 
power and coercion was described by Engel (2008), in reference to Vietnam. 
  
Sen discusses US coercion in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) exerted on the 
EU and Japan, where specific commitments „were extracted‟ (Sen 2003: 129) from 
both parties with regard to export subsidies and trade barriers. Also, the example of 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is mentioned 
in the literature to exemplify US hegemony:  
 
In yet another case of quasi-hierarchical rule-making, specific influence has not been 
conferred by a legal instrument, but is the result of the exclusion from decision making on 
the States targeted by the decisions. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is the most prominent case in point. . . . it establishes standards that, 
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though not legally binding, are to be observed by third States if they desire access to the 
OECD markets or other privileges . . . as one of their most ardent defenders admits, their 
informality and flexibility nevertheless „privileges the expertise and superior resources of the 
United States government institutions in many ways‟. (Krisch 2003: 158ff) 
 
Coercion is thus a common feature of global governance. According to Woods, the 
indications found can be generalised to all IOs of which the USA is a member. The 
USA, she argues, has disproportionate power in „every organization to which it 
belongs‟, surpassing its share of voting rights or its financial contributions. This 
results in the possibility of applying power to „induce some submission‟ in these 
organisations (Woods 2004: 38). Susan Strange mentioned in this regard that 
multilateral institutions serve as „instruments of the structural strategy and foreign 
policy of the dominant state or states‟ (Woods 2003: 1, online version). However, 
Woods also qualifies this statement: 
 
Finally, although the United States enjoys significant influence in both the IMF and the 
World Bank, this does not mean that the US Executive agencies control the mandate. The 
political pressures emanating from the United States do not all converge . . . The result is that 
US influence is almost always effective in securing a hearing and some action within the 
IMF and the World Bank, but it does not always reflect a coherent set of interests. (Woods 
2003: 21, online version). 
 
On the other hand, Karns and Mingst argue that: 
 
[The case studies] reaffirm the key role played by the United States in creating and 
sustaining the suite of postwar IGOs. Virtually all of the nine organizations depended heavily 
on American funds, personnel, and technical expertise. By providing material supports to 
them, U.S. decision makers expected that these IGOs could be used as instruments of 
American foreign policy. In some cases the expectation was explicit (the UN Security 
Council, NATO, OAS); in others, more implicit (UNESCO and WHO) . . . Because of the 
global predominance of liberalism, the United States could rely on these organizations as 
dependable forums for U.S. influence. (1992: 292) 
 
Influence  
Influence is probably the most often used application of power in global governance. 
According to Sen, the conduct of the USA vis-à-vis developing countries can be 
grouped under this head: „The United States ensured the acquiescence of developing 
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countries on a range of issues through robust diplomacy and cajolery and continues 
to exercise its persuasive powers‟ (2003: 129). Payne, for example, elaborates on the 
role of US influence with respect to international labor standards (2001). Steger 
writes about US „globalism‟ with respect to discursive power, and thus „influence‟ in 
the terms adopted here. He refers to „soft power‟ as the basis of neo-liberals‟ success 
in achieving their desired outcomes globally without the necessity of resorting to 
hard power. „These power elites constructed and disseminated narratives and images 
that extolled the virtues of deregulated and globally integrated markets‟ and 
„globalism was difficult to resist because it relied on the soft power of “common 
sense”, that is, the widespread belief that its prescriptive program ultimately derived 
from an accurate description of “objective reality”‟ (2005: 32). Narratives that were 
constructed mainly in and by the USA and that dominated the global discourse on 
globalisation before and after 9/11, state that: 
 
 the essence of globalisation is liberalisation, which will lead to a global 
integration of markets; 
 these processes are both inevitable and irreversible; 
 there is no hierarchy to be found in globalisation („nobody is in charge‟); 
 in the long term, all nations and peoples will benefit from globalisation; 
 democratisation is a beneficial outcome of the described processes; and 
finally (a narrative constructed after 9/11) 
 globalisation has to be defended by a „Global War on Terrorism‟.  
(Steger 2005: 32ff)  
 
Thus the existence and content of these discourses are proof of US influence in the 
world.  
 
Hegemonic governance in theory  
 
As mentioned before, global governance is usually understood as a heterarchical 
phenomenon. This is misleading. The power constellations that underpin global 
governance in the security sphere are still unipolar, with the USA at the centre of 
power. It would be naive to assume that this unipolarity has no effect on efforts to 
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govern the international system.  
 
Power in hegemonic governance 
Mann writes: „A general account of societies, their structure and their history can 
best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of 
social power: ideological, economic, military and political‟ (1993: 2). Here the 
argument is made for different forms of power, which in human societies overlap.  
 
Military power, which has already been shown to be the main source of US 
dominance, is described as follows: „Military power is the social organization of 
physical force. It derives from the necessity of organized defence and the utility of 
aggression . . . those who monopolize it, as military elites and castes, can wield a 
degree of general social power‟ (Mann 1993: 9). Military power is not only one form 
of power, but – if openly applied – its dominant form. In a decisive interaction, when 
forced to obey either a combatant with a weapon or a person offering shelter from 
the elements (the latter not being able to shield one from the threat of the weapon 
being used), one will decide to save its own life by obeying the combatant. For the 
mere sake of survival, the decision would be made to avoid the danger of being shot 
and to give up the chance of being rewarded with shelter. Furthermore, military 
power can only be opposed by military power, whereas economic and other soft 
powers can be opposed with similar powers as well as by military power. The threat 
of military force makes economic measures more credible, and can help to deter 
other actors. And in real cases of conflict – or „when the crunch comes‟, according to 
Waltz (1979: 94) – states are more susceptible to military than to economic threats 
(Pape 1997). This indicates that military power is still the dominant form of power: 
battles cannot easily be won with money, and peace cannot be paid for.
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 Military 
power is not beneficial nor desirable; it is simply the most coercive tool at the 
disposal of humanity.
48
 To look at military capabilities in determining unipolarity 
therefore makes sense, as they can be most easily translated into power, and military 
power is more decisive in deciding a conflict than any other form of power. For other 
states, the military (especially nuclear) power of the USA inherently bears a coercive 
dimension: 
 
the threat of a large-scale nuclear strike is a potentially powerful coercive tool . . . any 
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nuclear use would threaten considerable destruction to the adversary‟s civilian population, 
key elite groups, leadership, military, and country as a whole. The size and lethality of the 
U.S. arsenal make it exponentially more destructive than the massive U.S. conventional 
arsenal . . . the U.S. nuclear arsenal certainly plays a major role in shaping the international 
environment, and its role in dissuading regional adversaries from considering certain moves 
in a crisis, including WMD use, is substantial. (Byman and Waxman 2002: 102, 235) 
 
The USA also presides, as mentioned before, over economic power. „The concept of 
national power has both military and economic dimensions. While the two are 
related, they can also exist independently‟ (Julius 2005:  16). The USA makes use of 
its economic power by creating interdependence. Due to its superior economic 
power, this interdependence is usually asymmetric (except versus the EU as an 
organization of states). Target states are more dependent on the USA than the other 
way around. This means that the target states face higher costs for non-cooperation 
than the USA. This also allows the USA to apply economic sanctions, which have 
been shown to be efficient in obtaining compliance (Doxey 1971; Drezner 1999).  
 
Finally, power in global governance – for it to be rendered hegemonic – is not 
simply the use of force and coercion, but needs to be complemented with consent. 
Consent, as will be discussed below, derives from authority and legitimacy as well as 
from influence. If hegemony were based simply on brute force, it would have to be 
termed dictatorship: „Power, according to Gramsci, is constituted by a dual or dyadic 
opposition: force and consent, violence and persuasion‟ (Fontana 2008: 85). 
 
Consent in hegemonic governance 
Is hegemonic governance necessarily based on consensus? Other publications by the 
author argue that the consensus, on which hegemonic governance is based, is 
declining, in the populations of many countries and particularly due to US policies in 
the GWOT (Beyer 2008: ch. 3). However, at the state level, consent is still 
essentially present (chs. 4, 5). Economic and ideological power shape a reality which 
is based simply on the „perception of beneficiality‟ (Beyer 2008: ch. 3). States 
generally agree with the leading position of the USA, implicitly or explicitly, and the 
USA should not (or must not) be challenged. Even in the event of US non-
cooperation (which could be perceived as threatening) criticism remains surprisingly 
muted and the consensus around US leadership surprisingly high (Bertelsmann 
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Stiftung 2006: 23). This consensus was reflected in the interviews and confirmed the 
perception of legitimacy and authority.  
 
As Ikenberry and Kupchan write:  
 
Legitimacy enhances the capacity of the hegemon to lead. Legitimate domination is far more 
effective than naked domination. The right to lead emanates less from economic and military 
power as such and more from the willingness of smaller nations to buy into and internalize 
the norms and principles set forth by the hegemon. (1990: 49) 
 
The right to lead is „conditioned by the hegemon‟s prestige and moral authority‟ 
(1990: 51). Ikenberry and Kupchan particularly mention coercion and influence in 
their models of hegemonic power, but legitimacy derives rather from socialisation. 
This follows a process of normative persuasion > norm change > policy change 
(1990: 57): 
 
In more concrete terms, citizens and/or elites in secondary states come to believe in the 
virtues of the normative order articulated by the hegemon, to define their nation‟s interest in 
terms of that normative order, and then to move to bring policy practices into accord with 
those normative principles. (1990: 57) 
 
This is in accord with the results on rhetorical influence from the case studies, where 
the USA by „normative persuasion‟ led other states to participate in the GWOT by 
inflating the threat of terrorism, and thereby the need for a global war (against 
terrorism), and pushing certain counterterrorism policies. However, coercion is also 
potentially possible in the legitimation hegemony model; Ikenberry and Kupchan 
describe the process as follows: coercion/inducement > policy change > norm 
change (1990: 57): 
 
At the outset of the interaction, hegemonic power is exercised, as realists would expect, 
through coercion and inducements. The hegemon uses traditional power resources to induce 
compliance with its principles of order and leadership. Elites in secondary nations, with 
fewer resources at their disposal, adjust their policies accordingly. It is only later that the 
normative order, into which the secondary nations have been forced or induced to 
participate, comes to be embraced as rightful. (1990: 57) 
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Elements of this process are also present in the case of counterterrorism. Coercion 
and inducements, as Chapters 4–6 have shown, were present in the GWOT. Also, not 
all states and regions were at all times willing to participate, particularly in the case 
of the intervention in Iraq. However, increasingly there seems to be less opposition 
to counterterrorism policies and to the belief and norm systems they imply. 
Increasingly, states in the EU and ASEAN, as well as the organisations themselves, 
are adapting to these policies and norms. One cannot speak of the clear-cut presence 
or absence of either one of these two processes mentioned. Rather, they are both 
present and each influences the other. In the cases under study, for example, there 
were in both regions high levels of agreement on the need to counter terrorism 
globally, when the legitimacy and authority of the USA, directly after 9/11, was at its 
height. There was also a decline in cooperation and consent in the wake of the Iraq 
intervention, again in both cases, although both ASEAN and the EU were probably 
subject to increased US coercion to participate. Finally, following Iraq, willingness 
to contribute to the GWOT has apparently increased again, with many more 
programmes set up. Principally, this speaks for a generally high level of legitimacy 
and authority, as well as of normative or rhetorical influence, on the part of the USA 
as the basis for consensus with relatively little coercion. As Peschek writes:  
 
The global system, shaped by US economic and military supremacy, requires a strong 
modicum of ideological hegemony to reproduce the conditions of that supremacy: 
„automatic‟ mechanisms of corporate globalization, a relatively open network of 
communications and trade, „free markets‟, consumerism, and sufficient popular apathy to 
permit elite flexibility. . . .  The concept of ideological hegemony does not exclude the 
reliance on a power structure of force, but rather indicates that two elements – force and 
consent – develop within some measure of equilibrium . . . Hegemony is reproduced across 
multiple venues: education, religion, laws, the political system, mass media, culture. (2006: 
5f)  
 
In the case of ASEAN, evidence for a multifaceted reality is given by Prawindarti: 
 
The war on terrorism has increased US military presence and diplomatic influence in Asia . . 
. However, the global war on terrorism has brought a paradoxical implication towards US 
role in Southeast Asia. It is paradox because on the one hand this cataclysmic event has 
increased the US‟ strategic importance in the region; on the other hand, this growing 
strategic engagement has been followed by a widening legitimacy deficit of US hegemony in 
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the region as this involvement has triggered anti-Americanism movement across the region. 
In some countries, there is a significant gap between government response and popular 
support. (2008: 15)  
 
Consent also implies that due to its dominant military power the USA is perceived 
more as a protecting power, a legitimate leader and as benign, rather than as a 
possibly dangerous hegemon (Bell 2003, for consent in European governments). 
Solana, in his report A Secure Europe in a Better World, states: „One of the core 
elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only 
in our bilateral interest, but strengthens the international community as a whole‟ 
(2005a: 55). And „The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the 
European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the 
world‟ (2005a: 57). The report also shows clearly the influence of US ideas on the 
dominance of certain current threats: terrorism, rogue states, WMD (all of which, 
interestingly, are threats linked to terrorism).  
 
Enactment of power  
As discussed earlier, the hegemon has a number of means at its disposal, such as 
sanctions, the threat of military power, economic pressure, financial aid or rewards, 
propaganda, diplomatic or public discourse, etc. The hegemon can also use civil 
society actors (such as NGOs) to exert pressure on the target governments, even if 
this has not been observed in the cases studied. By using its power, the hegemon 
actively engages in governing the global space. In trying (and possibly succeeding) 
to change or influence the policies of target states, it engages in global governance. 
This is hegemonic governance so long as it is not mainly heterarchic and multilateral 
but based on the power of the hegemon. Unilateralist tendencies on the part of the 
hegemon result in a form of hegemonic governance, as opposed to normative global 
governance.  
 
The hegemon might decide to act on the basis of its power in global governance, 
either for the public good or for its own interest. The hegemon‟s superior powers are 
not generally and principally bound by a concern for the good of all. The hegemon is 
essentially bound by the same rationality as any other state, and most other states 
would agree with the proposition that it is sensible and legitimate under certain 
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conditions, for example, to attack another country, and that it is reasonable generally 
to pursue self-interest first. The hegemon has proven this rationality by intervening 
in Iraq on the premise of pre-emptive action, which was not agreed upon 
internationally. Was this an action based on the rationality of the common good, or 
was it rational self-interest? The available answers to this question differ vastly 
(Lucas 2003 vs Fisk 2003; and taking a synthesising position, Powell 2004).  
 
The hegemon usually has more freedom of action than the ordinary state because it is 
less dependent on, or threatened by, the responses of other states. This results in a 
tendency in the hegemon to pursue its self-interest. Examples are to be found in the 
global policies on climate change, on war crimes, on civil wars etc. (compare US 
non-cooperation with regard to the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC). On the other hand, 
the USA tends to overreact to issues which directly affect it. 9/11 was, after all, the 
first major international terrorist attack on the American homeland. The GWOT is to 
a large extent based on the rational self-interest of the USA (Powell 2004). 
Therefore, the hegemon might be expected to engage less in the ordering of global 
affairs and generally more in the pursuit of its specific self-interest. 
 
Other states or collective actors comply with this because of the consensual nature of 
the hegemon‟s policies, and rather less out of informed self-interest. To give an 
example, the NATO Secretary-General has suggested that the EU states spend at 
least 2 per cent of their GDP on defence, so they can be better equipped to deal with 
the terrorist threat (European Voice 2003). The EU has continued to increase 
expenditure under the relevant budget head, in 2007 by 12.8 per cent, for instance, 
and in 2008 by 10.8 per cent. Further, whereas 0.7 per cent of the budget was spent 
in 2008 on freedom, justice and security (which is comparable to the US „homeland 
security‟), only 0.3 per cent of the budget was spent on countering climate change 
(European Commission 2008), an issue which is in principle very high on the EU 
agenda as the EU sees itself as a leader on environmental issues. The budget for 
research on the environment in 2005/06 comprised about €1,900 million annually, 
whereas over the same period some €3,000 million were spent on research into 
security under the Seventh Research Framework Programme. Without the USA 
example, EU priorities would in all likelihood differ. 
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It is essential to understand here that, during the period of the GWOT, the USA 
successfully promoted an understanding of world politics in which traditional 
security threats and international terrorism were more dominant than other shared 
risks (e.g. climate change, migration etc.) and other „new‟ security threats (e.g. civil 
wars in developing countries). Another effect of this kind of policy promotion – 
which is more than simply agenda-setting – is that in many countries (including 
some in Europe, Asia and the Middle East) civil liberties have been restricted and 
democratic principles violated, under the impression that this would contribute to the 
success of the GWOT and was legitimate within its framework (Human Rights 
Watch 2003; Foot 2005). The hegemon could overall have played a different role: It 
could have promoted a broader and more complex understanding of security and 
could have engaged in the GWOT by promoting higher democratic standards and 
showing less readiness to resort to violence. The fact that it did not, supports the 
claim that even hegemons act selfishly. 
 
Effects and stability of hegemonic governance 
As indicated before, under the condition of hegemonic governance, the global public 
good is not necessarily provided for. The hegemon determines global public policy 
according to its own interests and this need not necessarily be selfless. Interest 
politics might dominate in hegemonic governance, as one actor in particular is able 
to shape global governance even in the face of opposition from other countries. A 
similar configuration could develop under multilateralism, but it can be assumed that 
in such conditions global governance would develop into a more profitable 
enterprise. Under the condition of factual heterarchy and multilateralism, some 
different rules of interaction would have to be found, ideally including higher levels 
of compromise, negotiation and democratic principles. Global governance built on 
such principles would probably produce more real public good than hegemonic 
governance is able to provide (Beyer 2007). This seems to be the focus of the largest 
part of the research on global governance, particularly the normative branch. 
Furthermore, hegemonic governance can frustrate states that want a more equal say 
in international relations. This can lead to tensions and conflicts, as currently 
observed over Iran. 
 
Is hegemonic governance, therefore, benign or malign? Waltz argues that the 
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dominance of the USA is currently the biggest problem in international affairs 
(Waltz, interview with the author, 2007). However, it depends very much on the 
intentions and behaviour of the hegemon: is it willing to engage in and support the 
solving of public problems, with or without the unilateral provision of public goods? 
If so, hegemonic governance can be beneficial. A hegemon, due to its function as a 
producer of consent, can bring about common action in the society of states.
49
 It has 
also been argued that cooperation can come about without a hegemon (Keohane 
1984). But if its interests and intentions are opposed to the public good and public 
needs, hegemonic governance will of course remain bereft of beneficiality.  
 
Furthermore, it was argued that hegemonic governance is stable, yet does not persist 
over very long periods of time. Hegemonic governance is stable because it is not 
easily challenged. The power of the hegemon surpasses that of other states by so 
much that it is hard for them to catch up and achieve a balance, and in the case of US 
hegemony no single state has so far been able to do so (Pape 2005).
50
 Furthermore, 
consent implies that there is no real incentive for states to try and achieve a balance, 
as long as the hegemon is understood to be benign. However, as Kennedy (1988) 
argues, hegemons seldom persist indefinitely: they experience phases of growth and 
decline. And it has been argued repeatedly that the US hegemony has already 
reached a phase of gradual and terminal decline (Wallerstein 2003).  
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8 
Conclusion 
 
The research presented in this book has attempted to single out hegemonic 
governance as a possible root cause of participation in the GWOT and in the global 
governance of counterterrorism. It was argued that the structure of global 
governance, which is a hegemonic one in counterterrorism, and the enactment of 
power lead to participation. Participation was defined as the combination of 
cooperation and compliance. In the following, the arguments and findings of the 
single chapters will be summarised.  
 
Chapter 2 elaborated on participation, its definition and causes. A lack of theorising 
within IR on the issue of participation was detected. Only a few studies deal with 
„participation in global governance‟, while there is a great deal more to be found on 
compliance and on cooperation. However, participation, as the term is used here, is a 
broader concept than either of these. Participation was here described as active or 
passive. It entails participation in multilateral action (for example by sending 
military personnel and equipment, financial or immaterial support), support for 
common policies vis-à-vis third parties, lobbying for common norms and standards, 
traditional compliance (meaning behaviour that is in conformity with rules addressed 
to the actors), and finally the adoption of common norms and rhetoric. Participation 
thus entails elements of both traditional cooperation and compliance. This 
description is new, and has not been found in the literature so far. However, it seems 
useful to conceptualise participation in this way, as rarely – particularly in the case 
of counterterrorism – either simply compliance or simply cooperation are to be 
observed. Usually both are to be found co-existing. A further difference, and one of 
importance, is that cooperation usually occurs in relationships of equality, whereas 
compliance is more often to be found in relationships of inequality. As the 
assumption is that in hegemonic governance we find both an equality of formal 
sovereignty and inequality in real power, a concept combining both aspects seems 
more useful. The chapter went on to look at possible causes of participation, 
assuming the hypothesis of hegemonic governance. For this assumption, the 
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theoretical background is established in order to derive test variables to be applied in 
the case studies. Critical realism serves both as a metatheory and as the theory 
behind hegemonic governance, and the following variables are derived: dominance, 
active and passive coercion, and issue-specific and general influence (or: „relative 
power‟, pressure, „asymmetric interdependence as a tool of power‟, „discursive 
influence‟ and authority and legitimacy). 
  
The next chapter then dealt with the units chosen for the case studies, elaborating on 
the EU – as an example – and on the question of actorness. Criteria were derived 
from the literature to test the actorness of the EU. The criteria were separated into 
structural ones, those dealing with the effect of actorness, and actor-specific ones. 
The following criteria were established: coherence, one voice and addressability; the 
existence of common strategies, the capacity to act externally and internally, and 
intended effects; and participation in global governance and external recognition 
under international law. All these criteria have been examined as to how far the EU 
meets them in the area of counterterrorism, and in most cases the results were 
positive. Therefore, we can speak of the EU‟s actorness. However, as the chapter 
argues, one should assume „collective‟ rather than genuine actorness in the 
traditional sense. „Collective actorness‟ denotes the fact that the EU states act 
together and mostly in agreement, even though not always in consensus. The EU as 
an organisation has no absolute power over the states and cannot force them to act in 
common. As the EU served as an example of the actorness of regional integration 
projects, it was argued that a similar actorness could possibly be found in the case of 
ASEAN. However, apparently the actorness of ASEAN is much weaker than that of 
the EU, a fact which is attributable to the shorter history and limited depth of 
ASEAN‟s integration. ASEAN was thus termed an „emerging collective actor‟. 
 
After thus laying out the background for the case studies, the next chapter went on to 
look at the issue of EU participation in the GWOT and the causes of this 
participation. The level of EU participation was determined, according to criteria set 
out above. The EU clearly participates in the GWOT, even though rather with a 
managing role over the cooperation and compliance of the member states. 
Furthermore, participation was found in the cases of military operations, common 
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policies, and rhetoric. Interviews conducted with foreign-policy experts from the EU 
were analysed with respect to the question of what the reasons are for this 
participation. Interestingly, and importantly, the particular threat to the EU from 
international terrorism does not seem to have greatly increased since 2001. However, 
the „perception of threat‟ is one of the main arguments the experts gave for 
participation in the GWOT. This supports the argument that the rhetorical influence 
of the USA – hegemonic „soft‟ power or influence – is among the major causes of 
participation and supports the hegemony thesis. Also, the dominance of the USA 
scored very highly in the interviews, even though the connection to participation was 
not directly made by the experts. A third important cause which emerged from the 
interviews with the experts was the authority and legitimacy of the USA. Finally, a 
certain amount of pressure (i.e. coercion) was found to be likely a factor. These 
results indicate that not only is US hegemony present, but it is also one of the major 
causes of EU participation in the GWOT. 
 
Chapter 5 dealt with the next case study, of ASEAN. Participation by ASEAN can 
be detected. But even more so as in the case of the EU, the organisation rather takes 
over the role of a coordination forum, than being an independent actor. Participation 
is to be found in the collective actions of the member states. The description of 
ASEAN as an „emerging collective actor‟ therefore seems an accurate one. What 
then are the reasons for ASEAN states‟ participation in the GWOT? Interestingly, 
these differ slightly from the EU‟s. As was found in interviews with scholars and 
practitioners from ASEAN, the main reasons for its participation are less the 
perceived threat of terrorism, even though the threat seems to have increased 
compared to the EU‟s situation. The main causal factors are the dominance of the 
USA and, following from that, ASEAN‟s interdependence with it. The latter referred 
mainly to economic dependence on the USA as a foreign investor and security 
guarantor, and indicated the possibility of passive coercion. Other less dominant 
factors present were authority, followed by pressure and discursive influence. 
  
Factors that imply hegemonic governance as a cause of participation were therefore 
found to be present in the interviews conducted with experts on foreign policy and 
security, as well as public officials from ASEAN and the EU. Therefore the study 
came to the following conclusions: firstly, that participation in current global 
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governance is partly dependent on the latter‟s structure (i.e. unipolarity, hegemony), 
and, secondly, on the application of power (i.e. coercion and influence) therein. 
Following from that, it concludes that global governance is not a heterarchical 
phenomenon, as it is often described in the literature. Heterarchical global 
governance is a highly normatively-laden term, which fails to describe accurately the 
reality of global cooperation. On the contrary, global governance shows the marks of 
unipolar power, and is therefore to be characterised as „hegemonic‟.  
 
In the following chapter, the global governance of counterterrorism was examined. 
US policies in the GWOT were analysed with respect to the exercise of power and to 
the presence of force, coercion and influence. It was claimed that in the GWOT all 
three elements of the exertion of hegemonic power are to be found, even though 
force is used selectively, and often coercive measures are hidden in apparent 
multilateralism. The US role in multilateral institutions was looked at, and again it 
was found that in the institutions most important for the GWOT the USA plays a 
major role and exerts considerable influence. This chapter therefore served to present 
a focus on the hegemon and on its actions in exercising hegemonic governance. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 theorised on the topic of hegemonic governance. It started with a 
definition of the term hegemony, derived from Gramsci, and went on to elaborate on 
the current use of the term, which is highly popular in the current literature for 
describing US power. Measurements of hegemony were established, by combining 
the ideas of Gramsci with those of a power theorist, Wartenberg. According to them, 
hegemony is power exercised over subordinates; this power stems from material 
dominance, and comes in the form of force, coercion and influence. The chapter then 
looks at material dominance and inquires whether this is present, or if, as is often 
assumed, we already live in a multipolar world. Dominance was established as 
involving a preponderance of power, even if other great powers might exist. The 
chapter went on to look at force, coercion and influence, whether they are exercised 
by the hegemon within global governance, and if so in what ways. Interestingly, 
force is usually used outside the framework of global governance. The USA uses 
military interventions, but does not usually participate to any major extent in UN 
actions, tending rather to sidestep the organisation. Coercion is frequently found in 
global governance, for example by the use or even merely the threat of sanctions. 
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Coercion, the chapter argued, is frequent not only against the usual suspects (so-
called „rogue states‟), but also even within international multilateral institutions. 
Influence, finally, is the basis of all US hegemony, providing the legitimacy and 
consent on which (according to Gramsci) hegemony rests. Influence in global 
governance can be found in the whole discourse surrounding integration and the 
establishment of common institutions, in essence the whole globalisation discourse 
as well as the discourse on the GWOT, discourses markedly set out in US terms. The 
chapter went on to theorise on the questions of how power is exerted generally in 
global governance, how consensus is achieved and whether hegemonic governance 
was beneficial and stable.  
 
This study was not set out to describe the architecture of hegemonic governance in 
detail, but rather to argue for the former, for the important empirical role of 
hegemony within global governance as such. It pointed out that hegemonic power, 
particularly in terms of general capability and authority, contributes in large part 
towards participation of other actors in global governance. Additional facets of 
power, such as discursive power and economic asymmetry and dependence, also 
contribute, but not in any case at all time. Even pressure from the hegemon at times 
seems to be present in order to make the hegemonic project work. Therefore, this 
study looked at some of the internal causal mechanisms, or „what makes global 
governance tick‟, rather than attempting to describe it‟s institutional, legal or other 
features in detail.  
 
Also, the conclusions derived from the analysis of the case of counterterrorism seem 
to be transferable to other policy fields within global governance. First, this is argued 
in chapters 6 and 7, where the dominant role of the US in international organisations 
in general is highlighted. Second, the implications of this study seem to be relevant 
for other policy fields such as economics, international law, etc. There are obvious 
cases where the hegemon does or did not encourage or declined cooperation (such as 
the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the ban on landmines). 
These do not, however, contradict the hegemony thesis, as the hegemon here just 
„opted out‟, made use of it‟s „freedom of action‟ very successfully, but did not 
necessarily require other states to abstain from pursueing these policies – or policies 
in these fields generally – themselves. Therefore, cooperation in these areas does not 
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contradict the hegemonic governance principle. Also, it should be pointed out that 
participation in the GWOT is not a „natural occurrence‟ which does not need further 
explanation. Given that in fact terrorist attacks in the Western world since 2001 are 
so infrequent that more people die from drowning in their bathtubs than from 
terrorism (Mueller 2006), the enormity of political changes in the last decade 
(surveillance policies, stricter immigration policies, military interventions, and a 
general alarmism and threat perception, just to mention some) could only have been 
realised on the basis of hegemonic power. That these changes are oftentimes 
understood as natural, necessary and unproblematic, in the author‟s view is a sign of 
successful hegemonic power application itself.  
  
The author wants to conclude with some general remarks on hegemonic governance. 
Many recent studies discount hegemony in international relations (for example Telo 
2007). 
 
As it moves away from a unipolar structure the global system remains in what has been 
called a post-hegemonic condition . . . that is, a situation in which no single country can 
provide unilaterally the public goods required for the operation of the system itself. (Padoan 
2007: 38) 
 
The alternative term „hegemonic governance‟ on the other hand introduces the issue 
of hierarchy and power into the discussion on global governance. Krisch comes to a 
similar conclusion, discussing the USA as a „world government‟:  
 
Not only does the United States possess far superior power in the international system, it has 
also established a network of international and domestic institutions in support of the 
exercise of its power. This stabilizes its predominant position, and increasingly resembles the 
exercise of formal governmental functions: the United States, often assisted by its Western 
allies, legislates (through, for example, the Security Council, the OECD, or its domestic law 
in connection with the certification practice), performs executive functions (through the 
Security Council, unilateral sanctions or the unilateral use of force) and adjudicates (through 
its own courts as international courts). Moveover, like domestic governments, the United 
States is not bound by the same rules as most other States – it persistently refuses to subject 
itself to important international instruments, especially those involving enforcement 
mechanisms. It remains unbound, while its subjects face ever further-reaching constraints. 
(2003: 169) 
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And: 
 
Given the restrictions on the exercise of governmental functions by the United States, one 
might argue that, instead of talking of „government‟, one should speak of structures of 
„governance‟. In the international arena, such a shift in terminology seems even more 
warranted, given the absence of a formal government and the enduring complex and 
multicentered structure of world politics. (2003: 171)  
 
This is what this book has argued.  
 
Welch and Kennedy-Pipe argue for at least the possibility of world government: „A 
tendency towards unipolarity or hegemony in the international realm would seem to 
imply a move away from governance, towards government‟ (2005: 132), but come to 
the conclusion that there is a „contradictory nature of evidence‟. As one of the very 
few realist conceptions on global governance, Sterling-Volker argues, as this study 
does, for the hegemony thesis: „The content of GG [global governance] varies 
according to the interests and social practices of the powerful human groupings of 
the particular epoch‟; and: „Because any given system of GG will always be licensed 
and bounded by the social practices of the powerful, both its existence (noun) and 
practice (verb) are a form of embedded power‟ (2005: 23ff). Together, these studies 
seem to confirm the interpretation arrived at in this study. 
 
The importance of both rhetorical power – which is necessary for consensus – and 
the habitual use of cercion in hegemony are stressed by Goverde:  
 
Under hegemonic conditions power functions in three layers. The US dominates both the 
Atlantic community and the world order. In the Gramscian tradition hegemony reflects a 
spiritual and cultural supremacy of the ruling class, i.e., a world order in which power takes 
primarily a consensual form. This means „awareness by the elites in secondary states that 
they are benefiting, as well as on the willingness of the hegemon itself to sacrifice short-term 
benefits for intangible long-term gains‟ . . . This supremacy is manifested in unilateral and 
multilateral discourses. These discourses represent the US hegemonic and the European 
internationalist belief-systems of policy-makers and politicians in both political systems. As 
a hegemon, the US presumes the urgency in world politics to demonstrate its leadership by 
using its resources of episodic hard power. (2006: 128) 
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Joseph concurs with this: „Hegemony and ideology . . . the terms are virtually 
synonymous‟; however: „Hegemony is broader than just ideology in that it 
encompasses not just ideological processes, but the material forces that generate 
these ideologies. This includes a wide rage of social practices‟ (2002: 139). This also 
was observed to be the case in this study. 
 
„Hegemonic governance‟, as is stated at the outset, is a new term which brings 
together different literatures: critical and realist studies on hegemony, the literature 
on global governance and that on security studies. This is part of the novelty of this 
approach, and (to the knowledge of the auhor) these literatures have not so far been 
combined. What derives from this is a focus on power in, and a security-studies 
perspective on, global governance. Therefore, this book lays the groundwork for 
further research in a new direction. This book thereby also challenges traditional 
approaches to global governance, mainly derived from neo-institutionalism, which 
openly discount the importance of power in the system: 
 
Neorealist and power-based theories assert that hegemony is a necessary component for 
regime formation and cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalism counters this argument by 
stating that regime formation and maintenance can occur without a nation-state acting as a 
hegemon. Throughout his 1984 text, Keohane constantly refers to post-hegemonic 
cooperation . . . Clearly neoliberal thought does not necessitate the existence of a hegemon 
for cooperation to occur; cooperation, for the institutionalists, occurs as the result of shared 
interests among states and the ascertaining of absolute gains through regime formation. 
Although hegemony may assist in the formation process, hegemonic coercion does not play a 
primary role for neoliberalism. (Leonard 2005: 83) 
 
In opposition to this view, the argument presented here runs that power is clearly a 
factor for cooperation and compliance, hence participation, in global governance. 
The unipolar structure and the enactment of hegemony by the USA, therefore, cause 
participation in the GWOT. It is uncertain, and not established, if this cooperation 
could have been brought about without the USA acting as the hegemon, without it 
promoting global counterterrorism cooperation both rhetorically and using coercion. 
This study thus challenges neo-institutionalist accounts of cooperation in global 
governance, stating that power is a factual given in current global governance, and 
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cannot be easily discounted. As Welch and Kennedy-Pipe write, this is important 
because „much of the governance literature holds that the traditional or realist 
perspective on global politics has little resonance for the development of 
international affairs after 1970‟ (2005: 131). 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the notion of hegemony and the GWOT are of 
continued interest to the scholarly community. Several recent publications tackle the 
issue of hegemony: The first – Hegemony: A Realist Analyis (Joseph 2002) – 
analyses hegemony, in the Gramscian sense. The critical realism of Roy Bhaskar 
used to analyse the concept of hegemony in its more recent theoretical use, and the 
concept is examined in relation to classical Marxism, to the English debates and to 
Derrida. The second relevant study, Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion 
(Howson and Smith 2008), provides a biographical sketch of Gramsci and then 
focuses on single topics within Gramsci‟s writings, such as subalternity, language, 
subjectivity, imperialism and the historical block. Furthermore, there are numerous 
other studies emerging which deal with the GWOT (cf Peschek 2006, and many 
others). There seems in fact to be a renewal of interest in hegemony and the GWOT 
(for good reasons). None of these recent studies, however, succeeds in bridging the 
gap between either an empirical description of more recent developments in the 
GWOT, on the one hand, and on the other theoretical reflections – coming from 
either a global governance, or a critical-realist perspective, or both – on these 
undertakings. It is this deficit which this book has attempted to remedy. 
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Notes 
 
Chapter 1 
 
1
 Compare, for example, Zürn 2005; Messner and Nuscheler 2003; Miura 2004; McGrew 2000. McGrew 
defines heterarchy as a „system in which political authority is shared and divided between different layers of 
governance and in which many agencies share in the task of governance‟ (2000: 163). In other works on global 
governance, heterarchy is often implicitly assumed or at least not openly discussed. 
2
 Chapter 12 of Barnett and Duvall‟s book deals with colonial and post-colonial global governance, and 
therefore is relatively close to the approach used here; however, it differs from the present study in arguing 
normatively. Chapter 2 mentions the question of what is termed here „hegemonic governance‟ as marked by 
processes of „hegemonic imposition‟ and „coercive socialization‟ (Hurrell 2005: 52ff). 
3
 This is not necessarily so, and in the case of the GWOT depended more on the then prominent neo-
conservative ideology in the United States. It is, however, facilitated by hegemony. 
4
 This section has been published in a former version in Beyer 2008. 
5
 For a discussion of the evolution of Adler‟s ideas see Beyer 2005. 
6
 See, for example, Journal of Peace Research, 36:4, Special Issue on Trade and Conflict. Some authors take the 
opposite that trade-related disputes might induce wars.  
7
 Parts of this section have been published in a former version in Beyer 2008. 
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8
 According to Shaw (1998), Hobson‟s approach is essentially realist.  
9
 Even if it is regarded, by some, as more or less imperialist in its foreign policy behaviour (Beyer 2008: chs. 3–
4).  
10
 Since no serious balancing behaviour – which would indicate disagreement and opposition – can be discerned 
(ch. 7). 
11
 In its history, the USA has been strongly committed to the creation of international institutions, even if under 
George W. Bush it sought to withdraw from many of them. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
12
 Selected parts of an earlier version of this chapter have been published in Beyer 2009a. 
13
 In these publications the author promotes a highly critical understanding of current counterterrorism policies, 
but this does not mean they cannot serve as a useful example for studying participation. 
14
 Contingent realism differs in this regard. It argues that the primary interest of states is security. As 
cooperation results in higher security than does competition, cooperation is understood as being more likely 
(Glaser 1994). 
15
 Also to be mentioned in this context are the games of „stag hunt‟ and „chicken‟. Stag hunt describes a 
situation in which it is preferable to defect, if it can be assumed that not all the others in the group will 
cooperate. Chicken describes a situation in which it is preferable not to cooperate, if it can be assumed that the 
other cooperates. Both therefore resemble to a certain extent the prisoner‟s dilemma.  
16
 The reason for this is that each actor is trying to avoid being punished by the other in a „tit-for-tat‟ strategy 
(Axelrod 1984). 
17
 It it often thought to occur in hierarchical systems, though not only there (Young 1979: ch. 3). 
18
 The author uses „authority‟ in the following instead of „prestige‟. 
19
 Parts of this section have been published in a former version in Beyer 2008. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
20
 This chapter has been published as an earlier version in Beyer 2008a. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
21
 Not all European countries were included! 
22
 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Peace 
Enforcing) by UN Security Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1659 and 1707. 
23
 US dominance was here measured indirectly by asking for the relative power of the EU (ASEAN in ch. 5) 
compared to the USA. 
24
 A positive response is shown here if the dominance of the USA is stated. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
25
 Parts of this chapter have been published as a different version in Beyer 2007. 
26
 A positive response is shown here if the dominance of the USA is stated. 
27
 Gunaratna, all others in this column: Hock. 
 
Chapter 6 
 
28
 Selected parts of this chapter have been published in earlier versions in Beyer 2008. 
29
 In the year 2000, nearly half of all terrorist attacks were directed at the USA (Federation of American 
Scientists 2000). 
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30
 US counterterrorism policy before 2001 was based on three Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs): PDD-62 
addresses the WMD threat, PDD-63 the cyber threat, and PDD-67 continuity of operations and government 
contingency planning (Cressey 2000).  
31
 Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008, for example, speak of $3 trillion as a conservative estimate.  
32
 The judges association „Neue Richtervereinigung‟ argues that it was not, as the intervention was not based on 
a formal conclusion to apply military force according to Article 42 (Neue Richtervereinigung 2002). 
33
 See, for a discussion of the legal proceedings, World Press Review n.d.; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003; 
Arnswald 2003; Human Rights Constitutional 2003.  
34
 According to Executive Order 13224 of 23 September, 2001. 
35
 So, for example, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Sudan. 
36
 Other bodies participate in counterterrorism as well, such as for example the OECD, but are not discussed 
here further.  
 
Chapter 7 
 
37
 This section has been published in a former version in Beyer 2008. 
38
 It should not be forgotten that the USA exerted intensive power via military support, intervention and covert 
operations in South and Central America and in the Middle East during the Cold War. 
39
 Parts of this section have beed published in a former version in Beyer 2008, 2009. 
40
 Particularly microeconomics (Kenneth Waltz, interview with the author, 2007). 
41
 For a critical discussion of this issue, see Johnson and Regets 1998. 
42
 It should be noted that in the present global recession and concurrent financial crisis, the economic power of 
the USA has been discernibly weakened; however, it is also the case that all other major nations are similarly 
affected.  
43
 Such as revolutions, intra-state wars, coups, etc. Some authors would disagree with this, citing the Watergate 
affair, the 2000 presidential election or even 9/11, for example. Yet, as neither Watergate nor the 2000 „stolen 
election‟ led to a major political disturbance within the USA, it will not be regarded here as relevant for the 
argument.  
44
 Generally, security issues in global governance are under-theorised. For exceptions, see for example Pugh 
(2002) and Krahmann (2003). 
45
 However, it does have some police personnel in the mission. 
46
 Woods uses the term „influence‟ (Woods 2003: 102), but according to the definition given above, what is at 
stake in the cases she cites is coercion, since threats are involved.  
47
 At least, in the short term. However, development aid, for example, is arguably a long-term tool for peaceful 
change. 
48
 It is also the most destructive form of power. It might, therefore, be argued that „soft power‟ is much more 
powerful (in a different way), but implies less control. 
49
 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), Gowa (1986). Frequently, Kindleberger is cited as arguing in this way. He 
himself, however, disclaims any preference for hegemony: „a word that makes me uncomfortable because of its 
overtones of force, threat, pressure. I think it is possible to lead without armtwisting‟ (1986: 841). 
50
 Pape argues that since 1990 no effective balancing with the USA has taken place; however, states increasingly 
engage in „soft balancing‟ (2005). 
